People v. Earnest

• Docket Number: 2-23-0390
• Decision Date: 23 January 2024
• Citation: 230 N.E.3d 288
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Royce D. EARNEST, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

230 N.E.3d 288

2024 IL App (2d) 230390

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Royce D. EARNEST, Defendant-Appellant

No. 2-23-0390

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Opinion Filed January 23, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County.Nos. 22-CF-157, 28-CF-266, 23-CF-938, Honorable James K. Booras, Judge, Presiding.

James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and Abigail Hogan Elmer, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of Springfield, for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE JORGENSENdelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[1]¶ 1Defendant, Royce D. Earnest, requests that we vacate the circuit court’s order granting the State’s verified petition to deny him pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963(Code), as amended byPublic Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act).¹SeePub. Act 102-1104, § 70(eff. Jan. 1, 2023)(amending various provisions of the Act);Rowe v Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52, 469 Ill.Dec. 248, 223 N.E.3d 1010(lifting stay and setting effective date as September 18, 2023).Specifically, defendant contends that the State lacked the authority to petition for his detention and that the circuit court improperly detained him based on an inadequate proffer by the State, without considering whether any condition or combination of conditions would mitigate his risk of flight and without providing defendant the opportunity to be heard.For the following reasons, we vacate the order for detention and remand for a new hearing.²

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On February 12, 2023, defendant was charged in Lake Countycase No. 23-CF-266 for attempted possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c)(West 2022)), use of an electronic communication device while driving (625 ILCS 5/12-610.2(b)(West 2022)), and possession of more than 5 grams but less than 15 grams of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/60(a)(West 2022)).At the time he was charged, he was on probation for possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c)(West 2022)) in case No. 22-CF-157.After he was charged in case No. 23-CF-266, he was arrested for aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer (625 ILCS 5/ll-204.1(a)(1)(West 2022)), resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a)(1)(West 2022)), driving 21 to 25 miles per hour above the limit (625 ILCS 5/11-601(b)(West 2022)), and use of an electronic communication device while driving (id.§ 12-610.2(b)) in May 2023 in case No. 23-CF-938.³

¶ 4Defendant was incarcerated in the Lake County jail but ordered released with the condition of a $200,000 bond.On September 21, 2023(three days after the Act became effective), defendant, who remained detained, moved pursuant to sections 110-7.5(b)and110-5 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-7.5(b), 110-5 (West 2022)), as amended by the Act, for a hearing to remove the financial surety as a. prerequisite for his release.He stated that he was unable to post the bond previously set and his requirement to pay a financial surety was the sole basis for his continued detention.He averred that he was entitled to a hearing and release from custody with any conditions the court deemed appropriate, because the court had already ordered his release on the condition of posting monetary bond.

¶ 5 Six days later, the State filed a verified petition to detain, arguing that the charges in case Nos. 23-CF-266and23-CF938 were detainable offenses pursuant to section 110-6.1. of the Code (id§ 110-6.1) and that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and he posed a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution.Further, the State alleged pursuant to section 110-10(b)(id.§ 110-10(b)) that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the risks to any person or the community or defendant’s risk of willfull flight.That same day, defendant moved to strike the State’s petition, arguing that he petition was untimely and that no provision of article 110 of the Code authorized the State to file a petition to detain a person not previously granted pretrial release.

¶ 6 On October 2, 2023, the circuit court held a hearing, first addressing defendant’s motion to strike.Defendant argued that the State’s petition to detain was untimely since more than 21 days had passed since his arrest.He also asserted that he had not been arrested for any of the enumerated detainable offenses under the Act’s dangerousness standard.The State conceded this point, and the dangerousness argument was stricken.The court then found that the State’s petition was timely because the Act had just become effective.

¶ 7The court then proceeded with the State’s petition to detain.The State noted "for context" that there was an underlying petition to revokedefendant’s probation in case No. 22-CF-157 because defendant had been subsequently charged in case No. 23-CF-266.It asserted, twofold, that it was seeking to revoke because of defendant’s subsequent arrests or, alternatively, detain defendant because there was a risk of flight evidenced by case No. 23-CF-938, where defendant fled on foot after leading police on a vehicle chase.Defense counsel objected to the State’s request for relief based on an alleged violation of probation without "additional filings by the State" and, instead, asserted that the only proper issue before the court was the State’s petition to detain based on the risk of willful flight.

¶ 8The court found that it could sua sponte detain defendant"in a situation where the defendant is on probation and gets arrested for a Class A or greater [offense]."Additionally, the court determined that, based on the State’s proffer, defendant’s running from police officers, his previous failures to appear, and the fact that he was on probation and incurred new felony offenses, it would detain defendant due to his risk of willful flight.The court also concluded that the evidence and presumption were great that defendant committed the alleged offenses, there was no condition or combination of conditions that would mitigate the threat defendant posed to the community, and there were specific and articulable facts that indicated that defendant would engage in willful flight from prosecution.

¶ 9 Repeatedly, defense counsel noted that the violation of probation was not addressed in the petition to detain; the court had not been given a proffer on the State’s petition regarding the facts supporting detention, the applicable law, or the willfulness standard; and the State had not filed anything in this case regarding the alleged violation of probation.Moreover, counsel addressed the court’s failure to hear a proffer by the defense before issuing its ruling.Overall, the court concluded that the State’s petition, in combination with defendant’s violation of probation, supported detention.The court entered a written order reflecting that defendant was ordered detained because of his risk of willful flight, Counsel’s motion pursuant to section 110-5 was never addressed.

¶ 10 On October 12, 2023, defense counsel filed a notice of appeal and a written addendum describing in detail defendant’s claims of error.Ill.S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2)(eff. Sept. 18, 2023).Therein, defendant argued that the State did not provide him with any notice or materials regarding the evidence it would rely on at the detention hearing.He asserted that the State’s proffer supporting detention did not address the willful-flight standard, which was, ultimately, the standard under which the State sought detention.Moreover, he averred that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that defendant committed the charged offenses; he posed a threat to any person or the community; and there was no condition or combination of conditions that would mitigate his threat to any person, the community, or his risk of willful flight.Additionally, he contended that the circuit court erred by finding that no conditions could reasonably ensure defen- dant’s appearance at later hearings.Defendant stated that he repeatedly urged the court to hold a hearing pursuant to article 110 of the Code; however, the court ultimately granted the State’s petition to detain without giving the defense an opportunity to be heard.Defendant requested that the order for detention be vacated or, alternatively, a new detention hearing be granted.

¶ 11 On December 8, 2023, defendant filed a memorandum in support of his appeal, and on December 26, 2023, the State responded.

¶ 12 II.ANALYSIS

¶ 13Defendant argues that the, circuit court erred in granting the State’s petition to detain because the Code does not contemplate the State’s filing of such petitions against incarcerated defendants who were ordered released but subsequently held on the condition of depositing financial surety.Rather, he contends, the court should have held a hearing under section 110-5 of the Code concerning his conditions of release.725 ILCS 5/110-5(West 2022).Defendant further claims that the court’s order for detention should be vacated where (1)the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence of willful flight, (2)the court failed to sufficiently consider less restrictive conditions, and (3)defendant was denied a fair hearing.The State contends that these issues were forfeited.We vacate and remand for a new detention hearing.

[2, 3]¶ 14 As for the standard of review, we employ a bifurcated standard, in which the court’s factual findings are reviewed under a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard and the court’s ultimate findings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13, — Ill.Dec. —, — N.E.3d —.A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is...