People v. Dubina

• Decision Date: 23 February 1943
• Docket Number: No. 112.,112.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. DUBINA.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

304 Mich. 363

8 N.W.2d 99

PEOPLE

v.DUBINA.

No. 112.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Feb. 23, 1943.

Michael Dubina was informed against for murder. A verdict of not guilty was returned on the ground of insanity and an order committing accused to the Ionia State Hospital for the criminally insane for the remainder of his natural life or until his discharge therefrom as provided by law was entered, and accused appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court of Kalamazoo; Geo. V. Weimer, judge.

Before the Entire Bench.

James B. Stanley, of Kalamazoo, for appellant.

Raymond W. Fox, Pros. Atty., of Kalamazoo, for the People.

STARR, Justice.

Defendant appeals from an order entered by the circuit court of Kalamazoo county November 29, 1941, committing him to the Ionia State hospital for the criminally insane for the remainder of his natural life.

This case involves the constitutionality of Act No. 175, chap. 6, §§ 15a, 15b, 15c, and 15d, Pub.Acts 1927, as added by Act No. 259, Pub.Acts 1939, Comp.Laws Supp. 1940, §§ 17207-1 to 17207-4, Stat. Ann.1942 Cum.Supp. §§ 28.933(1-4) which provides as follows:

‘Sec. 15a. Whenever any person charged with murder under the laws of this state, has been bound over to the court having jurisdiction of such criminal case, and the return is filed with the clerk of such court, the clerk shall forthwith notify the state hospital commission of that fact and such commission as soon as possible thereafter, shall cause such person to be examined for the purpose of determining his mental condition and the existence of any mental disease or defect which would affect his criminal responsibility. The commission shall designate 3 psychiatrists, as herein defined, for the purpose of making such examination. The report of such psychiatrists shall be transmitted by the commission to the clerk of said court and shall be accessible to the court, the probation officer thereof, the attorney general, prosecuting attorney and the attorney for such person. For making such examination each psychiatrist shall receive mileage at the rate of 10 cents per mile, and each psychiatrist who is not in the employ of the state shall also receive such fee as the trial court shall determine.

‘Sec. 15b. Any clerk of a court, or deputy clerk, who wilfully neglects to perform any duty imposed upon him by the preceding section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to imprisonment for not to exceed 90 days and a fine of not to exceed $100.00, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.

‘Sec. 15c. Any person, who is tried for the crime of murder and is acquitted by the court or jury by reason of insanity, shall forthwith be committed by order of said court to a state hospital for the criminally insane for the remainder of his natural life. The governor may, however, discharge such person upon recommendation of the commission, based upon an investigation by it and its determination that such discharge will not be harmful to other persons or their property.

‘Sec. 15d. A psychiatrist under the meaning of the foregoing sections is a physician, duly licensed to practice in the state of Michigan, who has had at least 5 years' experience in actual practice, including either (a) 3 years' full time practice since January 1, 1935, in the care and treatment of persons suffering from nervous or mental disease or mental defect, in an institution provided for the care of such persons, or (b) has devoted 5 years prior to the case in which his services are requested, to a practice confined wholly or substantially to the diagnosis, care or treatment of persons suffering from nervous and mental disease or mental defect.’

Defendant was arrested in October, 1941, and bound over to circuit court of trial. An information was filed charging him with the crime of murder. In pursuance of Act No. 175, chap. 6, § 15a, Pub.Acts 1927, as added by Act No. 259, Pub.Acts 1939, above quoted, the State hospital commission designated a sanity commission of three psychiatrists who examined defendant. The sanity commission stated in their report, which was signed by all members and filed with the county clerk, that, in their opinion, defendant was sane at the time he committed the crime. Such report further stated that the commission believed defendant ‘is sane today and capable of understanding the nature and object of the legal proceedings against him.’

When subsequently arraigned in circuit court, defendant stood mute, and the court entered a plea of not guilty. Defendant gave written notice of a plea of temporary insanity existing at the time of the alleged crime. During his trial by jury defendant took the stand in his own behalf and admitted facts which would have justified the jury in finding him guilty of the crime of murder if he was sane, or not guilty if insane. Four psychiatrists called by the prosecution testified that, in their opinions, defendant was sane when he committed the alleged crime. Three psychiatrists called by defendant testified that, in their opinions, defendant was insane at the time of the alleged crime.

At the conclusion of all proofs the court charged the jury, among other things, ‘that the testimony of the People's witnesses and the respondent's own admissions made him guilty of murder unless they found that he was insane at the time of the homicide.’ The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the ‘ground of insanity.’ Defendant was then remanded to the custody of the sheriff, and the following day, November 29, 1941, in pursuance of Act No. 175, chap. 6, § 15c, Pub.Acts 1927, as added by Act No. 259, Pub.Acts 1939, above quoted, the trial court entered an order committing him to the Ionia State hospital for the criminally insane ‘for the remainder of his natural life * * * or until his discharge therefrom as provided by law.’

On December 12, 1941, defendant filed motion requesting the trial court to reconsider and vacate its order committing him to the Ionia State hospital and to discharge and release him from such institution. Such motion was based on defendant's contention that the statute under which he was committed (Act No. 175, chap. 6, §§ 15a-15d, Pub.Acts 1927, as added by Act No. 259, Pub.Acts 1939), above quoted, is unconstitutional for the reasons: (1) that it denies him due process of law (Michigan Const.1908, art. II, § 16; U.S.Const. Amend. 14); (2) that it deprives him of the right to writ of habeas corpus (Michigan Const. 1908, art. 2, § 11; 3 Comp.Laws 1929, § 15206, Stat.Ann. § 27.2250); (3) that the subject matter of the statute is broader than its title (Michigan Const.1908, art. 5, § 21); (4) that the statute is not enforceable; and (5) that it delegates judicial powers (Michigan Const. 1908, art. 7, § 1). Defendant also contended that the court erred in making inquiry of the jury as to the basis of their verdict.

In considering the constitutionality of the statute in question we recognize the established rule of statutory construction as stated by Mr. Justice Butzel in Sullivan v. Michigan State Board of Dentistry, 268 Mich. 427, 256 N.W. 471, 472: ‘Even if the law could be construed in two ways, one consistent with the constitutionality, and the other inconsistent therewith, the former will be considered as the one presumptively intended by the Legislature. Motz v. City of Detroit, 18 Mich. 495;Grand Rapids Booming Co. v. Jarvis, 30 Mich. 308;Attorney General v. Detroit United Railway Co., 210 Mich. 227, 177 N.W. 726, 1023.’

In Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, at page 505, 286 N.W. 805, at page 807, we said: ‘A statute will be presumed to be constitutional by the courts unless the contrary clearly appears; and in case of doubt every possible presumption not clearly inconsistent with the language and the subject matter is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of legislation. * * * Every reasonable presumption or intendment must be indulged in favor of the validity of an act, and it is only when invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution, that a court will refuse to sustain its validity.’

See, also, Bowerman v. Sheehan, 242 Mich. 95, 219 N.W. 69, 61 A.L.R. 859;People v. Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 189 N.W. 927, 24 A.L.R. 1115; Attorney General ex rel. Barbour v. Lindsay, 178 Mich. 524, 145 N.W. 98;Albert v. Gibson, 141 Mich. 698, 105 N.W. 19.

In attacking the constitutionality of the 1939 act defendant relies upon the case of Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. 1, 20 Am.Rep. 633, in which Act No. 168, Pub.Acts 1873, was held unconstitutional. Section 2 of such act provided: ‘Any person acquitted of either of the crimes mentioned in the first section of this act by reason of such insanity and finding of the jury as mentioned and referred to in said section, shall be committed to the insane hospital connected with the State Prison, and shall only be released therefrom on the certificate of the medical superintendent of the insane asylum at Kalamazoo, and the circuit judge of the circuit from which such person was sent to said hospital, setting forth that said person has so far recovered from the alleged insanity as to be safe to go at large. On filing such certificate with the governor, it shall be his duty to at once order the release of such person from confinement.’

In the Underwood case we held the 1873 act unconstitutional because it required commitment of the person acquitted of crime by reason of insanity without legal investigation as to his mental condition at the time of commitment, and because it excluded the confined person from afterward securing any investigation and judicial determination regarding his sanity. Under the 1939 act in question the trial court has no alternative but to commit a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity to the Ionia State hospital for the remainder of his natural life. Except as the issue of insanity is determined upon trial for the crime...