People v. Ecarius

Decision Date13 September 1900
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesPEOPLE v. ECARIUS.

Error to circuit court, Saginaw county; Byron A. Snow, Judge.

Edward Ecarius was convicted of murder in the first degree, and brings error. Affirmed.

John Hurst and Crane & Crane, for appellant.

Horace M. Oren, Atty. Gen., and F. L. Eaton, Pros. Atty., for the People.

MOORE J.

The respondent was convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to the state prison for life. Two motions for a new trial were made before the circuit judge, both of which were overruled. The case is brought here by writ of error. Incorporated in the bill of exceptions are the affidavits and counter affidavits used in te motions for a new trial. The zeal of counsel on both sides has led them to make statements in their briefs not justified by the record.

In December last, Louis Buehler was employed in a factory near the river in the southwestern part of Saginaw. His home was reached by going through the settled portion of the city, and was in the outskirts of the city, and in the northwestern part thereof, and about three miles from where he worked. The annexed plat will help to explain the situation:

RPT.CC.1900000745.00010

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The respondent lived near Andre street, about halfway between the factory and Buehler's home. The father-in-law of the respondent lived in a shanty marked in the northeast portion of the plat. On December 20th Mr. Buehler was paid at the factory two $5 bills and 98 cents in change, all of which were in an envelope when handed to him. It is the claim of the people that on his way home he stopped at Starkweather's saloon, and got a flask filled with rum and had got within twenty rods of home, when he was felled to the ground by an iron when he was 2 feet long and 2 inches wide, used to connect iron rails together, and having in the ends thereof holes through which to pass bolts; that a struggle ensued, when he was struck over the front of the head, fracturing his skull; that he either climbed over the fence or was thrown over; that he afterwards was partially revived by the rain, and attempted to crawl to his house upon his hands and knees, and was found by his mother in a dazed condition. He said that he had been pretty nearly killed by a man with a piece of iron, who had taken his money, but did not say who the man was. He was afterwards removed to a hospital, and two days later died. In this connection it is proper to say it is claimed on the part of respondent that Mr. Buehler was at this time sufficiently possessed of his mental faculties to give a coherent narrative of what occurred, and that the reason why he did not state who was his assailant was because he did not know the man; but we think a reading of the testimony indicates very clearly that he was in a dazed condition, soon became unconscious, and remained so until his death. The cap of Mr. Buehler, with much blood on it, and the iron bar, with blood upon it, were found inside the fence. The pay envelope was also found. It had been torn open, and the money removed. It was bloody. A pocketbook carried by Buehler was not found on his person. A flask corresponding to the one which had been filled at Starkweather's was in Buehler's side pocket. It was the claim of the people that about 4 o'clock the respondent left the shanty of his father-in-law, going to a house near the factory, and leaving there about the time the factory closed, and a little later was seen by and talked with one Miller, and was also seen on Court street, going west, and still later was seen by Mrs. Streichert going west on Court street, five or six blocks from Buehler's and that Buehler was then a short distance ahead of him, and the respondent was walking fast, as though to overtake him. The respondent was arrested for the crime. There was a purse upon his person, in which there was a $5 bill and some change; and it is the claim of the people that there was fresh blood upon the bill, and also fresh blood upon the coat of respondent. The respondent denied all knowledge of the crime, and claimed he went near the factory to see one Miller, who owed him. Miller was sworn as a witness, and denied that he owed respondent. The respondent claimed that he had been possessed of the $5 bill for some time, and had kept it hidden at his house, so it should not be spent until he needed it for a definite purpose; that, if there was blood upon it, that fact could be accounted for by his having recently filed a butcher's saw, just from the meat block, and also from his having recently cleaned fish and also from the fact that he had recently had nosebleed.

The foregoing statement embraces the principal claims of the parties. Mr. Buehler was assaulted December 20th. He died on the 22d. The respondent was arraigned in court December 30th, and upon the same day his present counsel was assigned to him by the court. His trial was commenced January 11th. It is now said that respondent was railroaded into prison, and that the court erred in refusing to delay the case, and also erred in not summoning jurors from the vicinage. It is a reply to these claims that no application was made for a continuance, and there is nothing in the record to indicate any trouble whatever about getting a competent jury.

It is also said that the court erred in allowing names to be indorsed upon the information; counsel citing the case of People v. Casey (Mich.) 82 N.W. 883. Instead of being an authority against what was done, it is an authority sustaining the action of the court. The record shows that on January 3d, counsel for respondent asked and obtained an order for the subpoenaing of 13 witnesses on his behalf at the expense of the state; and in the same order leave is given the prosecuting attorney, upon a motion heretofore made, to add three names to the information. The record does not disclose that any objection was made to this order, and, under the circumstances shown, it was a very proper order to make.

Error is assigned to the opening statement of the prosecuting attorney, for the reason that he did not prove all that he stated that he should. The opening was a very temperate statement of the case which the people expected to make. There is nothing to indicate that any statement was made, except in the utmost good faith. A failure to prove all that the prosecuting attorney expected to prove is not a ground for reversing a case.

Errors are also assigned concerning the admission of testimony. We do not think that any of these were well taken, and but one of them calls for discussion. The respondent was called as a witness on his own behalf. On the cross-examination the following occurred: 'Q. Just take this iron bar and put it in your pocket. A. Which one? Q. Either one. Put it in the outside pocket of your coat. Mr. Hurst: Don't go any further until I make an objection. I want it stated on the record that the attorney for the people hands the prisoner an iron bar, and asks him to put it into his pocket. The prisoner does it, and I make an objection. I object to that, may it please the court, as incompetent and immaterial. There is no evidence to show that this man was seen by a single person with anything of that kind about his person; the evidence all to the contrary. I say there is no evidence to base it upon. It is incompetent and immaterial, and raises a presumption against this defendant. The Court: He may answer. (Exception.) Q. Put your hand down. This comes under your arm,--just goes under your arm? A. Yes; it would tear the pocket. Q. Just put it down in your trousers pocket. It is under your arm, ain't it? A. Yes, sir.' It is said that this compelled the respondent to give evidence against himself, and was error; citing Stokes v. State, 5 Baxt. 619, and Kerr, Hom. � 461. In Kerr on Homicide, supra, the author says: 'No principle of law is better settled than that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness or compelled to testify against himself. This is a right guarantied by the constitution in most, if not all, the states,'--citing Stokes v. State, supra. The case of Stokes v. State was referred to in State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, and held not to be good law. In Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 245, it was held that it was not compelling a respondent to give evidence against himself, within the meaning of the law, to require him to make an impression in a soft substance, in order that said impression might be compared with a footprint apparently connected with the homicide. See, also, State v. Graham, 74 N.C. 646. In this case, on...

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