People v. Egan

• Decision Date: 25 October 1928
• Docket Number: No. 18650.,18650.
• Citation: 331 Ill. 489,163 N.E. 357
• Parties: PEOPLE v. EGAN.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

331 Ill. 489

163 N.E. 357

PEOPLE

v.EGAN.

No. 18650.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 25, 1928.

Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Emanuel Eller, Judge.

Frank Egan was convicted of rape, and he brings error.

Reversed and remanded.

Robert E. Cantwell, Jr., of Chicago, (Elwyn E. Long, of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., Robert E. Crowe, State's Atty., of Chicago, Roy D. Johnson and James B. Searcy, both of Springfield (Edward E. Wilson, John Holman, and Lee R. La Rochelle, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

HEARD, J.

This writ of error is prosecuted to review a judgment of the criminal court of Cook county finding plaintiff in error, Frank Egan, guilty of rape, and sentencing him to imprisonment in the penitentiary for his natural life.

According to the testimony, Egan and Tom Orr met the complaining witness, Betty Pierson, and her friend, Mary Cavanaugh, near the Calumet Club, at Sixty-second street and Cottage Grove avenue, Chicago, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, May 30, 1926. Prior to that they had met each other at the bathing beach and at a dance hall. At the invitation of the men, the girls got into a taxicab and drove to apartment 311 at 6246 South Park avenue. This apartment had been leased the day before by plaintiff in error in the name of Alfred Farrell, with whom he resided. The apartment consisted of a living room, dressing room, kitchen, and bathroom, as shown by the following diagram:

Image 1 (2.61" X 2.37") Available for Offline Print

On the way to the apartment, plaintiff in error stopped and purchased a quantity of intoxicating liquor. Shortly after these four persons arrived at the apartment Farrell appeared, and a little later two other girls. During the evening a large portion of the liquor was consumed. The carousal lasted until about 11 o'clock. The crime with which Egan is charged is claimed to have taken place shortly before 11 o'clock in the dressing room, while the other five members of the party were in the living room, at which time no outcry or disturbance is shown to have been heard by any of the party.

It is claimed by plaintiff in error that, assuming the testimony of the prosecutrix to be true, it does not show him to have been guilty of the crime alleged. We do not consider it necessary to discuss the evidence in detail and pass upon this question. There is a direct conflict in the evidence in the case. The evidence of the prosecutrix as to matters occurring during the evening prior to the time in question is corroborated by one of the girls, while it is flatly contradicted by the other two girls and by Egan, who testified, denying his guilt. The evidence was of such a character that it was highly important that incompetent prejudicial evidence should not be admitted, that the jury should be properly instructed, and that the conduct of the court should not tend to prejudice the jury against the defendant.

[1][2] Over the objections of plaintiff in error the prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence tending to show that after the occurrence and until the time of the trial the health of the prosecutrix had been greatly impaired. While in cases of this character it is competent to show the physical condition of the prosecutrix soon after the commission of the crime as tending to prove its commission, evidence as to her condition, either mental or physical, a long time thereafter, has no tendency to prove the only question at issue, which is the guilt of the defendant. The only effect of such evidence would be to prejudice the jury against the defendant. Bynum v. State, 76 Fla. 618, 80 So. 572;State v. Houx, 109 Mo. 654, 19 S. W. 35,32 Am. St. Rep. 686;Bailey v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 30 S. W. 669.

[3] Over the objection of plaintiff in error the prosecution was allowed to prove that, about four hours previous to the time at which the offense is alleged to have been committed, he made improper advances and insulting proposals to Mary Cavanaugh out of the presence of prosecutrix, and also evidence of circumstances tending to show indecent relations with another girl about two hours after the prosecutrix had left his apartment. This evidence was no part of the res gestae, and should not have been admitted. Janzen v. People, 159 Ill. 440, 42 N. E. 862;Dalton v. People, 224, Ill. 333, 79 N. E. 669;People v. Gray, 251 Ill. 431, 96 N. E. 268;People v. Gibson, 255 Ill. 302, 99 N. E. 599,48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 236;People v. Rogers, 324 Ill. 224, 154 N. E. 909.

[4][5] It is contended by plaintiff in error that the conduct of the trial judge at various times was such as to be prejudicial to plaintiff in error. On one phase of the case the trial judge conducted an extended cross-examination of Egan, covering a page and a half of the abstract, and his tone of voice is characterized in the abstract as ‘loud and angry.’ While a trial judge is not a mere...