People v. Edwards

Decision Date14 May 1980
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Christopher EDWARDS, Defendant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

WALTER T. GORMAN, Justice:

The defendant in this case, an American Indian, is charged under a New York State indictment with murder and is being prosecuted by its political subdivision, Onondaga County. The alleged crime took place on the Onondaga Indian Reservation, outside of the City of Syracuse, New York. The victim was a non Indian.

The central issue presented is whether the State of New York or the federal government has jurisdiction to prosecute Indians for the crime of murder allegedly committed upon Indian reservation lands in New York State. Essentially, this involves an apparent conflict between two federal statutes; 18 U.S.C. § 1153 and 25 U.S.C. § 232. Section 1153 of Title 18 originally was enacted in 1885 and, subsequently, has been amended several times. It provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

"Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses; namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, rape, carnal knowledge of any female, not his wife, (under) the age of sixteen years, assault with intent to commit rape, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery and larceny within the Indian country shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States."

On the other hand, Section 232 of Title 25 was enacted in 1948 and provides that:

"The State of New York shall have jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations within the State of New York to the same extent as the courts of the state have jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the state as defined by the laws of the state: Provided that nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to deprive any Indian tribe, band or community, or members thereof, hunting and fishing rights as guaranteed them by agreement, treaty, or custom, nor require them to obtain state fish and game licenses for the exercise of such rights."

Interestingly enough, while various courts have made reference to one or the other of these statutes during their 95 and 32-year respective histories, no court has ever squarely resolved their effect upon each other.

To begin with, it is uncontroverted that the defendant is an Indian, that the crime was murder and that it took place upon Indian land. See Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, New York, 414 U.S. 661, 94 S.Ct. 772, 39 L.Ed.2d 73; Schuyler v. Livingstone, 123 Misc. 605, 205 N.Y.S. 888. Either of the statutes, standing alone, would seem to apply to the facts of this case and, but for the simultaneous existence of both of them, this jurisdictional controversy would not exist.

Federal statutes are to be construed in view of the established rules for statutory construction. Bardes v. First National Bank, 178 U.S. 524, 20 S.Ct. 1000, 44 L.Ed. 1175. Also see 73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes, Section 144. Moreover, one of the primary rules of statutory construction is to ascertain and declare the intent of the legislature. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071; Carr v. New York State Board of Elections, 40 N.Y.2d 556, 388 N.Y.S.2d 87, 356 N.E.2d 713. Historical background, underlying circumstances and the legislative notes accompanying the statute are all relevant to its interpretation.

Looking first at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 and its historical backdrop, it is clear that both its focus and applicability are nationwide. In New York, the Onondaga Indian Nation, a member of the Six Nations, ceded by treaty control over lands which they occupied within the United States in return for the United States' protection and guardianship. This treaty was known as the Treaty of Canandaigua of 1794. The treaty provisions not only acknowledged the lands "reserved" for the Onondaga Nation and the United States' promise never to claim or disturb the Onondagas in the free use and enjoyment of that land, but also specified the method by which disputes would be resolved between them until the United States Congress provided otherwise.

"Lest the firm peace and friendship now established should be interrupted by the misconduct of individuals, the United States and Six Nations agree, that for injuries done by individuals on either side, no private revenge or retaliation shall take place; but instead thereof, complaint shall be made by the party injured, to the other: By the Six Nations or any of them to the President of the United States, or the Superintendent by him appointed: And by the Superintendent, or other person appointed by the President, to the Principal Chiefs of the Six Nations, or of the nation to which the offender belongs: And such prudent measures shall then be pursued as shall be necessary to preserve our peace and friendship unbroken; until the Legislature (or Great Council) of the United States shall make other equitable provisions for the purpose." Article VII, Treaty of 1794, 7 United States Statutes at Large 44.

Generally, the land retained by various Indian tribes, under their respective treaties, was land where the Indian people could live in self-governed isolation from the non-Indian world. Indeed, it was recognized at an early stage that the Indians maintained their autonomy with control and jurisdiction over their members within the reservations. However, it was presumed that the Indians did not have criminal jurisdiction over non Indians absent a congressional statute or treaty provision to that effect. Oliphant v. Squamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 1015, 55 L.Ed.2d 209. The "Tribal Courts" were considered only to have jurisdiction over Indians. This was particularly true in cases where one Indian committed a crime against another Indian. In Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 3 S.Ct. 396, 27 L.Ed. 1030, the court held that it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribal court to try and punish a defendant Indian for the murder of another Indian.

Shortly after this decision, Congress, in 1885, passed what was then known as the Seven Major Crimes Act. Among its enumerated crimes was the crime of murder. This Act is now known as the Thirteen Major Crimes Act or, as previously noted, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. See Youngbear v. Brewer, D.C., 415 F.Supp. 807, whose facts and conclusions closely parallel those at bar.

The crime of murder is still contained in the Act. This Act preempted the enumerated crimes from tribal jurisdiction as well as state jurisdiction. Petition of Carmen, D.C., 165 F.Supp. 942. The United States Supreme Court recently addressed itself to this question of prevailing jurisdiction in United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 98 S.Ct. 2541, 57 L.Ed.2d 489. They stated at page 2550, supra, that:

"Mississippi appears to concede, Brief for the State of Mississippi 44, that if Section 1153 provides a basis for the prosecution of Smith John for the offense charged, the state has no similar jurisdiction. This concession, based on the assumption that § 1153 ordinarily is pre-emptive of state jurisdiction when it applies, seems to us to be correct. It was a necessary premise of at least one of our earlier decisions." Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 (1962). See also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 and n. 5, 79 S.Ct. 269, 270, 3 L.Ed.2d 251; Rice v. Olsen, 324 U.S. 786, 65 S.Ct. 989, 89 L.Ed. 1367 (1945).

Furthermore, it has been stated that the enactment of the Major Crimes Act was a carefully-limited, preemptive intrusion of federal power into the otherwise exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes to punish Indians for crimes committed on Indian land. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 209, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1996, 36 L.Ed.2d 844.

With this preemptive intrusion, all crimes, other than those enumerated in the Major Crimes Act, committed by one Indian against another within Indian country were subject to the jurisdiction of the tribal courts. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 643 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 1397 n. 2, 51 L.Ed.2d 701. However, a non Indian who committed a crime against a non Indian within Indian country was subject to prosecution under state law. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 26 L.Ed. 869.

By enacting Section 1153, Congress gave the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to try and punish Indians who had committed one of the enumerated crimes. All other crimes were excluded from its sweep United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 642 n. 1, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 1396 n. 1, 51 L.Ed.2d 701; United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 606, 36 S.Ct. 699, 700, 60 L.Ed. 1196 even a lesser-included charge. Kills Crow v. United States, 8 Cir., 451 F.2d 323; United States v. Davis, 8 Cir., 429 F.2d 552. This does not mean, however, that the defendant would not be entitled to have the federal court instruct the jury as to a lesser-included charge. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 1966, 36 L.Ed.2d 736; Felicia v. United States, 8 Cir., 495 F.2d 353. Under the cases and a proper reading of Keeble, supra, it is apparent that the defendant Indian may not be initially charged by information or indictment of the lesser-included charge before a federal court. Those crimes are left for those sovereignties that have residual criminal jurisdiction. As previously noted, absent a congressional enactment to the contrary, residual jurisdiction falls directly to the tribes themselves. Hence, the tribal courts...

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