People v. Elliott

• Decision Date: 24 January 2014
• Docket Number: No. 115308.,115308.
• Citation: 2014 IL 115308,4 N.E.3d 23,378 Ill.Dec. 424
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. David K. ELLIOTT, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2014 IL 115308

4 N.E.3d 23

378 Ill.Dec. 424

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.David K. ELLIOTT, Appellee.

No. 115308.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 24, 2014.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and David N. Stanton, State's Attorney, of Pinckneyville (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Joshua M. Schneider, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Stephen E. Norris and Rebecca E. McCormick, of the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Mt. Vernon, of counsel), for the People.

Edward W. Unsell, of Unsell & Schuman, of East Alton, and Donald J. Ramsell, of Ramsell & Associates, LLC, of Wheaton, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, David Elliott, was convicted of driving on a suspended license (625 ILCS 5/6–303 (West 2008)). He appealed, arguing that the conviction was improper because the statutory summary suspension upon which it was based had been rescinded. The appellate court agreed and vacated defendant's conviction. 2012 IL App (5th) 100584, 365 Ill.Dec. 487, 978 N.E.2d 742. We now reverse the appellate court and reinstate the conviction.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On August 26, 2009, defendant was arrested in Jackson County for driving under the influence (625 ILCS 5/11–501 (West 2008)). In connection with that arrest, defendant was also given notice of the statutory summary suspension of his driver's license (625 ILCS 5/11–501.1 (West 2008)). On September 1, 2009, defendant filed a petition to rescind the summary suspension.

¶ 4 On October 11, 2009, defendant's statutory summary suspension commenced. Two days later, on October 13, 2009, defendant was pulled over in Perry County and issued a citation for driving on a suspended license (625 ILCS 5/6–303 (West 2008)).

¶ 5 On October 19, 2009, the circuit court of Jackson County entered an order granting defendant's petition to rescind the statutory summary suspension. Four days later, on October 23, 2009, the Illinois Secretary of State entered a notice and order of rescission, thereby removing the statutory summary suspension from defendant's driving record.

¶ 6 Thereafter, defendant filed a motion in the circuit court of Perry County seeking to dismiss the pending citation for driving on a suspended license. In support, defendant argued that, because the circuit court of Jackson County had rescinded the statutory summary suspension upon which the driving on a suspended license citation was based, that citation no longer had a valid legal basis and therefore had to be dismissed. The circuit court of Perry County rejected defendant's argument and denied the motion to dismiss. A bench trial followed, and defendant was found guilty of driving on a suspended license.

¶ 7 Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed. 2012 IL App (5th) 100584, 365 Ill.Dec. 487, 978 N.E.2d 742. In doing so, the appellate court noted that, under section 2–118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (625 ILCS 5/2–118.1(b) (West 2008)), a trial court has only two dispositional options when it comes to a statutory summary suspension-it may “rescind” the suspension or it may “sustain” the suspension. 2012 IL App (5th) 100584, ¶ 15, 365 Ill.Dec. 487, 978 N.E.2d 742. From there, the appellate court explained that “[t]he act of rescinding is not simply to terminate.” Id. ¶ 16. Rather, “[b]oth common usage and the operation of the term in legal proceedings impute an intention to undo an action so that it never existed.” Id. Consequently, when the circuit court of Jackson County rescinded defendant's statutory summary suspension in this case, that suspension did not simply terminate going forward; rather, it became as though it never happened. And because the statutory summary suspension never happened, there was no longer any valid basis for charging defendant in Perry County with driving on a suspended license. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the circuit court of Perry County's judgment and vacated defendant's conviction. Id. ¶ 42.

¶ 8 The State appealed to this court, and we allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010).

¶ 9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 Driving on a suspended license is committed when a person “drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on any highway of this State at a time when such person's driver's license * * * is revoked or suspended as provided by [the Code].” 625 ILCS 5/6–303(a) (West 2008). Here, no one disputes that the statutory summary suspension of defendant's driver's license commenced on October 11, 2009. Nor does anyone dispute that, just two days later, and six days prior to the circuit court of Jackson County's order rescinding defendant's statutory summary suspension, defendant was pulled over in Perry County and charged with driving on a suspended license. In other words, no one disputes that the charge in this case arises from conduct that occurred after the commencement of but before the rescission of defendant's statutory summary suspension. The only issue, then, is whether the subsequent order of rescission renders that charge invalid. We hold that it does not.

¶ 11 The issue before us is one of statutory construction. When construing a statute, this court's primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent, keeping in mind that the best and most reliable indicator of that intent is the statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 25, 369 Ill.Dec. 759, 987 N.E.2d 386. In determining the plain meaning of the statute, we consider both the subject the statute addresses and the legislative purpose in enacting it. Id. Because the construction of a statute is a question of law, our review is de novo. Id. ¶ 12 As both parties recognize, the key to resolving the issue at hand is ascertaining what the legislature intended when it deployed the term “rescind” in section 12–118.1 of the Code. Unfortunately, the legislature provides us with little guidance on this question. Though section 1 of the Code contains an extensive catalog of defined terms, “rescind” is not among them. At the same time, “rescind” is a term that enjoys numerous meanings both inside and outside the legal context, and consequently we cannot simply presume that the legislature intended the term's “commonly understood” meaning, as such a meaning does not exist. We are therefore left no choice but to consider the range of possible definitions for “rescind” and assess which of these definitions best comports with the public policy purpose of the statutory summary suspension law, as this court has understood it.

¶ 13 Beginning with the dictionary definitions, we see quickly that “rescind” can have either prospective or retroactive meaning, depending upon the particular definition and the context. Webster's, for example, defines “rescind” as both “to do away with: take away: REMOVE” and “to abrogate (a contract) by tendering back or restoring to the opposite party what one has received from him.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1930 (2002). The first of these definitions clearly connotes an act with only prospective effect, while the second of these definitions connotes an act with retroactive effect. Similarly, Webster's defines “rescission” as both “an act of cutting off” and “an act of rescinding, annulling, or vacating or of cancelling or abrogating (as by restoring to another party to a contract or transaction what one has received from him).” Id. Again, the first of these definitions clearly connotes an act with only prospective effect, while the second of these definitions connotes an act with retroactive effect. Finally, we see that Black's Law Dictionary defines “rescind” both as “abrogate,” a term that suggests retroactive effect, and “cancel,” a term that suggests prospective effect. Black's Law Dictionary 1420 (9th ed. 2009). In short, rather than resolve the issue at hand, the dictionaries simply underscore the problem.

¶ 14 In the same way, we see that the Illinois legislature is inconsistent in its use of the term “rescind,” sometimes intending a retroactive meaning while other times intending only a prospective meaning. For example, section 5(b) of the Life Care Facilities Act provides that:

“any person entering into [a life care contract] shall have a period of 14 days beginning with the first full calendar day following the execution of the contract, or the payment of an initial sum of money as a deposit or application fee, or receipt of the financial disclosure statement, whichever occurs last, within which to rescind the life care contract without penalty or further obligation. In the event of such rescission, all money or property paid or transferred by such person shall be fully refunded.” 210 ILCS 40/5(b) (West 2008).

Clearly, in this context, “rescind” is meant to have a retroactive meaning, as the consequence of a rescission is to undo the life care contract in its entirety and to restore the parties to their previous positions as if the contract had never been executed. By contrast, in section 108A–1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108A–1 (West 2008)), the legislature uses the term “rescind” in a way that just as clearly is meant to have only a prospective meaning. That section, which governs the authorization for use of eavesdropping devices by law enforcement, states:

“The Chief Judge of the circuit may assign to associate judges the power to issue orders authorizing or approving the use of eavesdropping devices by law enforcement officers or agencies in accordance with this Article. After assignment by the Chief Judge, an associate judge shall have plenary authority to issue such orders without additional authorization for each specific application made to him by the State's Attorney until such time as the associate judge's power is rescinded...