People v. O'Donnell, 63813

• Decision Date: 22 May 1987
• Docket Number: No. 63813,63813
• Citation: People v. O'Donnell, 508 N.E.2d 1066, 116 Ill.2d 517, 108 Ill.Dec. 489 (Ill. 1987)
• Parties: , 108 Ill.Dec. 489 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois v. Dolores O'DONNELL, Appellee (Jim Edgar, Secretary of State, Appellant).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1066

508 N.E.2d 1066

116 Ill.2d 517, 108 Ill.Dec. 489

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois v. Dolores O'DONNELL, Appellee (Jim Edgar, Secretary of State Appellant).

No. 63813.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 22, 1987.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., State of Illinois, Roma Jones Stewart, Sol. Gen., Chicago, for intervenor-appellant; Patricia Rosen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel.

Justice RYAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The Secretary of State brings this appeal from a decision of the circuit court of Adams County. Because the court declared unconstitutional certain provisions of Illinois' drivers' license summary suspension and reinstatement procedure, the appeal lies directly to this court pursuant to our Rule 302(a). 94 Ill.2d R. 302(a).

On January 8, 1986, the defendant, Dolores O'Donnell, was issued a ticket for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.1). Chemical tests disclosed an alcohol concentration in excess of 0.10, so her driver's license was suspended for a period of three months, effective February 23, 1986. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-208.1(a)(2).

On May 8, 1986, the defendant filed a petition for restoration of her driving privileges. The statutory provision governing the restoration procedure provides in pertinent part:

"(b) Following a statutory summary suspension of the privilege to drive a motor vehicle under Section 11-501.1, the circuit court of venue shall restore full driving privileges when all appropriate fees are paid unless the court has evidence that the person should be disqualified, in which event the court shall notify the Secretary of State.

(c) Full driving privileges may not be restored until all applicable reinstatement fees, as provided by this Code, have been paid to the circuit court and forwarded to the Secretary of State." (Emphasis added.) Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 6-208.1(b), (c).

On May 8, 1986, the circuit court entered an order in response to the defendant's petition, in which it held that sections 6-208.1(b) and (c) were unconstitutional. With respect to the former, the court found that the phrase directing the court to restore driving privileges "unless the court has evidence that the person should be disqualified" was unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, the court noted that the provision was "completely devoid of any procedure or guidelines to be followed" in making the determination whether an individual's privileges should be restored.

The court also held that the procedure established by section 6-208.1(c), whereby the circuit court is directed to collect reinstatement fees on behalf of the Secretary of State, violated the separation of powers doctrine. As a consequence, the court ordered the clerk of the circuit court not to accept any such fees.

Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the circuit court's order. Also, the Secretary of State sought leave to intervene and requested a stay of the circuit court's decision. On June 11, 1986, the court denied the motion for reconsideration, granted the Secretary leave to intervene and denied the motion to stay. As above noted, the Secretary appealed directly to this court pursuant to Rule 302(a) (94 Ill.2d R. 302(a)). The defendant has not filed a brief in this court.

This court has previously set forth some general principles in reviewing the constitutionality of statutes. All statutes are presumed to be constitutional (People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill.2d 182, 188, 91 Ill.Dec. 171, 483 N.E.2d 517; Sayles v. Thompson (1983), 99 Ill.2d 122, 124-25, 75 Ill.Dec. 446, 457 N.E.2d 440) and the party challenging a statute has the burden of clearly establishing a constitutional violation (People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill.2d 182, 188, 91 Ill.Dec. 171, 483 N.E.2d 517; Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius (1979), 77 Ill.2d 287, 303, 32 Ill.Dec. 872, 395 N.E.2d 1376). We have repeatedly emphasized that it is our duty to construe acts of the legislature so as to affirm their constitutionality and validity, if it can reasonably be done, and further, if their construction is doubtful, the doubt will be resolved in favor of the validity of the law challenged. People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill.2d 182, 188, 91 Ill.Dec. 171, 483 N.E.2d 517; Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Com. (1969), 42 Ill.2d 385, 389, 251 N.E.2d 253.

Where, as here, a due process-vagueness challenge is raised and the first amendment is not involved, two requirements must be fulfilled. First, the statute must give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is lawful or unlawful. Second, the statute must provide standards, so as to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and application by police officers, judges and juries. Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28; People v. Bales (1985), 108 Ill.2d 182, 188, 91 Ill.Dec. 171, 483 N.E.2d 517.

The latter of these requirements is at issue in this case. In striking down section 6-208.1(b), the circuit court noted that the language of the statute instructing the court "to restore full driving privileges * * * unless the court has evidence that the person should be disqualified" was "completely devoid of any procedure or guidelines to be followed." The court also observed that section 6-208.1(b) does not enumerate the grounds for such disqualification, does not reveal what evidence may be considered and does not indicate who, if anyone, is to present such evidence.

It may be true that section 6-208.1(b), standing alone, does not provide explicit answers to these questions. That fact, however, does not necessarily create a constitutional infirmity. Such an objection ignores the fundamental principle that in construing statutes, the judicial role is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to give it effect. (City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill.2d 336, 340-41, 85 Ill.Dec. 508, 473 N.E.2d 1313.) In seeking to determine legislative intent, a court should not read a particular provision in isolation, but rather must construe each provision in light of the statute as a whole. (Winks v. Board of Education (1979), 78 Ill.2d 128, 135, 34 Ill.Dec. 832, 398 N.E.2d 823.) A review of section 6-208.1(b) in the context of the entire driver's licensing law (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-101 et seq.) leads us to conclude that the challenged provision is clear enough to permit uniform enforcement and is therefore constitutional.

Section 6-208.1(b) provides that following a period of statutory summary suspension, the circuit court "shall restore full driving privileges * * * unless the court has evidence that the person should be disqualified, in which event the court shall notify the Secretary of State." We note that the statute uses the term "suspension," as opposed to "revocation." "Suspension" is defined as "[t]he temporary withdrawal by formal action of the Secretary of a person's license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, for a period specifically designated by the Secretary." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-204.) After a period of suspension, an individual's temporarily inoperative driving privilege may be reinstated. "Revocation," on the other hand, is the formal termination of a person's license, and requires the application for and procurement of a new license before one can lawfully operate a motor vehicle. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-176; People v. Suddoth (1964), 52 Ill.App.2d 355, 359, 202 N.E.2d 120.) We also note that section 6-208.1(b) further provides that when the suspension period has expired, the court "shall restore" driving privileges, absent evidence of grounds for disqualification. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 6-208.1(b).

Based upon the use of the terms "suspension" and the mandatory "shall," we conclude that in the typical situation reinstatement will be automatic upon application. In our view, the procedure does not contemplate any exercise of discretion on the part of the court on whether to reinstate or any ex parte inquiry into an individual's fitness for reinstatement.

If "evidence that the person should be disqualified" is to come before the court, we interpret the statute to require that such evidence be presented by the State's Attorney who, by section 16-102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 16-102), is required to prosecute violations of the Code. Also, we conclude that such representation falls within the general duties of the State's Attorney set out in section 5 of "An Act in regard to attorneys general and state's attorneys" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 14, par. 5). If no evidence of grounds for disqualification is presented, the statute requires that driving privileges shall be reinstated. It appears that a procedure has been developed whereby the Secretary provides notice to the local State's Attorney regarding upcoming reinstatement applications. The State's Attorney may then appear and present any evidence he may have in opposition to the application.

If the State's Attorney presents evidence in opposition to the application for reinstatement, the inquiry then becomes, What evidence will show that "the person should be disqualified?" As the trial court noted, section 6-208.1(b), which contains this language, does not explicitly state the grounds upon which an individual "should be disqualified." This ambiguity, however, is resolved by reference to other provisions of the statute.

Sections 6-205 and 6-206 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, pars. 6-205, 6-206) enumerate the grounds for which the Secretary is given authority to suspend or revoke driving privileges. Thus, at the hearing on the reinstatement application, if the evidence presented shows that one of the grounds for...