People v. Eaton

• Decision Date: 23 August 1990
• Docket Number: Docket No. 124438
• Citation: 184 Mich.App. 649,459 N.W.2d 86
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifford EATON, Defendant-Appellant. 184 Mich.App. 649, 459 N.W.2d 86
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 86

459 N.W.2d 86

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifford EATON, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 124438.

184 Mich.App. 649, 459 N.W.2d 86

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 14, 1990.

Decided July 16, 1990.

Released for Publication Aug. 23, 1990.

[184 MICHAPP 649] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Gay Secor Hardy, Sol. Gen., Patrick M. Shannon, [184 MICHAPP 650] Pros. Atty., and Mark L. Dobias, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

Lawrence R. Greene, Detroit, for defendant-appellant on appeal.

Before CYNAR, P.J., and WEAVER and GRIFFIN, JJ.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences which resulted from his unconditional pleas of guilty to attempted delivery of less than fifty grams of a mixture containing heroin, M.C.L. Sec. 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), M.C.L. Sec. 750.92; M.S.A. Sec. 28.287, and to being a second felony offender, M.C.L. Sec. 769.10; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1082. Despite his unconditional pleas of guilty pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant argues that his convictions and sentences must be vacated due to the failure of the prosecution to bring him to trial within 180 days of his arraignment as required by Michigan's "180-day" speedy trial statute, M.C.L. Sec. 780.131; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(1). ¹

We disagree and hold that defendant's constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial were relinquished by operation of his unconditional pleas of guilty.

The relinquishment or forfeiture of these rights occurs by operation of law. Accordingly, a traditional "waiver" analysis which examines the defendant's intention to deliberately and knowingly forego a right or defense is inapplicable. ²

I

[184 MICHAPP 651] Defendant, while an inmate at the Kinross Correctional Facility, was charged on September 3, 1986, with three counts of assault of a prison employee, and one count of delivery of less than fifty grams of a mixture containing heroin. In addition, a supplemental information charged defendant as being an habitual offender, fourth offense. Following a preliminary examination, defendant was bound over to circuit court on September 10, 1986, and was arraigned on the information on September 17, 1986. Finally, on May 26, 1987, defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea bargain to one count of attempted delivery of less than fifty grams of a mixture containing heroin, M.C.L. Sec. 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), M.C.L. Sec. 750.92; M.S.A. Sec. 28.287, and to being a second felony offender, M.C.L. Sec. 769.10; M.S.A. Sec. 28.1082. Defendant was sentenced to a term of one year and six months to seven years and six months imprisonment to run consecutive to his current term being served. Defendant's subsequent motion to set aside his guilty pleas was denied by the circuit court on December 5, 1989. Defendant appeals his unconditional plea-based convictions as of right. We affirm.

II

At the present time, there is a substantial split of authority within the Court of Appeals on the issue whether a defendant who enters an unconditional plea of guilty relinquishes his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial. Panels of [184 MICHAPP 652] this Court in People v. Parshay, 104 Mich.App. 411, 304 N.W.2d 593 (1981), lv. den. 411 Mich. 1081 (1981), People v. Williams, 145 Mich.App. 614, 617, 378 N.W.2d 769 (1985), and People v. Rivera, 164 Mich.App. 670, 417 N.W.2d 569 (1987), have held that a guilty plea constitutes such a "waiver" of constitutional rights. Relinquishment of the statutory right to a speedy trial is less clear in these decisions.

Panels in People v. Smith, 183 Mich.App. 537, 455 N.W.2d 719 (1990), People v. Davis, 123 Mich.App. 553, 558-559, 332 N.W.2d 606 (1983), People v. Farmer, 127 Mich.App. 472, 339 N.W.2d 218 (1983), People v. Wolak, 153 Mich.App. 60, 395 N.W.2d 240 (1986), People v. Leroy, 157 Mich.App. 334, 403 N.W.2d 555 (1987), and People v. Sickles, 162 Mich.App. 344, 350-351, 412 N.W.2d 734 (1987), have concluded that constitutional or statutory speedy trial rights are not waived or relinquished by a guilty plea.

The panels of this Court which have held that the "180-day rule" is a viable defense despite an unconditional guilty plea base their decisions on jurisdictional grounds. They note that the pertinent statutory provision, M.C.L. Sec. 780.133; M.S.A. Sec. 28.969(3), provides that a violation of the speedy trial rule divests the court of jurisdiction and that untried warrants, indictments, and informations or complaints shall be without "any further force or effect." Although never specified, it is assumed that these panels construe the term "jurisdiction" to mean subject-matter jurisdiction rather than personal jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction involves the two different concepts of subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction encompasses those matters upon which the court has power to act. Personal jurisdiction deals with the authority of [184 MICHAPP 653] the court to bind the parties to the action. Subject-matter jurisdiction is never waivable nor may it be stipulated to by the parties. Personal jurisdiction, however, is always waivable and defects may be corrected by stipulation.

The Supreme Court in People v. Phillips, 383 Mich. 464, 469-470, 175 N.W.2d 740 (1970), examined the distinction between subject-matter and personal jurisdiction and held that a criminal defendant may "waive" personal jurisdiction defenses:

The jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is not here questioned. We are concerned only with the validity of the procedure whereby that court sought to exercise its jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter, of course, could not be conferred by consent or waiver, but no reason appears why an accused could not subject himself to the court's personal jurisdiction. The procedural safeguards spelling out the method whereby a court obtains jurisdiction over the person of an accused are all designed for his protection. If he elects not to avail himself of the established procedural rights there appears to be none who should be heard to complain.

Later, in People v. New, 427 Mich. 482, 487-488, 398 N.W.2d 358 (1986), the Michigan Supreme Court looked to federal precedent to determine the scope of constitutional rights relinquished by a plea of guilty. After analyzing the guilty plea trilogy of Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970), and the later cases of Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973), and Menna v. New [184 MICHAPP 654] York, 423 U.S. 61, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975), the Michigan Supreme Court cited with approval the following passage from Menna, 423 U.S. at pp. 62-63, n. 2, 96 S.Ct. at 242, n. 2:

Neither Tollett v. Henderson, 411 US 258 [93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235] (1973), nor our earlier cases on which it relied, e.g., Brady v United States, 397 US 742 [90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747] (1970), and McMann v Richardson, 397 US 759 [90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763] (1970), stand for the proposition that counseled guilty pleas inevitably "waive" all antecedent constitutional violations. If they did so hold, the New York Court of Appeals might be correct. However, in Tollett we emphasized that waiver was not the basic ingredient of this line of cases, 411 US at 266 [93 S.Ct. at 1607]. The point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the State's imposition of punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent [sic] [ ³] with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly established. Here, however, [184 MICHAPP 655] the claim is that the State may not convict petitioner no matter how validly his factual guilt is established. The guilty plea, therefore, does not bar the claim. [Emphasis added.]

The federal Courts of Appeal have employed the Menna analysis to hold that speedy trial rights do not survive a guilty plea since the purpose of speedy trial rights is to guarantee that factual guilt is validly established. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated in United States v. Gaertner, 583 F.2d 308, 311 (CA 7, 1978), cert. den. 440 U.S. 918, 99 S.Ct. 1238, 59 L.Ed.2d 469 (1979):

We believe Gaertner's speedy trial claim, whether based upon the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, is not open for our review after pleas of guilty. The purpose of a prompt trial is to guarantee that the accused's right to a fair trial is not substantially prejudiced by pre-trial delay, or, put another way, to lend assurance that factual guilt is validly established. Speedy trial violations preclude the establishment of guilt by trial, but a finding of guilt by a proper plea remains a viable option. Simply, the establishment of guilt is not logically inconsistent with speedy trial violations, and does not prevent the government from invoking the criminal process, so long as there is no trial. [Emphasis added.]

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. O'Donnell, 539 F.2d 1233, 1236-1237 (CA 9, 1976), has also ruled in accord:

"A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction if factual guilt is validly established." [Menna, supra.]

[184 MICHAPP 656] The appellant in the instant case argues that the...