People v. Dumas

• Decision Date: 14 August 1973
• Docket Number: Cr. 16723
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 512 P.2d 1208 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Clay DUMAS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 304

109 Cal.Rptr. 304

9 Cal.3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Clay DUMAS, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 16723.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Aug. 14, 1973.

Tolbert, Wooden & Malone, John H. Wooden and Hugo E. Hill, Hollywood, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., Howard J. Schwab, Robert F. Katz and Frederick R Millar, Jr., Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Associate Justice.

After the superior court denied defendant's motion under Penal Code section 1538.5 to suppress the evidence against him on the ground it was obtained in the course of an unreasonable search, he pleaded guilty to and was convicted of two counts of receiving stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496. Defendant bases his appeal from the judgment on the denial of this motion.

On May 11, 1970, officers of the Los Angeles Police Department obtained a warrant to search defendant's apartment, including 'all trash cans, storage areas, garages and carports which are assigned to and/or used by occupants of the aforesaid apartment,' for certain stolen railroad bonds and bank checks and certain narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia. The warrant issued pursuant to a police officer's affidavit which asserted that a confidential informant had reported he recently saw these articles in defendant's possession. Neither the warrant nor the affidavit made reference to defendant's automobile or to any other vehicle.

Equipped with the warrant, a group of police officers converged on the apartment described therein and forcibly entered without announcing their authority or purpose. Inside they found defendant and a young woman, and arrested defendant immediately. The subsequent search of the apartment revealed none of the articles named in the warrant. In the course of the search, however, the officers discovered an automobile registration certificate in the name of defendant and a set of automobile keys. An automobile meeting the description on the registration certificate was then found parked in the street two lots (about 100 feet) away from defendant's apartment building. The officer in charge of the operation, who testified he suspected the automobile might contain the items specified in the search warrant, ordered it searched without obtaining defendant's consent. In the trunk of the vehicle the officers found the stolen securities, a loaded revolver, and an aluminum foil packet apparently containing some narcotic substance. ¹

I

Defendant first contends the search warrant in question is defective because the supporting affidavit does not clearly establish the reliability of the confidential informant. This objection is not well taken. The affidavit states that the informant had provided information to the United States Secret Service 'On one separate occasion that resulted in three (3) arrests being made of three persons and the information resulted in three persons being held to answer at a commissioner's hearing and are now awaiting trial in the U.S. District Court.' In order to establish the reliability of an informant it is not necessary to relate that his prior information led to convictions. It is sufficient that the prior information was accurate or was 'of such substance as to cause a reasonable person to conclude that it is reliable.' (People v. Swayze (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 476, 490, 34 Cal.Rptr. 5, 11.) In People v. Prewitt (1959) 52 Cal.2d 330, 341 P.2d 1, we recognized that information from an informant who had twice previously provided police with tips that had led to arrests and trial was sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause for an arrest. Prior information that had proved accurate in leading to two valid arrests was also held sufficient to establish reliability in People v. Richardson (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 70, 85 Cal.Rptr. 607. If the fact of prior valid arrests of suspects is a sufficient index of an informant's reliability, the fact of a finding of probable cause to hold suspects by a federal magistrate is even more significant. (See People v. Superior Court (1972) 6 Cal.3d 704, 714, 100 Cal.Rptr. 319, 493 P.2d 1183.)

The affidavit also set forth substantial corroboration of the information provided by the informant. The informant stated he had seen Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad bonds in defendant's possession and that defendant advised him the bonds had a face value of approximately $25,000 and were stolen. Defendant also told the informant, as of May 7, 1970, that he had been in possession of the bonds for eight weeks. Independent police investigation established that 33 Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad bonds had been stolen between February 27 and March 2 of that year. Thus, independent investigation corroborated an important detail in the informant's report, and added to the probability that his information was reliable. ²

II

Defendant's second contention is that the officers violated Penal Code section 1531 in failing to announce their authority or purpose before forcibly entering his apartment. Section 1531 provides: 'The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance.' We have held that strict compliance with demand and notice requirements may be excused 'if the specific facts known to the officer before his entry are sufficient to support his good faith belief that compliance will increase his peril, frustrate the arrest, or permit the destruction of evidence.' (People v. Tribble (1971) 4 Cal.3d 826, 833, 94 Cal.Rptr. 613, 617, 484 P.2d 589, 593; People v. Gastelo (1967) 67 Cal.2d 586, 587--588, 63 Cal.Rptr. 10, 432 P.2d 706; People v. Maddox (1956) 46 Cal.2d 301, 306, 294 P.2d 6.) In the present case, the officer in charge of the search operation testified at the section 1538.5 hearing he had been informed by the confidential informant that defendant possessed several firearms in his apartment and that he invariably answered the door with a loaded gun in his hand. The informant told the officer he had personally observed defendant answer the door in this manner.

The case presents somewhat unusual facts in that the People attempt to justify noncompliance with announcement requirements on the basis of circumstances of which the officers were aware Before approaching defendant's residence to effect entry. In the typical case the officer discovers the facts that justify immediate entry only After approaching the residence. In People v. Maddox (1956) supra, 46 Cal.2d 301, 294 P.2d 6, for example, an officer who had knocked on the door of defendant's home to make a narcotics arrest heard a voice say 'Wait a minute' and also heard the sound of retreating footsteps. We held it was not unreasonable for the officer to believe that further delay in entry would facilitate secretion or destruction of evidence. Likewise in People v. Tribble (1971) supra, 4 Cal.3d 826, 832--833, 94 Cal.Rptr. 613, 484 P.2d 589, officers heard running footsteps inside the defendant's residence as they approached to make entry. This perception, combined with the officers' discovery of a firearm in an automobile in defendant's driveway and their knowledge of the violent character of the crimes of which defendant was accused, was sufficient to excuse compliance with section 844.

In some exceptional circumstances, however, we have upheld unannounced entry on the basis of information received by the officers prior to arrival at the scene of the entry. In People v. Smith (1966) 63 Cal.2d 779, 797, 48 Cal.Rptr. 382, 409 P.2d 222, and People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d 690, 707, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365, the officers had good cause to believe that the persons they were seeking were armed and that they had shot--and in one case killed--police officers. In People v. Hammond (1960) 54 Cal.2d 846, 854, 9 Cal.Rptr. 233, 357 P.2d 289, unannounced entry was also excused on the basis of prior information that the defendant was presently armed and was under the influence of heroin. The proposition that unannounced entry may be excused on the basis of information received before reaching the location at which entry is to be effected, when the information reasonably leads the officer to believe that compliance would increase his peril or frustrate the arrest, has been reaffirmed more recently in Duke v. Superior Court (1969) 1 Cal.3d 314, 323, 82 Cal.Rptr. 481, 462 P.2d 10. The ability of police officers to rely on such prior information in deciding to effect an unannounced entry is also clearly established by People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 28--29, 76 Cal.Rptr. 809, 816, 453 P.2d 353, 360, in which we stated that no announcement is required 'where officers have obtained particular information which leads them to reasonably conclude that the occupants of an apartment or residence have specifically resolved to effect disposal in the event of police intrusion or have made specific preparations in that regard.'

Thus, compliance with the announcement requirements may be excused where police officers, on the basis of previously obtained information, supported by facts occurring on the scene, are aware at the time they approach particular premises to effect entry that they are faced with an emergency situation as defined in our decisions.

In the present case the information provided by the confidential informant that defendant possessed several firearms is insufficient by itself to excuse compliance with section 1531. We have recognized that one of the primary purposes of section 1531, in addition to the protection of individual privacy, is to prevent possible violent responses that might be aroused in a startled and fearful householder suddenly confronted with unknown...