People v. Donald

Decision Date26 November 1963
Docket NumberNo. 36628,36628
Citation194 N.E.2d 227,29 Ill.2d 283
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error. v. George DONALD, Plaintiff in Error.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

J. Stephen Crawford, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O'Brien, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Elmer C. Kissane and John J. O'Toole, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for defendant in error.

DAILY, Justice.

At a jury trial in the criminal court of Cook County, the defendant, George Donald, was convicted of robbing John Neeley and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less then 10 nor more than 15 years. In prosecuting this writ of error, defendant contends that: (1) he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the trial court erred in refusing to give an instruction tendered by defendant, and (3) the closing argument of the prosecuting attorney was misleading, prejudicial, and not based on the evidence.

John Neeley, the complaining witness, testified that as he was walking north on the west side of South Giles Avenue near his residence, at about 9:45 P.M. on the night of May 21, 1960, defendant approached him from the opposite direction and asked for a light for his cigarette. Neeley said he withdrew a lighter from his pocket and lit defendant's cigarette, but as he started to return the lighter to his pocket, defendant stated that he needed another light, whereupon the witness proceeded to light the cigarette a second time. As he did so, however, someone from behind placed a knife at his throat and announced that it was a robbery. Defendant then took a watch and some loose change from Neeley's person while the accomplice took the victim's currency. Following this, according to Neeley, defendant struck him in the mouth knocking out several teeth and then ran northeasterly across South Giles Avenue and under a street light some 100 feet away. In all, Neeley estimated that the encounter will the defendant took about five minutes, and after its occurrence he returned home, called the police, and reported the crime. On May 30, 1960, defendant was arrested and on the following day Neeley identified him from a police line-up as the assailant.

Testifying in his own behalf, defendant related that for three or four days prior to May 21, 1960, he had been living with Robert Gray, James Gray, and Robert Overton at 3600 South Wabash Avenue and that during the evening of the crime, he had never left the Wabash Avenue address but had spent the entire time talking with the other occupants and a friend of theirs whose name he did not recall. Although Neeley denied previsouly knowing the defendant, the latter stated that he had lived near the Neeley residence from 1933 to 1937 and knew Neeley by sight.

Robert Gray testified that he had been released from jail as a bobbery suspect on May 21, 1960, and that he had spent the remainder of the day with defendant at the Wabash Avenue apartment, where defendant had been staying since May 14. The witness stated that defendant did not leave the apartment between 9 P.M. and 11 P.M. on the night in question, but he was not sure if James Gray was also there during this time. Although Overton was present at the apartment, Gray said his physical condition was such that he could not appear in court.

Defendant contends there was not ample opportunity for Neeley to identify his assailant, and that this fact, together with the uncontroverted alibi evidence, creates a reasonable doubt of guilt. In weighing evidence of identification, the attendant circumstances, along with the probability or improbability of an adequate opportunity for a definite identification, must be considered. (People v. Gold, 361 Ill. 23, ...

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