People v. Drymalski
| Citation | 175 N.E.2d 553,22 Ill.2d 347 |
| Decision Date | 14 June 1961 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 36400-36403,s. 36400-36403 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Raymond P. DRYMALSKI, Plaintiff in Error. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Harry J. Busch and Jacob Shamberg, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
Daniel P. Ward, State's Attorney, Chicago (John T. Gallagher and James R. Thompson, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel), for defendant in error.
This writ of error, sued out to review a judgment of the Appellate Court for the First District, presents problems of criminal procedure related to those considered in People v. Ferguson, 20 Ill.2d 295, 170 N.E.2d 171, and likewise involves the proper application of the principles concerning pleas in bar that were laid down in the Ferguson case.
By three separate indictments returned to the criminal court of Cook County, the defendant, Raymond P. Drymalski, then chief justice of the municipal court of Chicago, was charged with conspiracies to obstruct justice and to defraud Cook County and the city of Chicago. The indictments grew out of matters having to do with the vacation of judgments and the forfeiture of bail bonds, and joined with defendant in the charges were his administrative assistant, two former assistant State's Attorneys and four professional bondsmen. He was indicted alone for malfeasance in the same matters and for his alleged failure to disqualify defaulting bondsmen.
To these indictments defendant filed verified 'pleas in bar' alleging in substance: (1) that he was the duly elected chief justice of the municipal court and, as such, exempt from indictment for any judicial act performed by him in such office; (2) that 'at all of the times and all of the places mentioned in said indictment returned in the above cause, he, the said Raymond P. Drymalski, was such Chief Justice in and for the Municipal Court of the City of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois, and was acting honestly and in good faith in the performance of his duties and, therefore, is exempt from indictment and prosecution thereon in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois; and the said Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, has no jurisdiction over him in that the said indictment and all matters and things therein set forth and all counts in the said indictment relate exclusively to official judicial acts performed as Chief Justice of the said Municipal Court of the City of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois; and this he, the said Raymond P. Drymalski, is ready to verify.'
Oral motions to strike the pleas were overruled, whereupon the People filed verified answers in which it was denied that defendant was exempt from indictment or trial, or that he had acted honestly and in good faith in the performance of his duties, and affirmatively alleged 'that said Raymond P. Drymalski was not acting honestly and was not acting in good faith and was not acting honestly and in good faith when he performed the acts set forth in said indictment and at all of the times and places alleged in said indictment but that said Raymond P. Drymalski was acting corruptly, unlawfully, wrongfully, wickedly, deceitfully, wilfully and fraudulently in doing the said acts hereinabove mentioned.' On defendant's motion the original pleas in bar were allowed to stand as traverses to the People's answers.
After defendant had waived a jury, a hearing was had on the issues of fact raised by the pleas and answers during which the testimony of witnesses, including that of defendant, was heard. At the conclusion of the hearing, and upon consideration of the evidence, the trial court sustained the pleas in bar and entered judgment ordering the defendant's discharge.
All of these matters which have been related occurred prior to our decision in People v. Ferguson, 20 Ill.2d 295, 170 N.E.2d 171, and the problem that this case presents will therefore not recur.
The People sued out a writ of error to the Appellate Court for the First District and thus it was that this cause was pending in the Appellate Court when the Ferguson decision was announced. Although section 17 of division XIII of the Criminal Code authorizes the People to sue out a writ of error only 'to review any order or judgment quashing or setting aside an indictment or information,' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 38, par. 747), the Appellate Court entertained the People's writ over defendant's motion that it be dismissed, reversed the judgment of discharge and remanded the cause to the criminal court for further proceedings. People v. Drymalski, 28 Ill.App.2d 479, 171 N.E.2d 671. In brief, the practical effect and direction of the decision was that the fact questions determined under the pleas in bar should be retried and redetermined under pleas of not guilty. Defendant has prosecuted this writ of error for further review.
As we interpret it, the Appellate Court predicated its decision on two grounds it thought to be derived from the Ferguson case. First, that the pleas in bar in this case, like the plea in Ferguson, were to be treated as motions to quash the indictments; second, in view of the Ferguson (20 Ill.2d 295, 170 N.E.2d 174) holding that 'a plea in bar is appropriate in a criminal case only in those instances in which...
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State v. Wong
...that in passing upon the right of the state to appeal 'it is the substance which controls, and not the label.' Cf., People v. Drymalski, 22 Ill.2d 347, 175 N.E.2d 553, reversing 28 Ill.App.2d 479, 171 N.E.2d 671. It further appears that in Illinois 'by statute all defenses are available und......
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People v. Petropoulos
... ... In a fairly long line of cases (including People v. White, 364 Ill. 574, 5 N.E.2d 472; People v. Vitale, 364 Ill. 589, 5 N.E.2d 474; People v. Moore, 410 Ill. 241, 102 N.E.2d 146; People v. Mosby, Supreme Court No. 36052, Sept. 1960; People v. Drymalski, 22 Ill.2d 347, 175 N.E.2d 553) it was consistently held that the State's authority to appeal was a narrow right which [59 Ill.App.2d 303] could not be expanded by the courts beyond the specific statutory language. Thus it came to be considered 'established practice' (Moore) that the only ... ...
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People v. Agnew
... ... 71 Ill.2d 166, 179, 15 Ill.Dec. 759, 374 N.E.2d 194 ... As the People note, "trial" is not a word of rigid definition. To illustrate, in People v. Drymalski (1961), 22 Ill.2d 347, 175 N.E.2d 553, this court, citing People v. Vitale, 364 Ill. 589, 592, 5 N.E.2d 474, observed: ... "A 'trial' has been defined as a judicial examination, in accordance with the law of the land, either civil or criminal, of the issues between the parties, whether of law or ... ...
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People v. Bailey
... ... He therefore concludes that under Article 6, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution, 1970, 1 this Court is without jurisdiction. Defendant seeks support for his premise in the cases of People v. Drymalski, 22 Ill.2d 347, 175 N.E.2d 553 (1961); People v. White, 364 Ill. 574, 5 N.E.2d 472 (1936), and People v. Vitale, 364 Ill. 589, 5 N.E.2d 474 (1936) ... We find the cases inapposite ... In Drymalski, the defendant's pleas in bar contained factual allegations, ... ...