People v. Eck

• Decision Date: 02 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 5-95-0327,5-95-0327
• Citation: People v. Eck, 664 N.E.2d 1147, 279 Ill.App.3d 541, 216 Ill.Dec. 219 (Ill. App. 1996)
• Parties: , 216 Ill.Dec. 219 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald ECK, Allan Ritzel, Wayne Short, Jr., and Robert Baron, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1147

664 N.E.2d 1147

279 Ill.App.3d 541, 216 Ill.Dec. 219

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald ECK, Allan Ritzel, Wayne Short, Jr., and Robert Baron, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 5-95-0327.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth District.

May 2, 1996.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County, Nos. 94-TRAL-2895, 95-TRED-97, 95-TRED-108 and 95-TRCV-213, Hon. Ann Callis-Rongey, Judge, presiding.

Brian L. Polinske, Edwardsville, for Appellants.

William Haine, State's Attorney, Edwardsville, Norbert J. Goetten, Director; Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director; Gerry R. Arnold, Staff Attorney; Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Mt. Vernon, for Appellee.

Justice RARICK delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendants Wayne Short, Robert Baron, Donald Eck, and Allan Ritzel were all charged with the offense of driving under the influence (DUI) in violation of section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 1994)). Ritzel submitted to a blood-alcohol-content test which revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.21. The other three defendants refused to submit to the test. All four defendants were subject to summary suspension of their driving privileges by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 11-501.1 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501.1 (West 1994)). All four filed petitions to rescind their summary suspensions, and in each case the petitions were denied after an evidentiary hearing. Each defendant subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the criminal DUI charge, based upon double jeopardy grounds. Specifically, each defendant argued that a subsequent prosecution for DUI would constitute multiple punishment for the same offense. In denying the motions, the trial court noted that while a statutory summary suspension has a deterrent purpose, its primary purpose was remedial and it therefore did not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. The trial court also noted that statutory summary suspension and DUI proceedings were separate and distinct prosecutions, and that with respect to the defendants who refused to submit to the blood alcohol content test, the two proceedings punished them for different conduct. Specifically, the trial court ruled that statutory summary suspension resulted from refusing to submit to a blood alcohol content test, while the DUI prosection resulted from operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

On appeal, defendants argue that prosecuting them for DUI after a statutory summary suspension hearing subjected them to double jeopardy in violation of the Illinois and United States Constitutions. Specifically, defendants argue that summary suspension constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes, and that to subject them to both summary suspension and a DUI prosecution punishes them twice for the same offense.

The prohibition against double jeopardy protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense, when sought in separate proceedings. In re P.S., 169 Ill.2d 260, 272, 214 Ill.Dec. 475, 481, 661 N.E.2d 329, 335 (1996). In determining whether a defendant is being subjected to multiple punishments for double jeopardy purposes, a court must determine (1) whether the alleged multiple punishments were for the same offense; (2) whether the sanction in question constituted "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes; and (3) whether the second proceeding was distinct and separate from the first. In re P.S., 169 Ill.2d at 272, 214 Ill.Dec. at 481-82, 661 N.E.2d at 335-36. If any of these determinations are made in the negative, double jeopardy does not bar the subsequent proceeding. We will address the question of whether summary suspension constitutes punishment first because it is dispositive.

Defendants' argument with respect to the issue of whether summary suspension constitutes punishment has recently been addressed in People v. Dvorak, 276 Ill.App.3d 544, 213 Ill.Dec. 120, 658 N.E.2d 869 (1995). In Dvorak, the defendant was charged with DUI and served with notice of summary suspension. Defendant had submitted to a blood-alcohol-concentration test which disclosed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.13. Defendant subsequently filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension, and the suspension was rescinded in an agreed order. Defendant then sought the dismissal of the DUI charge, arguing that double jeopardy precluded further prosecution. In affirming the trial court's refusal to dismiss the DUI charge, the court in Dvorak first addressed the question of whether summary suspension constituted "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. As do the defendants in the present case, the defendant in Dvorak argued that under the recent Supreme Court cases of United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), and Montana Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994), unless a sanction is solely remedial it constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes. This argument is based upon the following language in Halper:

"[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term." Halper, 490 U.S. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 502.

As the Dvorak court noted, however, the actual holding in Halper was more restrictive:

"We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who has already been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1902, 104 L.Ed.2d at 502.

The Supreme Court appears to have clarified this apparent discrepancy in Austin where after quoting the "cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose" language, the court held that forfeiture of the defendant's mobile home and body shop pursuant at 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) constituted punishment for purposes of the eighth amendment's prohibition of excessive fines because it could not be said to serve solely a remedial purpose. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621, 113 S.Ct. at 2812, 125 L.Ed.2d at 505. In Kurth Ranch, the Supreme Court quoted the "second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution," language when referring to the holding in Halper but then held that the Halper...