People v. Edwards

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Citation: People v. Edwards, 757 N.E.2d 442, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 258 Ill.Dec. 753 (Ill. 2001)
• Decision Date: 20 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 87930.,87930.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Donald EDWARDS, Appellant.

757 N.E.2d 442

197 Ill.2d 239

258 Ill.Dec. 753

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Donald EDWARDS, Appellant.

No. 87930.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September 20, 2001.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Robert Neal Markfield, Assistant Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Springfield, for Appellant.

James E. Ryan, Attorney General, Springfield, John C. Piland, State's Attorney, Urbana (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, William L. Browers and Lisa A. Smith, Assistant Attorneys General, Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Justice McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Donald Edwards, filed a pro se post-conviction petition in the circuit court of Champaign County pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1998)) in which he alleged that, following the entry of his guilty plea, his court-appointed attorney refused his request to "file an appeal" and became "totally unavailable in regard to the case." The circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous or patently without merit. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998). The appellate court affirmed. 305 Ill.App.3d 853, 238 Ill.Dec. 989, 713 N.E.2d 235. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgments of the circuit and appellate courts.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was indicted in 1997 on one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance and one count of unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. In October 1997, while before the circuit court, defendant stated that he wished to plead guilty to the count of unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. In exchange for defendant's plea, the State agreed to drop the remaining count and recommend a term of imprisonment not to exceed six years. The circuit court admonished defendant of his rights, accepted the plea, and sentenced defendant to six years' imprisonment.

The circuit court then informed defendant that, although he had pled guilty, he retained the right to appeal. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 605(b) (145 Ill.2d R. 605(b)), the circuit court explained to defendant the conditions to pursuing an appeal from a guilty plea that are set forth in Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (145 Ill.2d R. 604(d)). Rule 604(d) requires a defendant who wishes to appeal from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea to first file a motion in the circuit court to withdraw his guilty plea within 30 days of sentencing. 145 Ill.2d R. 604(d). Such a motion must specify the grounds for withdrawal of the plea. 145 Ill.2d R. 604(d) ("The motion shall be in writing and shall state the grounds therefor"). In the case at bar, the circuit court properly admonished defendant that he could appeal from "the judgment of conviction on [the] plea, or the sentence imposed," but only after filing "a written motion to withdraw or take back your plea."

No further pleadings were filed after sentencing.

In February 1998, defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1996)). Defendant made a number of allegations within his petition including, inter alia, an allegation that his attorney failed to subpoena witnesses that defendant had requested and an allegation that his attorney showed a lack of interest in his case. Defendant also alleged the following:

"I requested to [my attorney] Lenik to file an appeal, after the Judge (DeLaMar) explained to me that I could do so. Atty. Lenik stated in regard to the appeal, quote [sic] On what grounds? unquote [sic] Atty. Lenik had taken it or decided for herself not to file an appeal, in spite of my numerous requests to. She (Atty. Lenik) also became totally unavailable in regard to the case in spite of the repeated calls by my wife on my behalf."

The circuit court found that "[t]his allegation [was] in essence a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to allow the Petitioner to appeal." After reviewing pertinent case law relating to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and Rule 604(d), the circuit court concluded that "it would appear that the Petitioner cannot just make the bare allegation that he requested counsel to file a motion to withdraw his plea. The Petitioner must show prejudice. In the least, [this] would apparently mean that the Petitioner would have to show grounds for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea." The circuit court determined that "[t]he Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as provided to this Court does not show * * * [any] recognized issues that can be raised in a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea." The circuit court then dismissed defendant's petition as frivolous or patently without merit. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998).

Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in concluding that defendant had to show how he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Relying upon this court's decision in People v. Moore, 133 Ill.2d 331, 140 Ill.Dec. 385, 549 N.E.2d 1257 (1990), defendant contended that prejudice should be presumed. In Moore, this court held that the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel (see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)) need not be established where counsel fails to perfect a defendant's appeal after trial and the defendant subsequently seeks post-conviction relief. In such cases, prejudice is presumed. Moore, 133 Ill.2d at 339,140 Ill.Dec. 385,549 N.E.2d 1257.

The appellate court, however, distinguished Moore on the ground that the defendant in that case was convicted following a trial. Citing People v. Wilk, 124 Ill.2d 93, 124 Ill.Dec. 398, 529 N.E.2d 218 (1988), and People v. Wendt, 283 Ill.App.3d 947, 219 Ill.Dec. 342, 670 N.E.2d 1230 (1996), the appellate court concluded that prejudice should not be presumed for a defendant who has pleaded guilty and agreed to a specific sentence. 305 Ill. App.3d at 857-58, 238 Ill.Dec. 989, 713 N.E.2d 235. Finding no grounds for withdrawing the guilty plea set forth in defendant's pro se petition, or any explanation of how defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to file the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 305 Ill.App.3d at 858, 238 Ill.Dec. 989, 713 N.E.2d 235.

We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315(a)) and, on November 16, 2000, issued an opinion affirming the judgment of the appellate court. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for rehearing, which we allowed. 155 Ill.2d R. 367; 134 Ill.2d R. 612(p).

ANALYSIS

I

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1998)) provides a remedy for defendants who have suffered a substantial violation of their constitutional rights at trial. Under the Act, a post-conviction proceeding not involving the death penalty contains three stages. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill.2d 410, 418, 221 Ill.Dec. 195, 675 N.E.2d 102 (1996). At the first stage, the circuit court must independently review the post-conviction petition within 90 days of its filing and determine whether "the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998). If the court determines that the petition is either frivolous or patently without merit, the court must dismiss the petition in a written order. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1998). A post-conviction petition is considered frivolous or patently without merit only if the allegations in the petition, taken as true and liberally construed, fail to present the "gist of a constitutional claim." Gaultney, 174 Ill.2d at 418, 221 Ill.Dec. 195, 675 N.E.2d 102, citing People v. Porter, 122 Ill.2d 64, 74, 118 Ill.Dec. 465, 521 N.E.2d 1158 (1988). The "gist" standard is "a low threshold." Gaultney, 174 Ill.2d at 418, 221 Ill.Dec. 195, 675 N.E.2d 102. To set forth the "gist" of a constitutional claim, the post-conviction petition "need only present a limited amount of detail" (Gaultney, 174 Ill.2d at 418, 221 Ill.Dec. 195, 675 N.E.2d 102) and hence need not set forth the claim in its entirety. Further, the petition need not include "legal arguments or [citations] to legal authority." Gaultney, 174 Ill.2d at 418, 221 Ill.Dec. 195, 675 N.E.2d 102.

In his special concurrence, Justice Fitzgerald notes that several decisions from our appellate court have stated that, under the "gist" standard, the pro se defendant must "`plead sufficient facts from which the trial court could find a valid claim of deprivation of a constitutional right.'" (Emphasis in original.) 197 Ill.2d at 260, 258 Ill.Dec. at 774, 757 N.E.2d at 463 (Fitzgerald, J., concurring), quoting People v. Lemons, 242 Ill.App.3d 941, 946, 184 Ill.Dec. 642, 613 N.E.2d 1234 (1993). In our view, the "sufficient facts" test used in Lemons and other appellate decisions is at odds with this court's holdings and should be avoided.

On its face, the "sufficient facts" test requires a pro se defendant to file a factually complete petition at the first stage of the post-conviction proceedings. In other words, the defendant must allege facts that would support all the elements of a constitutional claim. This conclusion follows from the requirement, as stated in Lemons, that the facts alleged must be such that the "trial court could find a valid claim of deprivation of a constitutional right." Lemons, 242 Ill.App.3d at 946, 184 Ill.Dec. 642, 613 N.E.2d 1234. Necessarily, if facts supporting all the elements of a constitutional claim are not included in the petition, the circuit court could not "find a valid claim."

However, requiring this type of full or complete pleading is contrary to this court's holding that the pro se defendant "need only present a limited amount of detail" (Gaultney, 174 Ill.2d at 418, 221 Ill.Dec. 195, 675 N.E.2d 102) to survive summary dismissal at the first stage of...