People v. DuMontelle
| Citation | 71 Ill.2d 157,374 N.E.2d 205,15 Ill.Dec. 770 |
| Decision Date | 23 March 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 49731,49731 |
| Parties | , 15 Ill.Dec. 770 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Michael DuMONTELLE, Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
Ralph Ruebner, Deputy State Appellate Defender, and Kathy M. Morris, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Chicago, for appellant.
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago, and L. Patrick Power, State's Atty., Kankakee for the People.
The defendant Michael DuMontelle, pleaded guilty to the charge of possession of cannabis, in violation of the Cannabis Control Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 561/2, par. 704(c)) (hereinafter cited as the Act). The circuit court of Kankakee County placed him on probation as provided in section 10 of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 561/2, par. 710). The court also fined the defendant $65 and assessed court costs against him in the amount of $25. The defendant appealed, arguing that section 10 of the Act does not authorize the imposition of a fine or the assessment of court costs. The appellate court affirmed with one justice dissenting. (49 Ill.App.3d 187, 7 Ill.Dec. 108, 364 N.E.2d 95.) We granted leave to appeal.
Two closely related questions are presented for review. First, we are asked to decide whether the general sentencing provisions of section 5-5-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3) may be applied to a defendant who has been placed on probation pursuant to section 10 of the Act. Similarly, we must decide whether a section 10 probationer may be required to pay court costs, as provided in the criminal costs statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 180-3). We will first consider whether a fine was properly imposed against the defendant under the circumstances of his case.
The basic sentencing provision of the Unified Code of Corrections is found in section 5-5-3. That section provides: "Every person convicted of an offense shall be sentenced as provided in this Section * * *." (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3(a).) The term "conviction" includes "a judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a plea of guilty * * *." (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005-1-5.) Section 5-5-3(d)(1) specifically authorizes a court to impose probation upon those defendants convicted of a felony or misdemeanor, and section 5-6-3(b)(2) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 1005-6-3(b)(2)) authorizes the imposition of a fine as one of the numerous terms upon which probation may be conditioned. Whether these sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections may be properly applied to a defendant who has been placed on probation pursuant to section 10 of the Act can only be ascertained by examining both the precise language of the statute as well as the legislative intent underlying the spirit and purpose of the Act itself.
Section 10 of the Act, often appropriately referred to as the "first offender" provision, provides for the lenient treatment of a defined class of first-time marijuana offenders. As set forth in the section, "(w)henever any person who has not previously been convicted of any offense under (the) Act" pleads or is otherwise found guilty, "the court may, without entering a judgment of guilt * * *, defer further proceedings and place him on probation upon reasonable terms and conditions as it may require." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 561/2, par. 710.) The section further provides for discharge and dismissal of the defendant upon his successful completion of the terms imposed by the court, and also allows the court to "enter an adjudication of guilty and proceed as otherwise provided" if the defendant fails to fulfill the probationary conditions. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 561/2, par. 710.) Finally, and most importantly, the section declares:
"Discharge and dismissal under this Section shall be without court adjudication of guilt and shall not be deemed a conviction for purposes of disqualification or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction of a crime * * *." Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 561/2, par. 710.
It is important to note that under the provisions of section 10, following the factual determination of guilt, no judgment of guilt as to the offense charged can be entered, but further proceedings are deferred during the period of probation. If the offender successfully completes his probation, the charge is dismissed and the offender discharged. In such a case, no adjudication of guilt of the offense charged can be made and there can be no conviction of the charge. It is only in cases of failure to successfully complete the probation that the court may, under section 10, adjudge the offender guilty and enter a judgment of conviction.
There are serious obstacles in attempting to apply the general sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections to the first-offender provision of the Act. It is difficult to circumvent the clear import of the statutory language, in particular that portion quoted above, which declares that treatment under the first-offender statute does not amount to a conviction. Since this is true, neither section 5-5-3 nor its accompanying provisions govern section 10 treatment because, as we have noted, a conviction is a necessary prerequisite to their application. Any other conclusion is not only contrary to the inescapable meaning of the statutory language, but also emasculates the legislative intent to provide a unique and innovative punitive scheme for first offenders by excising their treatment from the general provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 561/2, par. 701.
The majority of the appellate court approved the application of the sentencing provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections to section 10 treatment by concluding that such treatment was the equivalent of a "sentence entered upon a plea of guilty," and thus fell under the specified meaning of "conviction" as defined in section 5-1-5 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 1005-1-5). We do not agree with this analysis. Such reasoning is not in accord with the manifest intent of the statutory language declaring that probationary treatment under section 10 shall not be a conviction, regardless of how the term "conviction" is defined in the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill.Rev.Stat.1973, ch. 38, par. 1005-1-5). Also, the conclusion reached by the appellate court is not consistent with the intended operative effect of a section 10 proceeding. As noted above, ordinary probation is a sentence authorized by the Unified Code of Corrections. However, we are compelled to conclude that the probationary status contemplated by section 10, unlike its Unified Code counterpart, does not amount to a sentence. Pursuant to the provisions of the Act quoted above, when a defendant pleads guilty to a first offense, further proceedings are deferred...
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