People v. Edwards
Decision Date | 06 October 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 49789,49789 |
Citation | 74 Ill.2d 1,383 N.E.2d 944,23 Ill.Dec. 73 |
Parties | , 23 Ill.Dec. 73 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Ronald E. EDWARDS, Appellee. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., of Chicago, and Michael M. Mihm, State's Atty., Peoria , for the People.
Robert J. Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and G. Joseph Weller, Assistant State Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for appellee.
The defendant, Ronald E. Edwards, was found guilty of unlawful possession of a weapon, in two counts (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 24-1(a)(7)), and of burglary (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 19-1(a)) by a jury in the circuit court of Peroria County. The appellate court, with one justice concurring in part and dissenting in part, finding the State's Attorney had made prejudicial comments during closing arguments, reversed and remanded for a new trial. (49 Ill.App.3d 79, 7 Ill.Dec. 14, 363 N.E.2d 935.) We granted leave to appeal. 58 Ill.2d R. 315.
The defendant argues that his motion for mistrial due to improper closing arguments should have been granted by the trial court. He also contends, as he did before the appellate court, that the trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial because the prosecutor had called to the attention of the jury, on cross-examination of the defendant, the guilty plea of a co-indictee who was not called to testify; and that an arguably unlawful search of the defendant's car occurred which uncovered two sawed-off shotguns. (In this court, the defendant also asserts ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to challenge the lawfulness of the search.) We agree with the appellate court and the defendant failed to preserve these contentions for appeal because they were not cited as the basis for his motion for a new trial (49 Ill.App.3d 79, 81-82.) "Where the grounds for a new trial are stated in writing," as in the case here, "the accused is limited on review to the errors alleged therein and all other errors are deemed to have been waived." (People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill.2d 348, 367, 263 N.E.2d 840, 851.) The only error alleged as justifying a new trial, other than the customary reasonable doubt issue and catchall language regarding "any error which may appear from a reading of the entire transcript of this matter," was that of improper closing arguments.
The defendant and Robert Sneyd, who was a prosecution witness, were arrested near the Lipsett Steel Company in Peoria County after midnight on July 11, 1973, for burglary of the company. Police had arrived at the company in response to a burglar alarm, and found entry into the office had been through a hole in the roof and ceiling, plaster and other debris had been strewn about the area, and the safe had been tampered with. The clothing of the defendant and Sneyd was kept as evidence. The clothing thought to be the defendant's was sent to the FBI Crime Laboratory to be tested for the presence of plaster particles. The results were negative and given to defense counsel. Sneyd's alleged clothing was not sent. At trial, Sneyd, who had prior felony convictions and had pleaded guilty to the burglary here, testified that the defendant lowered himself through the hole they cut in the roof of the company, while he remained outside. The defendant testified that he and Sneyd, having left Frank Larsen in the defendant's car which was parked in the lot at the company, took Sneyd's car and parked it elsewhere, and went fishing. At the beginning of the third day of trial, before the jury appeared, the State moved for leave to reopen its case. The evening before, after the State closed its case, the prosecutor had the clothes labeled Sneyd's sent to the Joliet Crime Laboratory on the hunch that these clothes might actually belong to the defendant and contain plaster. The test results showed the presence of plaster. Defense counsel objected and the trial court denied the State leave to reopen its case to admit the new results into evidence. However, the trial court, over objection, did permit the State to reopen its case to permit Sneyd to testify that the set of clothing, first identified as the defendant's and lacking plaster particles, was his.
In his closing arguments, defense counsel made the following comments:
During the State's rebuttal arguments, the following was recorded:
This exchange is the basis of the defendant's appeal from the circuit court, and it is the extent of the closing arguments which appear in the record since both parties waived transcription of closing arguments. Although a tape recording was made and is the source for the above partial transcription, which was done at the instigation of the defendant, it was lost subsequent to the transcription. Apparently neither of the parties is responsible for the loss.
At the threshold, the State contends that the defendant waived consideration of the issue of prejudicial closing argument by joining in a waiver of transcription of the arguments, and that the record on appeal provided an insufficient basis for the appellate court to find reversible error. The State relies on People v. Smith (1969), 42 Ill.2d 479, 483, 248 N.E.2d 68, 71, which held that the "responsibility for the proper preservation of the record of the proceedings before the trial court rests upon the defendant." We agree that such responsibility falls on an appellant. Our disposition of this issue, which the appellate court did not address, obviates the necessity of resolving the question of improper and prejudicial closing arguments.
The rationale for the Smith holding is clear. For an assignment of error, the record must show the error; hence, the record must be preserved for an adequate assessment on appeal. This is so because, on review, "the reviewing court is restricted in its examination to the record." (People v. Shoffner (1948), 400 Ill. 174, 177, 79 N.E.2d 200, 201.) A reviewing court may not guess at the harm to an appellant or hypothesize about the context in which allegedly...
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...claims requiring further factual findings are cognizable only in post-conviction proceedings. See generally People v. Edwards, 74 Ill.2d 1, 23 Ill.Dec. 73, 383 N.E.2d 944 (1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 2862, 61 L.Ed.2d 299 (1979). Accordingly, that decision does not excuse On ......
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