People v. Eiland

• Decision Date: 26 July 1991
• Docket Number: No. 5-90-0317,5-90-0317
• Citation: 217 Ill.App.3d 250,576 N.E.2d 1185
• Parties: , 160 Ill.Dec. 231 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnnie L. EILAND, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1185

576 N.E.2d 1185

217 Ill.App.3d 250, 160 Ill.Dec. 231

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnnie L. EILAND, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5-90-0317.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fifth District.

July 26, 1991.

Wimmer, Stiehl & Montalvo, P.C. by William D. Stiehl, Jr., Belleville, for defendant-appellant.

Scott Mansfield, State's Atty., Belleville, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Gerry R. Arnold, Staff Atty., Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Mt. Vernon, for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice WELCH delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Johnnie Eiland, appeals from a judgment of conviction of the offenses of unlawful possession of 200 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine with the intent to deliver (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 56 1/2, par. 1401(a)(11)), and unlawful possession of more than 30 grams but not more than 500 grams of a substance containing cannabis with the intent to deliver (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 56 1/2, par. 705(d)), entered upon a jury verdict in the circuit court of St. Clair County. Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence; (2) the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion in limine to bar the State from introducing evidence of defendant's prior conviction; (3) the evidence was not sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) the State's closing argument was prejudicial.

On September 11, 1989, an information was filed charging defendant with the above-stated offenses based upon evidence seized during a warrantless search of his apartment and automobile conducted by defendant's probation officer on June 15, 1989. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that a search of his apartment by East St. Louis police officers on June 8, 1989, during which illegal drugs were seized, was unlawful and that the probation officer's search on June 15 was both without probable cause and "fruit of the poisonous tree."

At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, Scott Dennis, a friend of defendant, testified that he was at defendant's residence on June 8, 1989, as a baby-sitter for defendant's infant son. According to Dennis, two police officers broke open the back door and a third officer entered through the front door. The officers searched defendant's home.

Detective Delbert Marion, East St. Louis Police Department, testified that he went with two other police officers to defendant's apartment on June 8 in response to a citizen's complaint by Danny Thompkins that a youth believed to be defendant's son had burglarized Thompkins' home and stolen a rifle. Thompkins told the police that defendant took the rifle away, so Detective Marion and the other officers went to defendant's residence in order to recover the weapon. Detective Marion went to the front door of defendant's apartment and Scott Dennis allowed him to enter. From his location inside the apartment, Detective Marion could see a scale and two bags containing white powder. The officers seized the two bags, which appeared to contain cocaine, the scale, baggies, a 12-gauge shotgun, and a large sum of money.

Robert Hanson, an intensive probation supervision officer with the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, identified People's Exhibit No. 1 as a copy of the conditions of intensive probation supervision that had been given to defendant. Hanson, who conducted defendant's intake interview, stated that he had read through the conditions with defendant and that defendant indicated his understanding of those conditions and signed the agreement. Hanson stated that condition 10(d) was defendant's consent to submit to a search of his person, residence, automobile, and other effects upon request by the probation officer, and consent to the use of anything seized as evidence in a court proceeding.

Michael Buettner, supervisor of the intensive probation unit, testified that the intensive probation program differed from regular probation in that it was an intense monitoring of the probationer with very strict rules requiring, among other things, curfews and urinalysis testing. Buettner testified that he had made the decision to search defendant's residence and automobile based upon defendant's urinalysis on March 22 and May 23 showing the presence of controlled substances. In addition, on June 15 defendant's probation officer, Thomas McManemy, provided Buettner with information he had received that day from Captain Terry Delaney, a member of the Illinois State Police, Division of Criminal Investigation. Delaney had learned from a reliable informant that defendant was involved in drug trafficking. Both Buettner and McManemy testified that although they were aware the East St. Louis police had searched defendant's apartment on June 8, their decision to conduct a search on June 15 was based on defendant's urinalysis results and on the information provided by Captain Delaney, and not on the fact that the police had found cocaine and drug paraphernalia in defendant's residence on June 8.

Buettner further testified that he and four other probation officers participated in the search of defendant's apartment and automobile on June 15, 1989. The probation officers told defendant that they intended to conduct the search pursuant to the conditions of his probation and defendant did not deny them permission to search. The officers escorted five or six other people out of the apartment and discovered in plain view a scale, a spoon, and a plate, all having a white powdery residue on them. Defendant was then placed under arrest, read his Miranda rights and searched. One thousand and fifty-one dollars in U.S. currency was found on defendant's person. The search of the residence also produced various types of ammunition and a dresser drawer containing a white powdery residue. The officers discovered a bag of cocaine and a bag of cannabis in the trunk of defendant's automobile.

Subsequent to the hearing, the trial court entered an order denying defendant's motion to suppress and finding, inter alia, as follows:

"1. Defendant was placed on I.P.S. [intensive probation supervision] for a term of 30 months commencing 1-27-89, in case No. 88-CF-436, and defendant is still on said probation.

2. Illinois Revised Statutes Chapter 38, Sec. 1005-6-3(b) grants the Court authority to impose 'other reasonable conditions "[of probation]" [sic ] relating to the nature of the offense or the rehabilitation of the defendant ...[.]'

3. Pursuant to the authority granted under Chapter 38, Sec. 1005-6-3(b), specific [sic ] Rule 10(d) of the conditions of probation provides as follows:

'Submit to searches of your person, residence, papers, automobile and/or effects at any time such requests are made by the probation officer, and consent to the use of anything seized as evidence in a court proceeding.'

4. A warrantless search with less than probable cause may be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if it is conducted pursuant to a regulation that is a reasonable response to the special needs of the operation of the probation system. Griffin v. Wisconsin [1987], 483 U.S. 868, 97 L.Ed.2d 709. It is sufficient to uphold the reasonableness of the search 'if the information provided indicates ... only the likelihood [* * *] of facts justifying the search.' See 483 U.S. 868 at 880 .

Based upon the foregoing, this Court finds that, without considering the results of the search on June 8, 1989, information provided indicated the likelihood of facts justifying the search of the defendant who was subject to searches pursuant to the condition of I.P.S., the probation which defendant and his counsel actively sought and requested this Court to impose at the time of his sentencing in case No. 88-CF-436."

We believe the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will not be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. (People v. Guerrieri (1990), 194 Ill.App.3d 497, 503, 141 Ill.Dec. 580, 584, 551 N.E.2d 767, 771; People v. Clark (1982), 92 Ill.2d 96, 99, 65 Ill.Dec. 14, 16, 440 N.E.2d 869, 871.) Here, it is clear that neither the trial court's findings of fact nor its application of the law as stated in Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987), 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709, to those facts was in error.

In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of a probationer's residence was "reasonable" within the meaning of the fourth amendment because it was conducted pursuant to a regulation that was itself a reasonable response to the "special needs" of a probation system. The Court observed that a State's operation of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office, or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, presented "special needs" beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements. (483 U.S. at 873-74, 107 S.Ct. at 3168, 97 L.Ed.2d at 717.) Restrictions on a probationer, the Court further stated, are meant to assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer's conditional liberty status. These goals require and justify the exercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed. "Supervision, then, is a 'special need' of the State permitting a degree of infringement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large." (483 U.S. at 875, 107 S.Ct. at 3168, 97 L.Ed.2d at 718.) This special need is equally applicable to the State of Illinois and its probation system.

The Griffin Court reasoned that in conjunction with the need for supervision, a degree of flexibility must also be accorded the probation officer. A warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable degree with the probation...