People v. Doyle
| Decision Date | 12 July 1870 |
| Citation | 21 Mich. 221 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | The People v. Virginia Doyle |
Heard July 7, 1870 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]
Exceptions certified from the recorder's court of the city of Detroit.
Virginia Doyle was charged on the information before the recorder's court of the city of Detroit, with the offense of mingling poison (arsenic) with port wine, on the 23d day of February, A. D. 1870, with intent to kill one Catherine DeBaptiste. She was convicted, and a bill of exceptions settled and certified to this court, under the statute.
Upon the trial, one George Taliaffero was called as a witness, and he having given evidence tending to show that on the 23d day of February, A. D. 1870, the defendant had mingled poison with some wine which his grandmother, Mrs. Catherine DeBaptiste, drank, and that said grandmother was ill after drinking said wine, was asked by counsel for the people whether his grandmother was ill, a few days previous to the 23d, from eating mush. To this question the defendant's counsel objected on the ground that the prosecution could not prove any other offense different from that alleged in the information, or any previous acts, whereupon the question was withdrawn.
Upon cross-examination by the counsel for the prisoner, he testified that he did not know that his father left him any property. Upon further cross-examination, in response to a direct question, he testified that he was the only surviving child of the prisoner, that he had lived with his said grandmother nearly all his life, that his father (the first husband of the prisoner) was dead, and left a lot on Beaubien street, which went to him after his mother's death, and another lot which went to his mother (the prisoner) after his grandmother's death, and then, after his mother's death, to him, and that his said grandmother had been ill since the Friday night before the said 23d day of February, and that his said grandmother had, upon said previous Friday night, eaten of some mush which he thought was poisoned, and had also partaken of some beef tea and gruel, prepared by the boys, and was ill after eating of each of said articles, administered at two different times before said 23d.
He was then re-examined by the counsel for the people, and asked this question: "Who made the mush your grandmother ate that Friday night?" To which question counsel for the prisoner objected as immaterial and irrelevant to the issue, and as tending to prove another and distinct offense. The court overruled the objection, and admitted the evidence. To which ruling counsel for the prisoner excepted. The witness then answered: "My mother made it."
Counsel for the people then called Mrs. Catherine De Baptiste, who, having given evidence tending to show that the prisoner's conduct to her upon the night of the 23d, after she took the alleged poisoned wine, was strange, and her treatment of her unaccountable, was cross-examined relative to her feelings towards the prisoner, and then, upon re-examination, was asked by counsel for the people this question: "What was the treatment of the boys (Ellis and George) to you during this time?" To which question counsel for the prisoner objected as immaterial and incompetent. The court overruled the objection, and admitted the question. To which ruling, counsel for prisoner excepted. The witness then answered "They were as kind as they could be."
Exceptions overruled, and Judgment awarded upon the verdict.
H. M. & W. E. Cheever, for defendant:
I. The general rule, that the evidence should be confined to the issue, should be enforced strictly in a criminal case: 1 Bishop on Crim. Pro., § 490; U. S. v. Mitchell, 2 Dall 348; 1 Phil. Ev., 178; Barton v. State, 18 Ohio 221; Rex v. Butler, 2 C. and K., 221; Farrer v. State, 2 Ohio St., 54; People v. Lightfoot, 16 Mich. 511
The consequence of placing before the jury facts tending to prove another offense is to raise a presumption of guilt as to the offense for which the prisoner is on trial, and secure a conviction by irrelevant testimony: Foster, 245; 3 Minn. 262. See also, Birdeye's Case, 4 C. and P., 386.
This case can hardly come under that exception to this general rule, which admits evidence of other transactions, which, by reason of the time of their commission, are a part of the offense charged. There was no such connection between the two offenses (if the first was an offense) that proving the one tended legally to prove the other. It might tend to show moral turpitude in the prisoner, but it was not legal evidence. Its effect was necessarily to prejudice the mind of the jury.
II. The kindness of other parties to the person whose life the prisoner was charged with attempting to take, was entirely irrelevant to the issue. Its only tendency was, by contrast, to prejudice the jury against her. If it had such a tendency it ought to have been excluded.
Dwight May, Attorney-General, for the people:
I. There was no error in permitting the question, "Who made the mush your grandmother ate that Friday night?" to be answered. The object of the cross-examination is apparent. It was to raise a presumption that "the boys" poisoned the mush, and not the defendant; and it was certainly competent to show by the same witness that the defendant prepared the mush.
It appears, from the record, that this subject was called out on cross-examination, and the people had the right to repel, by the witness, any presumption arising from such examination, that other parties administered the poison.
II. Intimately connected with the last exception, is the second and only other error alleged. It seems to have been a part of the defense to attempt to show that the boys (Ellis and George) had something to do with the poisoning of Mrs DeBaptiste, and to rebut any such presumption she was asked, "What was the treatment of the boys (Ellis and George) to you during this time?" This was clearly competent. It grew directly out of the defense, and the answer of the witness that "They were as kind as they could be,"...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. McCrea
...100 N.W. 264;People v. Wilson, 55 Mich. 506, 21 N.W. 905;People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228, 15 N.W. 95;People v. Marble, 38 Mich. 117;People v. Doyle, 21 Mich. 221. In summary we conclude that there was no reversible error in admitting the above-discussed testimony relating to Block, Watson, Rya......
-
City of St. Louis v. Worthington
...admission to prove such unauthorized fact can be justified on the ground of its aptness to prove another fact legally provable." [People v. Doyle, 21 Mich. 221.] often happens that testimony which is "inadmissible for one purpose is admissible for other purposes" and when such testimony "is......
-
St. Louis v. Worthington
...admission to prove such unauthorized fact can be justified on the ground of its aptness to prove another fact legally provable." [People v. Doyle, 21 Mich. 221.] It often happens that testimony which is "inadmissible for one purpose is admissible for other purposes" and when such testimony ......
-
People v. Bailey
...whole or in part depend on the introduction of other competent evidence. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed), § 28, p. 410. See, also, People v. Doyle (1870), 21 Mich. 221, and People v. Lewis (1933), 264 Mich. 83, 249 N.W. The jury performs the function of assigning persuasive values to relevant e......