People v. Doran, Docket No. 44186

• Decision Date: 22 October 1980
• Docket Number: Docket No. 44186
• Citation: 100 Mich.App. 795,300 N.W.2d 415
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Thomas DORAN, Defendant-Appellant. 100 Mich.App. 795, 300 N.W.2d 415
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 415

300 N.W.2d 415

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Thomas DORAN, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 44186.

100 Mich.App. 795, 300 N.W.2d 415

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Oct. 22, 1980.

Released for Publication Jan. 29, 1981.

[100 MICHAPP 796] Edward Schwartz, Ann Arbor, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William F. Delhey, Pros. Atty., John W. Stanowski, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before DANHOF, C. J., and KELLY and CORSIGLIA, ^* JJ.

[100 MICHAPP 797] KELLY, Judge.

Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling with intent to commit a larceny contrary to M.C.L. § 750.110; M.S.A. § 28.305. On January 11, 1979, defendant was sentenced to a term of 9 to 15 years imprisonment. On the date set for sentencing, the prosecution filed a supplemental information charging that defendant had been convicted of five prior felonies, M.C.L. § 769.12; M.S.A. § 28.1084. On January 18, 1979, pursuant to a plea and sentence bargain, defendant pled guilty to the habitual offender charge. The trial court vacated its original sentence and ordered defendant imprisoned for 9 to 15 years on the recidivist conviction. Defendant appeals as of right.

Addressing the issues raised by defendant in reverse order, we first consider whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant's conviction of the charged offense. It is defendant's position that, absent any proof of a breaking, the greatest offense properly chargeable was possession of stolen property. Our review of the record convinces us that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

Chris Thompson, a resident of the victimized fraternity house, testified that when he and a friend arrived at the house at 12:45 a. m., he noticed nothing unusual. Upon departure, approximately 45 minutes later (1:30 a. m.), he observed that both the front door and the side entrance french doors were open. Mr. Thompson closed the front door, left the house and returned at 1:45 a. m. at which time he closed the french doors.

Jane Schaeffer and Melanie Bennett testified that four sorority sisters, themselves included, gained entry to the house for the purpose of stealing[100 MICHAPP 798] the fraternity composite picture. They found the front door locked and the french doors closed, but were able to gain entrance by pushing them open. Betsy Greenway testified that after the picture was removed she closed the french doors to the point that they were "barely touching" and that she could not recall any wind of sufficient force to blow them open. Their arrival and departure occurred some time between 1:10 a. m. and 1:25 a. m.

A police surveillance team observed defendant in the parking lot behind the Lambda Chi House at approximately 1:25 a. m. and he was thereafter seen placing certain objects, later identified as a television and stereo, in his car. When police stopped the vehicle shortly thereafter, the stolen items were discovered in the back seat.

Thus, the evidence supports the conclusion that when defendant approached the house the front door was locked and the french doors closed to such a degree that some force upon the doors, sufficient to support the breaking element of the offense, was necessary to gain entry. See People v. Hill, 36 Mich.App. 679, 193 N.W.2d 909 (1971), and People v. White, 153 Mich. 617, 117 N.W. 161 (1908).

The substantive question remaining then, is whether the prosecution was required to negate every reasonable hypothesis consistent with defendant's innocence since the evidence presented as to invading the house was entirely circumstantial. There is currently a split of authority on this issue. Compare People v. Edgar, 75 Mich.App. 467, 469-474, 255 N.W.2d 648 (1977), and People v. Davenport, 39 Mich.App. 252, 255-258, 197 N.W.2d 521 (1972). The most recent analysis, found in People v. Williams, 94 Mich.App. 406, 288 N.W.2d 638 (1979), synthesizes the superficially contradictory views [100 MICHAPP 799] and the result that emerges represents a logical, reasonable standard:

"If inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence are so compelling that the trier of fact has no reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, that should be sufficient basis for a guilty verdict. If circumstantial evidence does not give rise to inferences of such a compelling nature as to overcome the reasonable doubt standard, then a guilty verdict could not be justified, not because the evidence was circumstantial or because of basing inferences on inferences, but rather, because of the prosecution's failure to meet its burden of proof. If so, it would seem to follow that if the evidence persuaded the trier of fact of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt the prosecution's failure to specifically disprove an innocent hypothesis advanced by defendant would not result in the setting aside of a guilty verdict. It should be recognized that there can be...