People v. Donelson

• Decision Date: 10 February 1977
• Docket Number: No. 13738,13738
• Citation: People v. Donelson, 359 N.E.2d 1225, 45 Ill.App.3d 609, 4 Ill.Dec. 273 (Ill. App. 1977)
• Parties: , 4 Ill.Dec. 273 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jim DONELSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1225

359 N.E.2d 1225

45 Ill.App.3d 609, 4 Ill.Dec. 273

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Jim DONELSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13738.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Feb. 10, 1977.

Gerald B. Cohn, Bethalto, for defendant-appellant.

Norbert J. Goetten, State's Atty., Greene County, Carrollton, G. Michael Prall, Principal Atty., Ill. State's Attys.Assn., Statewide Appellate Assistance Service, Springfield, Marc D. Towler, Staff Atty., Springfield, for plaintiff-appellee.

GREEN, Justice.

DefendantJim Donelson was charged in the Circuit Court of Greene County with the offenses of misdemeanor theft, obstructing justice and concealing a fugitive.A jury found him guilty of concealing a fugitive and acquitted him of the other charges.The court sentenced him to 2 years probation with conditions that he spend 52 consecutive weekends in the county jail and pay a fine of $500 plus costs within the first year of probation.Defendant appeals.

The concealing a fugitive charge alleged that defendant violated section 31--5 of the Criminal Code(Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 31--5) on or about June 2, 1975 in that he, 'with the intent to prevent the apprehension of Robert Devault, who he knew committed the offense of burglary, concealed his knowledge that the offense of burglary had been committed by Robert Devault.'Various errors are cited by defendant.We need consider only his contention that it was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he concealed knowledge that Devault had committed a burglary.

At the heart of the dispute in this case is the meaning of the word 'conceals' in section 31--5.That section states:

'Every person not standing in the relation of husband, wife, parent, child, brother or sister to the offender, who, with intent to prevent the apprehension of the offender, conceals his knowledge that an offense has been committed or harbors, aids or conceals the offender, commits a Class 4 felony.'

At most the evidence only showed that defendant(1) was told by Devault that he had burgled a physician's office, (2) received some pills from Devault taken in the burglary and (3) drove Devault to a nearby town to help him dispose of some other fruits of the burglary.No evidence was introduced that defendant had lied to anyone about the burglary or even refused to answer any questions about it.All that was shown was that defendant took no affirmative act to come forward with information about the burglary.

No Illinois cases are directly in point as to what is meant by the word 'conceals' in section 31--5.The State contends that a mere silence would constitute concealment and that the statute is violated when a person with the required knowledge and intent fails to inform law enforcement officers about the offense.It argues that we should be guided in our interpretation by the definition of conceal in Black's Law Dictionary (Rev.4th Ed. 1968), which includes the definitions 'withhold from the knowledge of others' and 'withhold from utterance or declaration,' and in Webster's Third New International Unabridged Dictionary (1961), which includes the definitions 'withhold knowledge of' and 'treat as to be unnoticed.'By the interpretation the State suggests, the evidence here could be deemed sufficient for the jury to have found that defendant concealed knowledge of the offense.We believe, however, that the history of section 31--5, analogy to interpretation of similar statutes, and common sense all support a definition of the word 'conceals' that requires more than a failure to come forward with information.

The comments of the committee that drafted the Criminal Code state that section 31--5 is the same as the old accessory after the fact statute found in Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, ch. 38, par. 584.Although dictum in Yoe v. People(1868), 49 Ill. 410, suggested that a failure to inform authorities of a crime would make a person with the required knowledge and intent an accessory after the fact, we find no indication that such a rule was ever actually applied in Illinois under the common law or accessory after the fact statutes.We believe a more accurate statement of the law to be that of American Jurisprudence 2d which states, 'Mere failure to reveal knowledge that a person had committed a felony did not make one an accessory after the fact at common law, but the rule may be made otherwise by statute'(21 Am.Jur.2dCriminal Law, sec. 125(1965)).Neither the Illinois accessory after the fact statute in force at the adoption of the Criminal Code(Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, ch. 38, par. 584) nor any of its predecessors have been called to our attention as stating that mere failure to come forward with knowledge was an offense.It seems more likely that the legislature in enacting the more recent statutes intended to follow the common law rather than the dictum of Yoe.

In People v....