People v. Donohoo
| Decision Date | 21 October 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-443,75-443 |
| Citation | 12 Ill.Dec. 49,54 Ill.App.3d 375,369 N.E.2d 546 |
| Parties | , 12 Ill.Dec. 49 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard R. DONOHOO, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
L. Thomas Lakin, East Alton, for defendant-appellant.
Nicholas G. Byron, State's Atty., Edwardsville; Bruce D. Irish, Principal Atty., Martin N. Ashley, Staff Atty., Ill. State's Attys. Assn., Prosecutors' Appellate Service, Mount Vernon, of counsel, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant, Richard Donohoo, was charged in the Circuit Court of Madison County with operating a motor vehicle at a speed of 70 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour speed zone as determined by a device known as a speed gun. The trial court found the defendant guilty and set his fine at $15 plus court costs.
At trial, the defendant maintained that the State had the burden of demonstrating that a speed gun was in fact a radar device and that it was an accurate means of recording speeds of moving objects. The State had this burden, the defendant argued, because no Illinois court had yet judicially noticed the usefulness and accuracy of speed guns. The State presented evidence of the reliability and accuracy of speed guns through the testimony of Otis Baker, communications supervisor for the Illinois State Police. In comparing the speed gun to the more common radar speed meter, Baker testified that both types of speed measuring devices employed the Doppler effect, 1 the scientific principle underlying the operation of radar devices. Baker stated that both types of speed measuring devices have the same radar projection units and that the handheld speed gun differed only in the respect that the measured speed is indicated as a digital readout on the device, whereas the conventional radar unit indicates the measured speed on a meter or on a graph on the radar installation in the police car. Baker further testified that as with the conventional radar meter, the accuracy of a speed gun is tested by the use of a calibrated tuning fork, certified to be correct every six months by laboratory equipment in Springfield.
The arresting officer, Trooper File, also appeared for the State and testified that a tuning fork test he had conducted shortly before he ticketed the defendant showed the speed gun to be accurate and in proper working order. Trooper File's experience with the operation of the speed gun consisted of personal instruction by a police supervisor in the operation of the unit, his reading the device's operating manual and several months use of the speed gun. File testified that when he aimed the speed gun at the defendant's automobile it registered a speed of 70 m. p. h. and that he subsequently stopped and ticketed the defendant.
Defendant maintains on this appeal that the trial court erred in both allowing Otis Baker's testimony regarding the operation and accuracy of the speed gun where it was not established that he was properly qualified to do so, and in finding that the speed gun was, in fact, the same as radar. Defendant also contends that it was not sufficiently established that the arresting officer was capable and qualified in the operation of the speed gun.
At present, there are no reported cases in this state involving the use of speed guns. It is well settled, however, that the accuracy and reliability of the Doppler principle employed by radar speed meters is judicially noticeable subject to necessary proof of the accuracy and proper operation of the particular radar device under consideration (People v. Cash, 103 Ill.App.2d 20, 242 N.E.2d 765 (5th Dist. 1968); People v. Abdallah, 82 Ill.App.2d 312, 226 N.E.2d 408 (1st Dist. 1967).)
The reliability of the Doppler principle is not questioned by the defendant nor does he dispute the fact that a speed gun employs this principle; instead he contends that expert testimony is necessary to support the scientific accuracy of a speed gun in a case of first impression. The defendant urges that just as the scientific facts and principles underlying the operation of VASCAR have required proof in case of first impression (State v. Schmiede, 118 N.J.Super. 576, 289 A.2d 281 (1972)), so should the speed gun's reliability as a speed measuring device be initially proved by expert testimony.
We do not agree with the defendant that comparable proof should be required in the instant case. Unlike the speed gun, VASCAR does not employ the Doppler principle nor is it a radar device; it...
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