People v. Dudley

• Decision Date: 17 September 1974
• Docket Number: No. 46330,46330
• Citation: 58 Ill.2d 57,316 N.E.2d 773
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Mose DUDLEY, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 773

316 N.E.2d 773

58 Ill.2d 57

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Mose DUDLEY, Appellant.

No. 46330.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 17, 1974.

Paul Bradley and James R. Streicker, Chicago, for appellant.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Bernard Carey, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Patrick T. Driscoll, Jr., and Marianne Jackson, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

WARD, Justice.

After pleading guilty in the circuit court of Cook County on May 15, 1972, to an indictment charging attempted rape, Mose Dudley, the defendant, was sentenced to a term of from 3 to 8 years. On appeal (15 Ill.App.3d 18, 303 N.E.2d 753) the appellate court affirmed the conviction but reduced the defendant's sentence to a term of 2 years and 8 months to conform with the maximum sentence permitted under the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 1001--1--1 et seq.). We granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal.

On this appeal the defendant states that his plea of guilty was the result of a plea agreement and that contrary to the provisions of our Rule 402(b) the terms of the agreement were not stated in open court. Nor did the trial judge question him, he says, in open court to confirm the terms of the plea agreement as Rule 402 requires. The defendant asks that his conviction be reversed and the cause remanded with directions that he be permitted to plead again to the indictment.

There is no question that the plea of guilty entered was pursuant to a plea discussion and agreement. The record shows that prior to the entering of the plea the defendant was advised by the circuit judge of his right to trial by jury and of the minimum and maximum sentences possible upon his conviction. It discloses, too, that the judge satisfied himself that the plea was voluntary and that there was a factual basis for the plea. The defendant was asked by the court if he was satisfied with the plea agreement that his attorney had arranged in his behalf and the defendant answered that he was. It is clear, however, that the terms of the agreement were not stated in open court and that the court did not question the defendant as to the terms of a plea agreement.

Rule 402 provides in part:

'In hearings on pleas of guilty, there must be substantial compliance with the following:

(b) Determining Whether the Plea Is Voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is voluntary. If the tendered plea is the result of a plea agreement, the agreement shall be stated in open court. The court, by questioning the defendant personally in open court, shall confirm the terms of the plea agreement, or that there is no agreement, and shall determine whether any force or threats or any promises, apart from a plea agreement, were used to obtain the plea.' 50 Ill.2d R. 402.

The Committee Comments to paragraph (b) state:

'In contrast to current practice, paragraph (b) also requires that if the tendered plea is the result of a plea agreement, then the agreement must be stated in open court. It is important to give visibility to the plea agreement process in this way, as otherwise the defendant may feel required to state falsely that no promises were made and the plea may later be subject to collateral attack.'

The failure to state the plea agreement reached by the parties was error. (People v. Ridley, 5 Ill.App.3d 680, 284 N.E.2d 37; 1 Loyola U.L.J. 1 (1970).) The Committee Comments to paragraph (b) set out adequate reasons why such an agreement should be made of record in open court. In addition, the requirement prevents misunderstandings as to the terms of an agreement. It is an efficient means of...