People v. Edwards
| Decision Date | 28 August 1974 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 17755,No. 3,3 |
| Citation | 55 Mich.App. 256,222 N.W.2d 203 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie Lee EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Joseph N. Law, Niles, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Ronald J. Taylor, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and T. M. BURNS and SMITH,* JJ.
Defendant Willie Lee Edwards was charged with armed robbery, M.C.L.A. § 750.529; M.S.A. § 28.797. On August 24, 1972, defendant filed a motion to suppress certain identification testimony unless it was shown to be independent of a photographic display shown the witness. A hearing on the motion was held with testimony being taken on September 26 and October 2, 1972. On October 5, 1972, the trial court denied defendant's motion, finding the identification to be independent of the photographic display.
Trial was held on November 16, 17 and 21, following which the jury returned a verdict against defendant of guilty as charged. On January 8, 1973, defendant was sentenced to a term of not less than 10 nor more than 25 years in prison, with appropriate credit for time already spent in jail. Defendant's motion for a new trial was denied on June 21, 1973. Defendant now appeals his conviction and the denial of a new trial as of right.
Evidence produced at trial discloses that Mrs. Elaine Noble, the victim of and only eyewitness to the robbery, testified that on February 21, 1970, she was working as a clerk in the Oak Dairy Store in Niles, Michigan. She stated that at some time between 4:00 and 4:30 p.m., a man entered the store and robbed her at gunpoint. She was subsequently knocked unconscious, and when she awoke, the man was gone. She testified, however, that the man had worn no mask, and that he had stood in front of her for several minutes. Mrs. Noble concluded her testimony by identifying the defendant as the robber.
Defendant raises several allegations of error which we deem worthy of discussion. Other pertinent facts of this case are contained in our discussion of these issues.
Defendant first contends that his motion for a directed verdict, made on the basis that the identification testimony was insufficient to support his conviction, should have been granted by the trial court. We disagree.
As already mentioned, Mrs. Noble testified on direct examination that defendant was the man who robbed her. On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to impeach Mrs. Noble by showing that her identification was made on the basis of photographic displays the police had shown her and by pointing out allegedly inconsistent descriptions of defendant made by her prior to trial.
In People v. Hodo, 51 Mich.App. 628, 639, 215 N.W.2d 733, 739 (1974), we set forth the standard to be followed in determining whether a motion for directed verdict should have been granted, when we said:
The credibility of identification testimony is a matter left solely for the jury to determine. People v. Watson, 52 Mich.App. 211, 214, 217 N.W.2d 121 (1974); People v. Goodwin, 48 Mich.App. 692, 696, 211 N.W.2d 73 (1973); People v. Harper, 43 Mich.App. 500, 507, 204 N.W.2d 263, 268 (1972), lv. den., 389 Mich. 759 (1973). The jury in the case at bar had the opportunity to weigh Mrs. Noble's identification testimony in light of her alleged inconsistent descriptions and the circumstances of the identification. After listening to all the testimony, the jury chose to believe Mrs. Noble. We shall not substitute our judgment for theirs. People v. Watson, Supra; People v. Goodwin, Supra; People v. Harper, Supra. Therefore, since there was evidence presented on the material elements of armed robbery that defendant committed the offense, the trial court did not err by denying the motion for a directed verdict and submitting the case to the jury.
Defendant next argues that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. U.S.Const.Am. VI; Const.1963, art. I, § 20.
The robbery occurred on February 21, 1970. On April 15, 1970, defendant was arrested on a fugitive warrant from Indiana, the warrant later being withdrawn. The Michigan authorities returned defendant to Indiana on or about the 15th of April. The warrant for defendant's arrest on the present charge was issued on April 16, 1970, but was not returned until June 14, 1972. A preliminary examination was held on July 12, 1972, with defendant being arraigned on the information 2 days later. As mentioned earlier, trial was held in mid-November, 1972.
Thus, although defendant argues that he was denied a speedy trial, his claim is primarily based upon the fact that there was an extended delay in arresting him. Due to the fact that the defendant did not raise this issue before the trial court, there are few facts before this Court concerning the defendant's whereabouts during the 2-year period of delay.
The factors to be considered in determining whether a criminal defendant was denied a speedy trial are: length of delay, reason for the delay, defendant's demand for a speedy trial, and the amount of prejudice suffered by the defendant due to the delay. People v. Chism, 390 Mich. 104, 111, 211 N.W.2d 193 (1973); People v. Classen, 50 Mich.App. 122, 212 N.W.2d 783 (1973).
As indicated earlier, more than 2 years elapsed between issuance of the warrant and trial. However, length of delay alone is not determinative. It must be balanced with the other factors. Long delays are not by themselves a denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial. People v. Classen, Supra.
When we balance all the required factors, we find no denial of defendant's right to a speedy trial. The delay cannot be attributed to any deliberate attempt by the Michigan authorities to hamper the defense. Nor has defendant made a sufficient showing of prejudice resulting from the delay. Defendant's alibi witnesses were able to testify at some length as to the events on the day in question. If anything, the delay worked in defendant's favor since it lessened the ability of Mrs. Noble to identify him, thus increasing defendant's ability to attack the credibility of her identification testimony. Finally, defendant did not make a timely demand for a speedy trial nor did he raise this issue when he made a motion for a new trial. Balancing these factors, no denial of the right to a speedy trial has been established.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in holding the sole identification witness's testimony admissible as independent of the photographic display.
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the identification testimony, one officer Chute testified that he showed Mrs. Noble 7 pictures from which she chose defendant as the robber. Mrs. Noble testified that only 2 pictures were shown her. This apparent discrepancy was resolved at trial when Mrs. Noble testified that she had been shown pictures on 2 occasions, once by officer Chute and once by another officer.
No counsel was present at either of these photo identifications nor was there any evidence that defendant had waived his right to counsel. Therefore, these photographic identifications were improperly conducted. People v. Anderson, 389 Mich. 155, 187, 205 N.W.2d 461 (1973); People v. Dates, 52 Mich.App. 544, 218 N.W.2d...
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People v. Lowenstein
...trial in the present case. Prejudice. The length of delay is insufficient in and of itself to require dismissal. People v. Edwards, 55 Mich.App. 256, 222 N.W.2d 203 (1974). However, "an affirmative demonstration of prejudice [is not] necessary to prove a denial of the constitutional right t......
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People v. Tillman, Docket No. 18998
...as 'that animal'.2 Nor did the court err in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant on this ground. People v. Edwards, 55 Mich.App. 256, 259, 222 N.W.2d 203 (1974).3 This statute has been amended by 1972 P.A. 242 and 1974 P.A ...
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