People v. Easton

• Decision Date: 29 November 2018
• Docket Number: Docket No. 122187
• Citation: People v. Easton, 2018 IL 122187, 123 N.E.3d 1074, 429 Ill.Dec. 15 (Ill. 2018)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Jordan EASTON, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2018 IL 122187

123 N.E.3d 1074

429 Ill.Dec. 15

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.Jordan EASTON, Appellee.

Docket No. 122187

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed November 29, 2018.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Brian McLeish, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Lilien, Deputy Defender, and Andrew Smith, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Elgin, for appellee.

JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Jordan Easton, pled guilty to aggravated unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and four counts of unlawful use of a credit card. At sentencing, the circuit court of Kendall County imposed concurrent prison terms for all six convictions. Defendant moved for reconsideration of the sentences, and defense counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). The circuit court denied the motion, and defendant appealed. The appellate court vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that defense counsel's certificate did not comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Dec. 3, 2015), which was amended during the pendency of the appeal. 2017 IL App (2d) 141180, 412 Ill.Dec. 78, 74 N.E.3d 545. This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 2016). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, albeit on different grounds.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On August 26, 2014, defendant appeared in the circuit court on six distinct criminal cases. He entered open pleas of guilty to one count of aggravated unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle ( 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7)(A) (West 2012) ) (charged in case No. 2013 CF 333), one count of unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle (id. § 4-103(a)(1) ) (charged in case No. 2014 CF 53), and four counts of unlawful use of a credit card ( 720 ILCS 5/17-36 (West 2012) ) (charged in case Nos. 2014 CF 24, 2014 CF 138, 2014 CF 139, and 2014 CF 140). The circuit court sentenced him to prison terms of 10 years each for aggravated unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle and unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle and three terms of 6 years and one term of 5 years for unlawful use of a credit card, with all sentences to be served concurrently. In five of the six cases, the circuit court also ordered defendant to make restitution payments to the victims after his release from prison.

¶ 4 On October 29, 2014, defendant's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the sentences imposed were excessive and that the court failed to properly consider several factors in mitigation. Along with the motion to reconsider, defense counsel also filed a certificate as required under Rule 604(d).¹

¶ 5 At the time the certificate was filed, Rule 604(d) required counsel to certify, inter alia , that he or she "has consulted with the defendant *** to ascertain defendant's contentions of error in the sentence or the entry of the plea of guilty, [and] has examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the plea of guilty." (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). The certificate filed by defendant's attorney mirrored the language of Rule 604(d) that was in effect at that time and stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

"1. I have consulted with the Defendant in person to ascertain his contentions of error in the imposition of the sentence or the entry of plea of guilty;

2. I have examined the trial court file and report of proceedings of the pleas of guilty."

The circuit court denied the motion on November 26, 2014, and defendant immediately appealed.

¶ 6 While defendant's appeal was pending, Rule 604(d) was amended to require that counsel certify that he or she "has consulted with the defendant *** to ascertain defendant's contentions of error in the sentence and the entry of the plea of guilty." (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(d) (eff. Dec. 3, 2015). The amended rule also requires counsel to certify that he or she has "examined the trial court file and both the report of proceedings of the plea of guilty and the report of proceedings in the sentencing hearing. " (Emphases added.) Id.

¶ 7 On appeal, defendant argued that the amended version of Rule 604(d) applied retroactively to his case and that his counsel's certificate failed to satisfy the requirements of the amended rule because counsel did not certify that she had consulted with him as to his contentions of error with regard to both his guilty plea and his sentence.

¶ 8 The appellate court held that, because the amended version of Rule 604(d) is purely procedural, it applies retroactively to defendant's case. 2017 IL App (2d) 141180, ¶ 17, 412 Ill.Dec. 78, 74 N.E.3d 545. Applying the amended rule, the appellate court determined that defense counsel's certificate was deficient on two grounds: it did not certify that she had consulted with defendant as to his contentions of error with regard to both his guilty plea and his sentence, and it did not certify that she had reviewed the report of proceedings of the sentencing hearing. Id. ¶ 18. Accordingly, the appellate court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for further postplea proceedings, including the filing of a new Rule 604(d) certificate, a new motion to withdraw the guilty plea and/or reconsider the sentences, if necessary, and a new motion hearing. Id. ¶ 19.

¶ 9 The State appeals to this court.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 A. Retroactivity of the Amendment to Rule 604(d)

¶ 12 The fundamental issue in this appeal is whether the certificate filed by defendant's counsel complied with the requirements of Rule 604(d). To resolve that question, we first determine which version of Rule 604(d) applies to defendant's case. Therefore, we initially address the State's argument that the appellate court erred in holding that the amended version of Rule 604(d) applies retroactively to defendant's case, which was on appeal when the amendment became effective. According to the State, the sufficiency of defense counsel's certificate is governed by the preamendment version of the rule that was in effect when the notice of appeal was filed in November 2014.

¶ 13 As is true with statutes, the determination of the temporal reach of a supreme court rule is a matter of construction. See People v. Hunter , 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 15, 422 Ill.Dec. 791, 104 N.E.3d 358. The same principles that govern the construction of statutes also guide the interpretation of this court's rules. People v. Salem , 2016 IL 118693, ¶ 11, 400 Ill.Dec. 32, 47 N.E.3d 997 ; In re H.L. , 2015 IL 118529, ¶ 6, 400 Ill.Dec. 631, 48 N.E.3d 1071. Our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the drafters of the rule. Salem , 2016 IL 118693, ¶ 11, 400 Ill.Dec. 32, 47 N.E.3d 997 ; In re H.L. , 2015 IL 118529, ¶ 6, 400 Ill.Dec. 631, 48 N.E.3d 1071. As with a statute, the interpretation of a supreme court rule and the determination of its temporal reach present questions of law that we review de novo . Hunter , 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 15, 422 Ill.Dec. 791, 104 N.E.3d 358 ; In re H.L. , 2015 IL 118529, ¶ 6, 400 Ill.Dec. 631, 48 N.E.3d 1071.

¶ 14 Given that statutes and supreme court rules are treated congruently, we employ the same analytical framework to determine whether they may be applied retroactively. See In re Marriage of Duggan , 376 Ill. App. 3d 725, 728-29, 315 Ill.Dec. 811, 877 N.E.2d 1140 (2007) ; People ex rel. Madigan v. Petco Petroleum Corp. , 363 Ill. App. 3d 613, 619-21, 299 Ill.Dec. 333, 841 N.E.2d 1065 (2006). Our retroactivity analysis is premised on that set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products , 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), which was adopted by this court in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector , 196 Ill. 2d 27, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d 964 (2001). Hunter , 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 20, 422 Ill.Dec. 791, 104 N.E.3d 358 ; People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 19, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346.

¶ 15 Under that analysis, we first look to the rule itself to ascertain whether its temporal reach has been specifically articulated. See Hunter , 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 20, 422 Ill.Dec. 791, 104 N.E.3d 358 (citing Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 19, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346 ). If the rule contains such an express intent, it must be given effect unless doing so would violate the constitution. Id. If the rule is silent as to its temporal reach, the court must determine whether the rule has a retroactive impact such that it "would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 19, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346, quoting Commonwealth Edison , 196 Ill. 2d at 38, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d 964, quoting Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483 ). If the rule does not have a retroactive impact, it may be applied retroactively; if the rule has a retroactive impact, it is presumed to apply prospectively. Id.

¶ 16 However, based on section 4 of the Statute on Statutes ( 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2016) ), Illinois courts need not advance beyond the first step of the Landgraf analysis. Hunter , 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 21, 422 Ill.Dec. 791, 104 N.E.3d 358 (citing Howard , 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 20, 410 Ill.Dec. 960, 72 N.E.3d 346 ). Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes states:

"No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether such former law is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed against the former law, or as to any act

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