People v. Ellison

• Decision Date: 04 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99SA117.,99SA117.
• Citation: 14 P.3d 1034
• Parties: In re The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Plaintiff, v. Erik R. ELLISON and Daniel Bartholomew, Respondents-Defendants.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

14 P.3d 1034

In re The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Plaintiff, v. Erik R. ELLISON and Daniel Bartholomew, Respondents-Defendants.

No. 99SA117.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

December 4, 2000.

Gustave F. Sandstrom, Jr., District Attorney, Tenth Judicial District, James S. Whitmire, Assistant District Attorney, M. Katherine Howard, Deputy District Attorney, Pueblo, CO, Attorneys for Petitioner.

Matthew Martin, Pueblo, CO, Attorney for Respondents.

Justice BENDER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

In this original proceeding we hold that the definition of knowledge in Colorado's driving under restraint statute does not violate the guarantees of due process of law. The statute provides that if a person drives with "knowledge of circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be aware that such person's license or privilege to drive was under restraint," he commits a misdemeanor. The Pueblo county court ruled that this language offends due process of law guarantees because it permits a conviction when the defendant was not aware of the restraint on his license or privilege to drive. On appeal, the Pueblo district court affirmed the county court. We hold that this language does not violate constitutional standards of due process. Hence, we make our rule absolute and order the district court to vacate its order affirming the trial court, to enter an order reversing the trial court's order, and to remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

This case arises out of the consolidated appeal of separate cases brought in Pueblo county court. The district attorney charged Respondent Erik Ellison with driving under restraint. In an unrelated case, the district attorney also charged Respondent Daniel Bartholomew with driving under restraint. The driving under restraint statute makes it a misdemeanor for a person to drive "with knowledge" that such person's license is restrained.¹ Knowledge is defined under the statute as "actual knowledge of any restraint from whatever source or knowledge of circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be aware that such person's license or privilege to drive was under restraint." § 42-2-138(4)(a) (emphasis added).

Each defendant filed a motion to strike the emphasized language from the statute on the grounds that it would allow a jury to convict based on the knowledge of a hypothetical reasonable person, rather than on what the defendant actually knew. Concluding that the challenged language violated due process of law, the county court granted these motions and required the prosecution to prove that each defendant had actual knowledge of the restraint.

In reaching this conclusion the trial court relied on People v. Johnson, 193 Colo. 199, 564 P.2d 116 (1977), where we held unconstitutional the knowledge requirement of the theft by receiving statute then in effect. That knowledge requirement unconstitutionally permitted a conviction in situations where the defendant was unaware that the property he received was stolen, if a reasonable person would have known that such property was stolen.²193 Colo. at 200,564 P.2d at 118. We noted in Johnson that felony theft may not be based on a defendant's negligence or failure to act reasonably, but rather due process requires that the state of mind for felony theft be that of the actual defendant.

There is a constitutional proscription against conviction of a defendant charged with felony by theft if it is predicated upon his negligence or his failure to exercise the intelligence of an ordinary prudent man. The standard of culpability, in order to be constitutional, must be what the state of mind of the particular defendant was, not what a jury concludes might be that of a fictional reasonably prudent man.

Id.

Consolidating the two defendants' appeals, the district court affirmed the rulings of the county court, holding that both cases were "governed by the principles pronounced by the Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Johnson."

The district attorney then filed a Petition for a Rule to Show Cause with this court pursuant to C.A.R. 21. We entered an order construing the district attorney's appeal as a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, which we granted. However, because there is no final judgment in this case, we treat this appeal as one under C.A.R. 21 and review the lower court's rulings on that basis.³

II. ANALYSIS

The driving under restraint statute defines "knowledge" as "actual knowledge of any restraint from whatever source or knowledge of circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be aware that such person's license or privilege to drive was under restraint." § 42-2-138(4)(a). The first part of this definition requires actual knowledge of the restraint. The second part requires actual knowledge of circumstances, with those circumstances defined as those that would cause a reasonable person to be aware of a restraint. The issue presented is whether the second part of the definition of "knowledge" violates the guarantees of due process of law under the federal and Colorado Constitutions.⁴ See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 25. A combination of factors convinces us that this definition passes constitutional muster.

A.

We begin our analysis by turning to the definition of knowledge contained in the driving under restraint statute. This definition contains two independent sections: (1) actual knowledge from any source and (2) knowledge of circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to be aware that his license was under restraint:

"Knowledge" means actual knowledge of any restraint from whatever source or knowledge of circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be aware that such person's license or privilege to drive was under restraint.

§ 42-2-138(4)(a).

The second part of this definition involves in part the use of an objective reasonable person standard. However, this definition requires that the particular defendant possess knowledge of those circumstances that would trigger a reasonable person to believe his license was under restraint. Under this definition, a defendant could not be punished for acting without actual subjective knowledge of these circumstances. Thus, knowledge, as defined, combines both a subjective and an objective component. It requires the defendant to be actually aware of specific circumstances. These specific circumstances are defined by using an objective reasonable person standard. For example, if, after being convicted of numerous traffic offenses, a defendant sees mail from the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) and then refuses to open the letter, he might be found to have been aware of circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe his license to drive was under restraint and his claim that he drove without knowledge of the restraint might fail. In contrast, if we were to accept as true that a defendant unwittingly threw out the DMV letter with his junk mail and that he never saw the DMV letter addressed to him, then he might be found not to have possessed the subjective knowledge of the circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe his license was under restraint.⁵ This defendant, although perhaps negligent in sorting his mail, might not have driven with the required "knowledge" of the restraint.

The knowledge required by this statute differs from the knowledge required by the former theft by receiving statute held unconstitutional in Johnson. The theft statute provided that one who received a thing of value "knowing or believing or having a reasonable cause to believe" that the article had been stolen, was guilty of theft by receiving, provided that he had the intent to keep the property permanently. § 18-4-410(1), 8 C.R.S. (1973 & Supp.1976). In contrast, the driving under restraint statute requires "knowledge of circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be aware that such person's license or privilege to drive was under restraint." § 42-2-138(4)(a). There exists a subtle yet significant difference between these two definitions of knowledge: under the definition in Johnson, a defendant could be convicted solely on the basis of actions that violate the objective reasonable person standard — he need not be aware of the specific facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the property was stolen. In other words, under that statute a defendant might have been convicted for buying property priced so low that a reasonable person would have known the property was stolen even though this particular defendant lacked knowledge of the specific facts — the high retail price of the property — that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the property was stolen. On the other hand, to be convicted of driving under restraint, one must be aware of specific facts that would cause a reasonable person to believe that his license was under restraint.

B.

Equally important as this statute's incorporation of subjective and objective parts in its knowledge definition is the fact that driving under restraint is a public welfare offense. Unlike traditional common-law crimes that serve to punish individuals for morally blameworthy behavior, public welfare offenses seek to promote the public welfare by enforcing compliance with regulatory schemes. See State v. Collova, 79 Wis.2d 473, 255 N.W.2d 581, 585 (1977).

The Supreme Court has articulated the characteristics that differentiate public welfare offenses from traditional crimes. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255-56, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). The first distinguishing characteristic is the type of act the crime proscribes. Traditional common-law crimes typically prohibit aggressions such as battery or invasions such as burglary. See id. at 255, 72 S.Ct. 240. In contrast, public welfare offenses usually...