People v. Dow

• Decision Date: 14 December 1908
• Parties: PEOPLE v. DOW.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

155 Mich. 115
118 N.W. 745

PEOPLE
v.
DOW.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 14, 1908.

Error to Recorder's Court of Detroit; William F. Connolly, Judge.

Alex Dow was convicted of driving a motor car at a rate of speed exceeding eight miles an hour, and brings error. Affirmed.

Respondent was convicted upon the charge that he drove a motor car upon Woodward avenue, in the business portion of the city of Detroit, at a rate of speed exceeding eight miles an hour, contrary to the provisions of Act No. 196, p. 287, Pub. Acts 1905. The particular section of the act violated is section 12, and it reads: Sec. 12. No person shall operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper having regard to the traffic and use of the highway, or so as to endanger the life or limb of any person, or the safety of any property; and shall not in any event while upon any highway run at a higher rate of speed than twenty-five miles an hour, and within the corporate limits of all cities and villages the rate of speed shall not be greater than eight miles an hour in the business portion of any such city or village, and not greater than fifteen miles an hour in all other portions thereof, subject, however, to the other provisions of this act.' It is admitted that Woodward avenue, between Milwaukee and Baltimore avenues, the point at which respondent was driving his car, is, in fact, a business district. Between this point and the main business portion of the city the distance is about two miles, in which distance are districts usually denominated residence districts, and districts devoted more or less to business. In section 1 of the act the term ‘business portion of any city or village’ is defined as ‘the territory of a city or incorporated village continuous to a public highway which is at that point either wholly or partially built up with structures devoted to business.’ The questions presented, as stated in the brief for respondent, are: ‘(1) The proper construction of the provisions of Act No. 196 of the Public Acts of 1905, in so far as it undertakes to prescribe speed limits, and to define what is the ‘business portion’ of a city within which the rate of speed shall not be greater than eight miles an hour, and what constitutes ‘other portions,’ in which the rate shall not be greater than fifteen miles an hour; and (2) if such provisions of the act are not capable of a definite construction, whether they are valid. Respondent claims...