People v. Elerding

• Decision Date: 21 June 1912
• Citation: 98 N.E. 982,254 Ill. 579
• Parties: PEOPLE v. ELERDING.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

254 Ill. 579

98 N.E. 982

PEOPLE

v.ELERDING.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 21, 1912.

Error to Coles County Court; J. P. Harrah, Judge.

Edward H. Elerding was convicted of violating the Hours of Labor Law, and he brings error. Affirmed.J. H. Marshall, for plaintiff in error.

W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., R. G. Hammond, State's Atty., and Fred H. Hand (Edgar A. Bancroft and Samuel A. Harper, of counsel), for the People.

FARMER, J.

Plaintiff in error is the manager of a hotel in Charleston, Coles county, Ill., in which he employs female help. The state's attorney of Coles county, at the October term, 1911, of the county court of said county, filed an information against plaintiff in error charging him with the violation of the statute prohibiting the employment of females in hotels more than 10 hours during any one day. The information contained three counts. The first count charged plaintiff in error with unlawfully employing Dolly Gertz, a female, for a period of 10 1/2 hours. The second count charged the unlawful employment of Gertrude Doering, a female, for a period of 12 hours, and the third count charged the unlawful employment of Mary Jones, a female, for a period of 12 hours. The plaintiff in error moved to quash the information, which motion to overruled. He thereupon entered a plea of not guilty. There was no dispute as to the facts, and the case was submitted to the court without a jury, on a written stipulation. Dolly Gertz was employed by plaintiff in error in his hotel as a kitchen maid from 5:30 o'clock a. m. to 2:30 o'clock p. m. and from 5:30 o'clock p. m. to 7 p. m. Her duties during said hours were to wash dishes and kitchen utensils, to assist in paring potatoes, cleaning and preparing vegetables for cooking and fruits for the table. She was required to be in readiness for work during all the hours of her employment; but the time required to do the work assigned her did not exceed 7 hours in the aggregate. Gertrude Doering was employed in the said hotel as housekeeper from 7 a. m. to 7 o'clock p. m. She was charged with the responsibility of keeping the rooms in readiness to receive guests, cleaning rooms, making beds, changing linen, and caring for bedclothing. All her duties were supervisory, and no manual labor was required of her. Mary Jones was employed in the hotel from 7 a. m. to 7 p. m. Her duties were to assign guests to rooms, receive payment of bills, keep the accounts of the hotel, and to occasionally take dictation of letters in shorthand from plaintiff in error and transcribe the same on a typewriter. Her duties during the hours of her employment did not actually require more than two-thirds of her time. Plaintiff in error contended that the law limiting the hours females may work in hotels is unconstitutional and requested the court to so hold. The court denied the request, held the law valid, and imposed a fine against plaintiff in error of $25 under each cound of the information. The case is brought here by writ of error; the only question presented for consideration being the validity of the statute.

In 1909 the Legislature adopted an act entitled ‘An act to regulate and limit the hours of employment of females in any mechanical establishment or factory or laundry in order to safeguard the health of such employes; to provide for its enforcement and a penalty for its violation.’ That act limited the hours females might be employed in any mechanical establishment, factory, or laundry to 10 hours during any one day, but applied to no other line of employment or business. In 1911 the act was amended by the Legislature so as to include a large number of other lines of employment. Hurd's Stat. 1911, p. 1135. As amended and in force since July 1, 1911 (Laws 1911, p. 328), section 1 of the statute reads as follows: ‘Section 1. That no female shall be employed in any mechanical or mercantile establishment, or factory, or laundry, or hotel, or restaurant, or telegraph or telephone establishment or office thereof, or in any place of amusement, or by any person, firm or corporation engaged in any express or transportation or public utility business, or by any common carrier, or in any public institution, incorporated or unincorporated in this state, more than ten hours during any one day. The hours of work may be so arranged as to permit the employment of females at any time so that they shall not work more than ten hours during the twenty-four hours of any day.’

[1] That under the police power of the state the General Assembly may enact legislation to prohibit all things hurtful to the health, welfare, and safety of society, even though the prohibition invade the right of liberty or property of the individual, is too well settled to require discussion or the citation of authority. The question here to be determined is whether the law limiting the hours females may be employed in hotels is a valid exercise of that power.

[2] It is for the Legislature to determine when conditions exist calling for the exercise of the police power; but the judgment of the Legislature in enacting laws under the police power is not conclusive of their validity. There are the same limitations against legislation not authorized under the police power as exist against legislation of any other kind not authorized by the Constitution. What are subjects of the lawful exercise of the police power is as much a question for judicial determination as is the question whether other constitutional limitations have been violated in the passage of laws relating to other subjects.

[3] Sex, alone, would not in all cases serve as a proper basis for the exercise of the police power, for in the invasion of the right of liberty and property there must be some reasonable connection between the limitation upon the hours females may work and the public health, safety, and welfare proposed to be secured by the limitation. Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N. E. 454,29 L. R. A. 79, 46 Am. St. Rep. 315;Booth v. People, 186 Ill. 43, 57 N. E. 798,50 L. R. A. 762, 78 Am. St. Rep. 229; In matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636.

In Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, 244 Ill. 509, 91 N. E. 695,27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 994, this court sustained the act as originally adopted, limiting the time females might be employed in any mechanical establishment, factory, or laundry to not exceeding 10 hours in any one day, as a valid exercise of the police power for the protection of the health of women and insuring the production of vigorous and healthy offspring by them. There can be no doubt working long hours day after day under the pressure usually attending the labor of an employé who is subject to the control, direction, and dismissal of the employer, has a tendency to weaken and impair the health of women that would not attend shorter hours of employment. To exactly what extent this may be so of females employed in hotels cannot, perhaps, be definitely known; nor is it necessary that it should be in order to sustain legislation reasonably limiting the hours of work therein. That such is, in general, the effect of long hours of work in any employment is sufficient to authorize their regulation. In Ritchie & Co. v. Wayman, supra, we held the court would take judicial...