People v. Earl
| Decision Date | 19 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 302945,302945 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD LEE EARL, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
RONALD LEE EARL, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 302945
STATE OF MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS
June 19, 2012
Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and SAWYER and RONAYNE KRAUSE, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right following his jury trial convictions for bank robbery, MCL 750.531, and two counts of possession of less than 25 grams of a controlled substance, MCL 333.7403(1) and MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v). He was sentenced as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison terms of 10 to 40 years for the robbery conviction and 2 to 15 years for each drug conviction. We affirm.
Defendant was convicted of robbing a Southfield branch of Bank of America on March 18, 2010, while dressed as a woman. He was identified as the perpetrator by both the confronted bank teller and a bank manager, and a bystander identified defendant as the person the bystander had observed fleeing from the area. The prosecution also presented three witnesses who each testified that defendant had approached them about being a getaway driver for a planned bank robbery. When defendant was arrested on March 24, 2010, the police found crack cocaine and heroin on his person. At trial, defendant conceded that he was guilty of the narcotics offenses, but denied committing the bank robbery. He presented an alibi defense through his fiancée, and the defense argued that the identification testimony was not credible, and that the witnesses who claimed that they were solicited to be a getaway driver were unreliable drug users.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress a pair of women's reading glasses that were seized during a search of defendant's fiancée's vehicle. Defendant had been a passenger in the vehicle when he was arrested. When reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, we review for clear error the trial court's findings of fact and we review de
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novo its ultimate decision whether to suppress the evidence. People v Hyde, 285 Mich App 428, 438; 775 NW2d 833 (2009).
The United States and the Michigan Constitutions both prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. The basic rule is that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Arizona v Gant, 556 US 332, 338; 129 S Ct 1710; 173 L Ed 2d 485 (2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In other words, warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. However, to attack the propriety of a search and seizure, the defendant must first establish that he or she has standing to challenge the search. People v Powell, 235 Mich App 557, 561; 599 NW2d 499 (1999). Standing exists if, considering the totality of the circumstances, the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the object of the search and seizure and that expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. People v Parker, 230 Mich App 337, 340; 584 NW2d 336 (1998). Regarding vehicles, when the stop of a vehicle is legal, a passenger with no property or possessory interest in the vehicle does not have standing to contest the search of the vehicle.1 See People v Labelle, 478 Mich 891, 892 (2007), People v Armendarez, 188 Mich App 61, 71; 468 NW2d 893 (1991), People v Carey, 110 Mich App 187, 194-195; 312 NW2d 205 (1981), and People v Smith, 106 Mich App 203, 208-209; 307 NW2d 441 (1981).
In this case, defendant did not assert a property or possessory interest in the vehicle or the women's eyeglasses that were seized. The vehicle searched belonged to defendant's fiancée, who was also the driver. The mere fact that defendant was engaged to the owner of the vehicle did not endow him with an ownership interest in the vehicle or a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Although defendant claims that his fiancée allowed him to use the vehicle, he did not show a continuous use of and right of access to the vehicle. Thus, defendant failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that he had a legitimate possessory or privacy interest in the vehicle. Accordingly, he lacks standing to contest the search of it and the seizure of the women's eyeglasses from it. Therefore, the trial court did not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress.
Defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court erroneously assessed 10 points for offense variables (OVs) 4 and 13 of the sentencing guidelines. Again, we disagree. Defendant did not object to the scoring of OV 4 or OV 13 at sentencing. However, he
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filed a motion to remand with this Court in order to raise this issue in a motion for resentencing. Therefore, this issue is preserved. MCR 6.429(C) and MCL 769.34(10).2
A trial court's scoring of the sentencing guidelines is reviewed to determine whether the court properly exercised its discretion and whether the record evidence adequately supports a particular score. People v Lechleitner, 291 Mich App 56, 62; 804 NW2d...
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