People v. Eddington

• Decision Date: 08 August 1977
• Docket Number: Docket No. 27325
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William H. EDDINGTON, Defendant-Appellant. 77 Mich.App. 177, 258 N.W.2d 183
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 183

258 N.W.2d 183

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William H. EDDINGTON, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 27325.

77 Mich.App. 177, 258 N.W.2d 183

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Aug. 8, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 12, 1977.

Released for Publication Oct. 17, 1977.

[77 MICHAPP 180] Thick & Bush by George C. Bush, Saginaw, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Robert L. Kaczmarek, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before GILLIS, P. J., and CAVANAGH and D. E. HOLBROOK, Jr., JJ.

CAVANAGH, Judge.

Defendant appeals as of right from his May 23, 1974, jury conviction of armed robbery, M.C.L.A. § 750.529; M.S.A. § 28.797. On June 13, 1974, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

On January 15, 1974, two men broke into and robbed at gunpoint the Heidelberg Inn, in Saginaw, Michigan. The police trapped the defendant inside the bar and apprehended him when he was overpowered by several bar patron-hostages. He was later charged with armed robbery and rape of one of the barmaid-hostages. ¹

I

Defendant's first claim of error concerns his efforts to obtain counsel before and during his preliminary examination. On January 18, 1974, James Brisbois, who had previously represented [77 MICHAPP 181] the defendant on other criminal charges, was appointed defense counsel by circuit court. On January 25, 1974, defense counsel moved to adjourn the preliminary examination for one week because he had just returned from Mexico and needed more time to prepare. The district court granted the motion, set January 31, 1974, as the new examination date, and ordered the parties to bring all motions before that date.

On January 28, 1974, defense counsel moved to withdraw as counsel stating that he was unable "to summon up the requisite mental attitude," and that his practice was already overloaded. The defendant agreed with the reasons cited by his attorney, and asked that he be allowed an opportunity to retain new counsel or that the court appoint a new attorney. When questioned by the district court concerning further delays, the defendant replied that he thought that counsel could be substituted without further delays:

"THE COURT: And you realize that by a motion such as today and no matter what the outcome of this motion, it would be possible further delays in your right to a preliminary examination on the charges?

"MR. EDDINGTON: Not necessarily, I mean I can't foresee these if a Court appointed counsel is appointed today or tomorrow I feel that I still would have time to confer with the counsel before Thursday (January 31.) And if I'm allowed to use the telephone to get additional counsel I feel that I should be adequately represented if the attorney feel like he can represent me Thursday. But I feel like we would have a step towards it and stopping further delays 'cause I don't want no delays whatsoever."

The district court denied the motion on grounds that the district court lacked power to allow withdrawal of an attorney appointed by the circuit [77 MICHAPP 182] court. The court declared that the preliminary examination would be held on schedule, with Mr. Brisbois as defense counsel.

For the next three days the defendant attempted diligently to retain new defense counsel. ² His efforts were unsuccessful.

At the preliminary examination on January 31, 1974, the district court acknowledged receipt of a letter from the defendant which declared the defendant's intent to discharge James Brisbois and to proceed in his own behalf. Upon the defendant's acknowledgment that the letter was genuine and reflected his present intentions, ³ the trial court [77 MICHAPP 183] informed the defendant of the nature of the right that he was about to give up. ⁴ The trial court inquired of the defendant's formal education a high school diploma completed while in military service and experience in teaching and languages and, satisfied that the defendant was competent to do so, granted his motion to represent himself. The court directed Mr. Brisbois to remain in the courtroom during the proceedings until such time as the circuit court would allow his withdrawal.

Contrary to defendant's view, we find his actions to have constituted a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel, under the standards articulated in People v. Anderson, 398 Mich. 361, 247 N.W.2d 857 (1976), and People v. Holcomb, 395 Mich. [77 MICHAPP 184] 326, 235 N.W.2d 343 (1975). Defendant's request was unequivocal: even though reserving his right to retain counsel at a later date, the defendant declared that he desired to proceed then and there with the preliminary examination as his own counsel. The trial court adequately informed the defendant of the dangers and potentially serious consequences of self-representation and determined that the defendant's competence was sufficient to allow assertion of the constitutional right to self-representation. Although the defendant lacked technical legal knowledge, legal expertise is not the relevant inquiry regarding competence to represent oneself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), People v. Anderson, supra, 398 Mich. at 368, 247 N.W.2d at 860. Lastly, the district court determined that the defendant's self-representation would not disrupt or unduly inconvenience the court or the administration of the court's business; that finding is implicit in the district court's ruling to allow the defendant to proceed on his own.

Just before noon on the day of the preliminary examination, attorney Craig Dill's arrival interrupted the proceedings. Mr. Dill stated that he had been retained to represent the defendant and requested an adjournment to allow him time for necessary preparation of the case. In response to the court's interrogation, defendant Eddington stated that he no longer desired to proceed in propria persona but now wanted to be represented by Mr. Dill. The court ruled that it would allow representation by Mr. Dill, but upon consideration of the notice which the parties had received and the time for preparation already allowed the defendant, the court denied the motion for adjournment.

[77 MICHAPP 185] When the examination resumed after a two hour noon recess, attorney Dill stated that he had been discharged by the defendant and that the defendant again desired to represent himself. Upon questioning from the bench, the defendant stated that he had requested Dill's services because he felt that he himself was inadequate to perform as legal counsel. However, if Dill could not be provided adequate time to prepare, the defendant no longer desired his services and had determined to act as his own counsel.

Upon resumption of the examination, the defendant refused to take further active part, claiming that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel by the district court's actions. The prosecution then rested its case and moved to have the defendant's case bound over for trial. The district court granted the motion as to both charges.

The defendant claims that the trial court reversibly erred by refusing to grant an adjournment to allow his retained attorney to prepare for the examination.

While a defendant has a right to assistance of counsel guaranteed by the 6th and 14th Amendments of the Federal Constitution and article 1, § 20 of the Michigan Constitution, an indigent defendant is not constitutionally entitled to the attorney of his choice. "He may, however, become entitled to have his assigned lawyer replaced upon a showing of adequate cause for a change in lawyers". People v. Ginther, 390 Mich. 436, 441, 212 N.W.2d 922, 924 (1973); People v. Blassingame, 59 Mich.App. 327, 331, 229 N.W.2d 438, 440 (1975); People v. Bradley, 54 Mich.App. 89, 220 N.W.2d 305 (1974); People v. Wilson, 43 Mich.App. 459, 204 N.W.2d 269 (1972), lv. den. 393 Mich. 813 (1975). The decision regarding substitution of appointed counsel[77 MICHAPP 186] is entrusted to the trial court's discretion: the substitution should be granted upon a showing of good cause if it would not unreasonably disrupt the judicial process. People v. Blassingame, supra, People v. Wilson, supra.

As a necessary corollary, in order to insure the effective representation required for a fair trial, the defendant may seek an adjournment in order to allow his new counsel a reasonable opportunity to prepare his case. People v. Charles O. Williams, 386 Mich. 565, 194 N.W.2d 337 (1972). While the grant of a request for a continuance is entrusted to the trial court's discretion, that exercise of discretion must respect the crucial role that legal representation plays in the system of criminal justice. "A myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality. There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied." (Citations omitted.) Nilva v. United States352 U.S. 385, 77 S.Ct. 431, 1 L.Ed.2d 415 (1957), quoted in People v. Charles O. Williams, supra, 386 Mich. at 575, 194 N.W.2d at 342. Our Supreme Court has articulated the considerations which should guide the exercise of the trial court's discretion when faced with a request for a continuance in a criminal case: (1) the origin and nature of the right asserted, (2) the defendant's reasons for asserting that right, (3) the defendant's negligence or untimely assertion of the right, and (4) the extent to which previous delays or disruptions are attributable to the defendant. People v. Wilson, 397 Mich. 76, 81, 243 N.W.2d 257, [77 MICHAPP 187] 260 (1976), reh. den., 397 Mich. 962 (1976); People v. Merritt, 396 Mich. 67, 81, 238 N.W.2d 31, 37 (1976), reh....