People v. Dorsey
| Decision Date | 14 June 1984 |
| Citation | 477 N.Y.S.2d 747,102 A.D.2d 123 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. James B. DORSEY, Jr., Respondent. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
David A. Wait, Dist. Atty., Ballston Spa (Thomas J. McNamara, Ballston Spa, of counsel), for appellant.
McMahon & McMahon, Saratoga Springs (John L. McMahon, Saratoga Springs, of counsel), for respondent.
Before MAHONEY, P.J., and WEISS, MIKOLL, YESAWICH and LEVINE, JJ.
During the early morning hours of March 5, 1983, local police found Leonard Younes lying eight feet off the east side of Kaydeross Park Road in the City of Saratoga Springs. Younes was apparently seriously injured and barely conscious. He was taken to the emergency room of Saratoga Hospital where he was diagnosed as having incurred a fractured skull with extensive brain damage and two fractured legs. He was transferred to Ellis Hospital in Schenectady where he subsequently expired. The police concluded that Younes had been the victim of a hit-and-run driver. From their investigation, the police believed that Younes had been walking with the traffic in a northerly direction at about 3:00 A.M. when he was struck by a red or yellow-colored car. This information was given to the news media and defendant heard a radio broadcast to that effect during the afternoon of the same day. Because he had been driving his sister's red Pontiac in the vicinity of the accident at around the time it reportedly took place and had noticed a fresh dent in the hood of the car, defendant discussed the subject with his father, who then notified the Saratoga police of the possibility that his son had been involved. The police came to defendant's residence, obtained a written statement from him and then took samples of paint from the subject automobile which they sent to the FBI laboratory in Washington, D.C., along with the victim's clothing, for testing. Defendant was subsequently arrested and indicted for leaving the scene of an accident as a felony (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 600, subd. 2). County Court permitted inspection of the Grand Jury minutes and then granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, without leave to resubmit, on the ground that the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was legally insufficient. This appeal by the People followed.
We reverse. The Grand Jury was given defendant's statement in which he admitted driving over the road where the victim was found after leaving a local nightclub within the pertinent time frame. Defendant was unable to explain how the hood of the car he was driving became dented that night, although he acknowledged that he had struck something along the accident route without stopping to investigate further. The rear of his vehicle had also come in contact with a fencepost, leaving paint fragments, when he had earlier skidded while exiting the nightclub. The Grand Jury also heard testimony from FBI Agent James Corby, the prosecution's expert, as to his scientifically testing and comparing known samples of paint from the suspect vehicle with particles of paint found on the victim's jacket, slacks and shirt. The known samples from the vehicle contained nine strata, consisting generally of alternating layers of red metallic paint and grey or black primer. A particle recovered from the victim's jacket contained eight layers of paint similar in color, composition and other properties to the top eight layers of the known sample from the vehicle. Particles from the victim's shirt and slacks similarly matched several layers of the paint chips taken by the police from the vehicle. None of the particles contained properties inconsistent with the control specimens. Based upon the foregoing findings, Agent Corby concluded that the particles of paint he had examined had become embedded on the victim's clothing as a result of contact with the vehicle defendant had driven that night.
At the request of defendant's attorney, exculpatory evidence was also presented to the Grand Jury. It consisted of the testimony of defense expert Vincent Colangelo and transcripts of the testimony of Agent Corby and of a local auto repairman at the preliminary hearing conducted following defendant's arrest. Colangelo had performed similar tests on chips of paint he extracted from various areas of the suspect vehicle. He did not dispute Agent Corby's procedures or test results, but disagreed with Corby's conclusions based upon Corby's inability to match paint smears on the victim's trousers with the known specimens and upon the paucity of matching specimens from the victim's clothing. The repairman testified at the preliminary hearing that in October, 1982, he entirely repainted the suspect vehicle, applying one coat of primer and three coats of red enamel paint. The portion of Agent Corby's testimony at the preliminary hearing stressed by defendant was where he was asked to assume that the vehicle had recently been totally repainted with three coats of red paint and was then asked whether his opinion linking defendant's vehicle to the accident would remain the same, to which he answered no.
In ruling that the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally insufficient, County Court applied the standard of proof required in circumstantial evidence cases, namely, that the evidence "must logically point to defendant's guilt and must exclude to a moral certainty every reasonable hypothesis of innocence" (citing People v. Miller, 54 A.D.2d 742, 387 N.Y.S.2d 655). Although we have no quarrel with the application of that principle to indictments based solely on circumstantial evidence, we have concluded that the standard was misapplied here in that County Court ignored equally applicable principles governing the quality of proof necessary in general to sustain an indictment and not permitting consideration of exculpatory evidence or the weighing of evidence on a motion to dismiss.
Defendant's motion could only be granted if the evidence before the Grand Jury was legally insufficient to establish the...
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