People v. Elliott

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: Justice GOLDENHERSH delivered the judgment of the court
• Citation: People v. Elliott, 2012 IL App (5th) 100584, 978 N.E.2d 742, 365 Ill.Dec. 487 (Ill. App. 2012)
• Decision Date: 01 November 2012
• Docket Number: No. 5–10–0584.,5–10–0584.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. David K. ELLIOTT, Defendant–Appellant.

2012 IL App (5th) 100584

978 N.E.2d 742

365 Ill.Dec. 487

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.David K. ELLIOTT, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 5–10–0584.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Nov. 1, 2012.

Edward W. Unsell, Law Office of Edward W. Unsell, East Alton, IL, Attorney for Appellant.

David Stanton, State's Attorney, Pinckneyville, IL, Patrick Delfino, Stephen E. Norris, Neha Sharma, Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Mt. Vernon, IL, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

Justice GOLDENHERSH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[365 Ill.Dec. 489]¶ 1 Defendant, David K. Elliott, was issued a citation in Perry County for driving on a suspended driver's license. The circuit court entered a judgment of guilt. On appeal, defendant raises the issue of whether the conviction was proper given that his statutory summary suspension was rescinded.

¶ 2 We reverse.

¶ 3 FACTS

¶ 4 From August through October 2009, defendant was the subject of two traffic stops and several court proceedings related to his driving privileges. The first traffic stop was on August 26, 2009. After the stop, defendant was issued a citation for driving under the influence (DUI), and a complaint for DUI was filed in Jackson County.

¶ 5 On September 1, 2009, counsel for defendant filed a petition for rescission of statutory summary suspension. On September 3, 2009, the circuit clerk sent notice setting the petition for a hearing on September 21, 2009. On September 11, 2009, the State filed a confirmation of statutory summary suspension setting the suspension to start on October 11, 2009. On September 17, 2009, defendant filed a motion to continue, and the following day the court granted a continuance with delay attributable to defendant. The clerk was instructed to set the matter for a hearing on October 5, 2009. On September 21, 2009, the court again continued the matter, this time to October 19, 2009. The docket entry of the court does not reflect who requested the delay.

¶ 6 In October, the matter of defendant's statutory summary suspension was resolved by the circuit court of Jackson County. On October 11, 2009, 45 days after the notice of statutory summary suspension was issued, the suspension commenced. On October 19, 2009, the circuit court heard the petition. A docket entry on that date indicates that the petition was granted and the court ordered rescission of the suspension. On October 23, 2009, the Secretary of State entered a “Notice/Order of Rescind.”

¶ 7 In the same month, defendant was issued a citation in an adjacent county that eventually led to this appeal. On October 13, 2009, defendant was stopped while driving in Perry County and issued a citation for driving while license suspended. 625 ILCS 5/6–303 (West 2008). The traffic stop was after the commencement of the summary suspension of October 11, 2009, but before the hearing and the order to rescind issued October 19, 2009. On November 22, 2010, the circuit court of Perry County entered an order finding defendant guilty of driving on a suspended license and ordering defendant to pay a fine and serve either 10 days in jail or 30 days of community service.

¶ 8 Defendant appeals.

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Upon refusing to submit to testing for DUI, defendant was issued a notice of statutory summary suspension. The notice informed defendant that his driver's license would be suspended beginning in 46 days. 625 ILCS 5/11–501.1, 2–118.1 (West 2008). In this case, defendant filed a petition to rescind his suspension before it took effect, but the ruling on the petition was not handed down until after defendant had been issued a citation for driving on a suspended driver's license.

¶ 11 Section 2–118.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) sets forth the standards for a petition to rescind. A driver may petition the court within 90 days of the notice for a hearing to contest the statutory suspension. 625 ILCS 5/2–118.1(b) (West 2008). The court is required to hold a hearing within 30 days of receipt of the driver's petition or the first appearance date for the DUI ticket. 625 ILCS 5/2–118.1(b) (West 2008). “[The] hearing, request, or process shall not stay or delay the statutory summary suspension.” 625 ILCS 5/2–118.1(b) (West 2008).

¶ 12 The scope of the hearing is limited. 625 ILCS 5/2–118.1(b)(1)–(4) (West 2008). Section 2–118.1 limits the scope of a hearing on a petition to rescind to: (1) whether the defendant was placed under arrest for driving under the influence; (2) whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was driving under the influence; (3) whether, after being advised that the privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended if he refused to submit to blood-alcohol testing, the defendant refused to submit to such a test; and (4) whether, after being so advised, the defendant submitted to such testing and the test revealed a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.08 or greater. People v. Grabeck, 2011 IL App (2d) 100599, ¶ 13, 356 Ill.Dec. 935, 962 N.E.2d 620.

¶ 13 Section 2–118.1 also prescribes the relief that can be granted:

“Upon the conclusion of the judicial hearing, the circuit court shall sustain or rescind the statutory summary suspension * * *.” 625 ILCS 5/2–118.1(b) (West 2008).

¶ 14 The issue at hand is one of statutory construction. As such, our review is de novo and controlled by certain principles of law. People v. Johnson, 2011 IL 111817, ¶ 15, 355 Ill.Dec. 417, 959 N.E.2d 1150. The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Williams, 239 Ill.2d 503, 506, 347 Ill.Dec. 677, 942 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (2011). The starting point for any inquiry is the language of the statute at issue. People v. Garcia, 241 Ill.2d 416, 421, 349 Ill.Dec. 929, 948 N.E.2d 32, 35 (2011). Courts are to give effect to the intent of the legislature by adhering to the plain and ordinary meaning of legislation. People v. Howard, 233 Ill.2d 213, 218, 330 Ill.Dec. 702, 909 N.E.2d 724, 727–28 (2009). Courts are to consider a statute in its entirety with an eye to the subject it addresses and apparent objective in enacting the legislation. People v. Davis, 199 Ill.2d 130, 135, 262 Ill.Dec. 721, 766 N.E.2d 641, 644 (2002). Each word is to be given a reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous. People v. Jackson, 2011 IL 110615, ¶ 12, 353 Ill.Dec. 353, 955 N.E.2d 1164. If the plain language reveals legislative intent, then no other interpretative aids should be applied. People v. Young, 2011 IL 111886, ¶ 11, 355 Ill.Dec. 677, 960 N.E.2d 559.

¶ 15 The plain language of section 2–118.1 controls our disposition. The statute limits the authority of the trial court to two possible dispositions—to “sustain or rescind the statutory summary suspension.” 625 ILCS 5/2–118.1(b) (West 2008). The trial court ordered the suspension rescinded.

¶ 16 The act of rescinding is not simply to terminate. Both common usage and the operation of the term in legal proceedings impute an intention to undo an action so that it never existed. The common meaning is defined as:

“rescind * * * 1 : to do away with: take away: REMOVE (~ this needless outlay) 2 a : to take back: ANNUL, CANCEL (refused to ~ his harsh order) b : to abrogate (a contract) by tendering back or restoring to the opposite party what one has received from him (as in cases of fraud, duress, mistake, or minority) 3 : to vacate or make void (as an act) by the enacting or a superior authority: REPEAL (a law) (a judgment) * * *.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1930 (1986).

¶ 17 The concept of rescission has developed in the law as a mechanism for the retroactive erasure of a contract. Black's Law Dictionary defines “Rescission of Contract”:

“To abrogate, annul, avoid, or cancel a contract; particularly, nullifying a contract by the act of a party. The right of rescission is the right to cancel (rescind) a contract upon the occurrence of certain kinds of default by the other contracting party. To declare a contract void in its inception and to put an end to it as though it never were. [Citation.] A ‘rescission’ amounts to the unmaking of a contract, or an undoing of it from the beginning, and not merely a termination, and it may be effected by mutual agreement of parties, or by one of the parties declaring rescission of contract without consent of other if a legally sufficient ground therefor exists, or by applying to courts for a decree of rescission.” Black's Law Dictionary 1306 (6th ed. 1990).

¶ 18 Illinois has adopted the definition provided by Black's Law Dictionary. Horan v. Blowitz, 13 Ill.2d 126, 132, 148 N.E.2d 445, 449 (1958). In certain circumstances, merely claiming a right to rescission is insufficient to defeat the procedure for addressing contract disputes. See Allianz Insurance Co. v. Guidant Corp., 373 Ill.App.3d 652, 675, 312 Ill.Dec. 51, 869 N.E.2d 1042, 1062 (2007) (claim for rescission did not negate duty to cooperate in declaratory judgment action); Cusamano v. Norrell Health Care, Inc., 239 Ill.App.3d 648, 653, 180 Ill.Dec. 352, 607 N.E.2d 246, 250 (1992) (claim for rescission did not remove question of arbitrability from arbitrator). In addressing such procedural objections, a court is not to presume that a contract never existed. See Allianz Insurance Co., 373 Ill.App.3d at 675, 312 Ill.Dec. 51, 869 N.E.2d at 1062;Cusamano, 239 Ill.App.3d at 653, 180 Ill.Dec. 352, 607 N.E.2d at 250. Nonetheless, “[w]hen a contract is rescinded, it is as if the contract never existed in the first place.” YPI 180 N. LaSalle Owner, LLC v. 180 N. LaSalle II, LLC, 403 Ill.App.3d 1, 5, 342 Ill.Dec. 879, 933 N.E.2d 860, 863 (2010).

¶ 19 In reaching this decision, we are aware of apparent conflict with other districts. People v. Focia, 287 Ill.App.3d 767, 768, 223 Ill.Dec. 177, 679 N.E.2d 121, 122 (1997); People v. Ciechanowski, 379 Ill.App.3d 506, 510, 318 Ill.Dec. 746...