People v. Edwards, 54995

Decision Date03 June 1976
Docket NumberNo. 54995,54995
Citation396 Mich. 551,242 N.W.2d 739
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ernest EDWARDS, Defendant-Appellant. 396 Mich. 551, 242 N.W.2d 739, 92 A.L.R.3d 1149
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

Frank R. Vargas, Saginaw, for defendant-appellant.

Daniel R. Connell, Saginaw, for plaintiff-appellee.

LEVIN, Justice.

Ernest Edwards was jury convicted of second-degree murder for the fatal shooting of Robert Stevens.

At trial, one of Edwards' witnesses sought to testify that Chester Blake, then deceased, had told him that he (Blake) killed Stevens. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection and asked the jury to disregard the testimony.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 1

We hold that the proffered hearsay evidence was admissible as a declaration against penal interest and reverse and remand for a new trial.

I

Harold Napora and Stevens (the victim) spent the evening of April 23, 1971 traveling from bar to bar in search of a prostitute.

They met defendant Edwards who said he could find them a woman for $10. Edwards introduced them to Betty King. Napora, Stevens and King, however, were unable to agree on a price.

Napora testified that when it became apparent no agreement would be reached, he and Stevens started to drive away. Edwards pulled a gun and said, 'This is a stickup. Give me your money and don't take off.' 2 As Napora drove away, he heard two shots fired.

Stevens had been sitting on the passenger's side of Napora's truck. The door was partly open as they started to drive away and Stevens told Napora he thought he 'got grazed a little bit.' They examined his side at Stevens' home. Napora testified that they saw only a little red spot which did not look like a hole. Stevens was not bleeding and declined Napora's offer of a ride to the hospital. Napora, not knowing Stevens had been shot, went home. 3

Stevens bled to death as a result of a gunshot wound of the liver. A .22 caliber bullet was removed from his body.

Edwards testified that after he introduced King to Napora and Stevens, he went to Skip's After Hour. He denied having a gun or firing any shots at Napora or Stevens. 4 He said that Chester Blake came into Skip's trying to pawn a .22 caliber pistol for $10. Edwards said he gave Blake $10 for the gun, took it home and sold it to David Benton the next day. Stevens was killed with a .22. 5

King's testimony tended to corroborate that of Edwards. She said that after she, Stevens and Napora failed to reach an agreement, 'some shooting started.' She said she saw Chester Blake standing nearby with a gun. 6

II

John Longuemire sought to testify that Chester Blake, then deceased, had told him 7 that he (Blake) killed Stevens. The people's objection was sustained and the jury instructed to disregard Longuemire's testimony. 8

The general rule is that hearsay, an out-of-court statement offered as proof of the matter asserted, is inadmissible at trial. 9

That rule is riddled with exceptions.

One exception is for declarations against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the defendant. 10 Such statements are admissible as proof of the matter asserted if the declarant is unavailable for trial because they are considered inherently reliable. Wigmore states '(t)he basis of the exception is the principle of experience that a statement asserting a fact distinctly against one's interest is unlikely to be deliberately false or heedlessly incorrect.' 11.

While courts uniformly recognize the exception for declarations against pecunitary or proprietary interest, they have generally refused to admit declarations against penal interest. 12

This distinction, which has been criticized by courts, commentators and code drafters as without basis in law or logic, 13 was first made by the House of Lords in 1844 in the Sussex Peerage case. 14

Both Wigmore and McCormick state that the House of Lords ignored precedent in holding that a declaration against penal interest was not within the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule. 15 Wigmore characterizes the case as 'a backward step,' 'an arbitrary limit' that 'was plainly a novelty at the time of its inception' 16 and that would perhaps in England 'no longer be observed.' 17 He labels the decision a 'barbarous doctrine which would refuse to let an innocent accused vindicate himself.'

'It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to discard this barbarous doctrine, which would refuse to let an innocent accused vindicate himself even by producing to the tribunal a perfectly authenticated written confession, made on the very gallows, by the true culprit now beyond the reach of justice. Those who watched (in 1899) with self-righteous indignation the course of proceedings in Captain Dreyfus' trial should remember that, if that trial had occurred in our own courts, the spectacle would have been no less shameful if we, following our own supposed precedents, had refused to admit what the French court never for a moment hesitated to admit--the authenticated confession of the absconded Major Esterhazy, avowing himself the guilty author of the treason there charged, and now known beyond a doubt to have been the real traitor.' 18

Justice Holmes severely criticized recognition of the distinction by the United States Supreme Court in his oft-quoted dissent in Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 277, 33 S.Ct. 449, 461, 57 L.Ed. 820 (1913):

'The confession of Joe Dick, since deceased, that he committed the murder for which the plaintiff in error was tried, coupled with circumstances pointing to its truth, would have a very strong tendency to make any one outside of a court of justice believe that Donnelly did not commit the crime. I say this, of course, on the susposition that it should be proved that the confession really was made, and that there was no ground for connecting Donnelly with Dick. The rules of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and common sense, less hampered by history than some parts of the substantive law. There is no decision by this court against the admissibility of such a confession; the English cases since the separation of the two countries do not bind us; the exception to the hearsay rule in the case of declarations against interest is well known; no other statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder; it is far more calculated to convince than dying declarations, which would be let in to hang a man * * *; and when we surround the accused with so many safeguards, some of which seem to me excessive; I think we ought to give him the benefit of a fact that, if proved, commonly would have such weight. The history of the law and the arguments against the English doctrine are so well and fully stated by Mr. Wigmore that there is no need to set them forth at greater length.'

And Judge Friendly in United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373, 378 (C.A. 2, 1961), felt bound by but expressly disapproved what he characterized as 'the rather indefensible limitation' on the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule.

III

A number of state courts 19 have declined to follow the English rule and have held declarations against penal interest admissible as a common law exception to the hearsay rule. 20

Earlier proposals for codification of the law of evidence rejected exclusion of declarations against penal interest. See Uniform Rules of Evidence 1953, 63(10) and ALI Model Code of Evidence 1942, 509(1).

In Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843, 846, 35 A.L.R. 431, 439--440 (1923), a witness for the defense was permitted to testify as to a confession made by a then deceased person. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated:

'* * * (W)e think it must be conceded that many of the courts and textwriters who stand for the doctrine (that declarations against penal interest are inadmissible) have felt called upon to apologize for their position, or, if not to apologize, to undertake to explain to the lay mind that, although a contrary doctrine would appear to be demanded by common sense and natural justice, nevertheless a trained professional eye could see the matter in a different light.'

In Newberry v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445, 61 S.E.2d 318 (1950), the same Court held that a third person's written confession was properly admitted where he claimed his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to testify.

The Supreme Court of California, in People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal.2d 868, 36 Cal.Rptr. 841, 389 P.2d 377, 381 (1964), held admissible statements of defendant's companion that the heroin found by police was hers. The Court found declarations against penal interest 'no less trustworthy' than declarations against pecuniary or proprietary interest: '(A) person's interest against being criminally implicated gives reasonable assurance of the veracity of his statement made against that interest.'

Additionally, the California Court stated that traditional analysis could be relied on to admit declarations against penal interest since conviction of a crime 'ordinarily entails economic loss.' 21

The Supreme Court of Hawaii in State v. Leong, 51 Haw. 581, 465 P.2d 560, 564 (1970), citing People v. Spriggs, supra, agreed that there is 'no sound basis' for excluding declarations against penal interest. They are 'no less trustworthy' than other declarations against interest and the potential criminal liability 'will act as a stimulus to telling the truth, or as a deterrent to falsification.' 22

The New York Court of Appeals, in adopting 'a more rational view of admissibility of declarations against interest,' stated that 'the distinction which would authorize a court to receive proof that a man admitted he never had title to an Elgin watch, but not to receive proof that he had admitted striking Jones over the head with a club, assuming equal relevancy of both statements, does not readily withstand analysis.' 23

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  • Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest: State v. Parris Goes Too Far
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