People v. Edmonson

• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: HANCOCK; WACHTLER
• Citation: People v. Edmonson, 75 N.Y.2d 672, 555 N.Y.S.2d 666, 554 N.E.2d 1254 (N.Y. 1990)
• Decision Date: 03 May 1990
• Parties: , 554 N.E.2d 1254, 58 USLW 2679 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles EDMONSON, Appellant.

Page 666

555 N.Y.S.2d 666

75 N.Y.2d 672, 554 N.E.2d 1254, 58 USLW 2679

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles EDMONSON, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 3, 1990.

Lissa Griffin, for appellant.

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty. (Laurie Sapakoff, White Plains, and James M. McGuire, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HANCOCK, Judge.

Defendant's appeal presents a novel question: whether evidence of a prior extrajudicial identification made by the complaining witness from a videotape taken by the police, canvassing a particular neighborhood and focusing on numerous passersby, is inadmissible as a matter of law under CPL 60.30. We hold that such evidence may be admitted as proof of identity provided there is nothing suggestive in the videotape or the manner in which it was presented to the witness. In this case, the hearing court's findings "that the videotape procedure employed by the police officers and the subsequent viewing by the victim were neither suggestive nor prejudicial" (137 Misc.2d 408, 410, 520 N.Y.S.2d 707) are supported by the evidence, and, accordingly, there should be an affirmance.

I

After a trial on charges stemming from a savage attack on the victim on the night of April 6, 1987, a jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25[1] and assault in the first and second degrees (Penal Law § 120.10[2]; § 120.05[1]. The victim testified that she met the man who attacked her on the street (she had seen him three or four times previously, she said). She went with him to a building in the Lincoln Housing Projects where the man repeatedly assaulted her, choked her into unconsciousness and caused severe injuries which required her hospitalization for almost three weeks. In the hospital, the victim gave the police a description of defendant and told them where she thought he could be found. Acting on this information, the police made a videotape and showed it to her. She identified the man who attacked her from the videotape and the police arrested defendant on April 25, 1987. The next day, she identified defendant at a precinct lineup.

On defendant's motion to suppress the evidence of the victim's identification of him from the videotape, the court conducted a suppression hearing during which it viewed the entire tape. At the hearing, the People presented one witness, Detective Edward May. He testified that he interviewed the victim at the hospital and received information from her concerning the attacker's description and the possibility of finding him in the vicinity of 55 West 129 th Street and Fifth Avenue between 131st and 132nd Streets.

The facts pertinent to the videotaping procedure and its viewing by the victim may be briefly summarized. Officer May with two other detectives stationed a surveillance van at various locations in the area described by the victim and randomly videotaped the passersby on the street. The 50-55-minute tape depicts the pedestrian traffic at 10 to 15 different locations, and focuses particularly on individuals generally matching the description provided. Of the men appearing in the videotape, 50 are seen in closeup or "zoom" shots. About one-half hour into the tape, the defendant is depicted in one of the closeup shots, standing at the entrance of 55 West 129th Street. He appears in the midst of a group of men seen going into and out of the building.

The victim's viewing of the videotape took place at her home the day after her release from the hospital. Officer May, using a portable VCR and viewer, played the tape without sound. The victim recognized certain landmarks and various people shown on the screen. When defendant's image appeared, she promptly and unequivocally identified him.

In its written decision concluding that the identification procedure was neither "suggestive nor prejudicial" and denying defendant's suppression motion, the trial court made the following findings: "There was nothing in the manner in which the tape was made and thereafter viewed by the victim that unduly influenced her to identify the defendant. The officers admittedly concentrated the camera's attention on those who matched the victim's description of the assailant. The description could apply to many of those who came within camera range. Nothing in a viewing of the tape suggests that the defendant was singled out in any way. The tape was presented to the victim without prompting. She viewed the tape, and commented from time to time on people she recognized. Her identification of the defendant was immediate and certain when his image appeared on the tape." (137 Misc.2d, at 410, 520 N.Y.S.2d 707.) Defendant's conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Division, without opinion, 150 A.D.2d 990, 543 N.Y.S.2d 600.

II

Discussion of the admissibility of pretrial identification procedures under CPL 60.30 must start with a reiteration of our established rule that suggestive pretrial identifications are to be excluded (see, People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 241, 251, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902, 423 N.E.2d 379). The purpose of the rule is plain: to "reduce the risk that the wrong person will be convicted as a result of suggestive identification procedures employed by the police." (Id., at 251, 440 N.Y.S.2d 902, 423 N.E.2d 379.) As we recently noted in People v. Riley, 70 N.Y.2d 523, 530, 522 N.Y.S.2d 842, 517 N.E.2d 520, the "importance of identification evidence is, of course, self-evident. But then so, too, are the weaknesses and dangers of improper identification evidence. 'The influence of improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other factor--perhaps it is responsible for more such errors than all other factors combined' (Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases, at 26, quoted in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1933, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149)."

Being mindful of these admonitions, we conclude that there is nothing inherently suggestive in the videotaping procedure employed here which should render evidence of the witness's identification inadmissible. As found below, defendant was not singled-out, portrayed unfavorably, or in any other manner prejudiced by police conduct or comment or by the setting in which he was taped. In fact, it is undisputed that, at the time of the videotaping, the police neither suspected defendant nor had any reason to believe that the victim's assailant would be among the pedestrians they might actually get on camera.

The police simply canvassed the area in which the victim had previously seen the assailant and videotaped all the pedestrian traffic at the locations she had mentioned. Though they took a closeup of defendant, they did the same for approximately 50 other individuals and did nothing, visually or through commentary, to distinguish defendant from the rest. Thus, when the police "zoomed in" on defendant, they did so only as part of a continuous flow of pedestrians, all of whom matched the victim's general description of her assailant and were engaged in seemingly unremarkable activities.

Contrary to defendant's contentions, the videotape and its presentation to the victim suffered none of the problems...