People v. England

Citation613 N.Y.S.2d 854,636 N.E.2d 1387,84 N.Y.2d 1
Parties, 636 N.E.2d 1387 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Crystal L. ENGLAND, Respondent.
Decision Date14 June 1994
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
OPINION OF THE COURT

KAYE, Chief Judge.

In People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 337, 486 N.Y.S.2d 888, 476 N.E.2d 287, we held that a valid statement of readiness for trial under CPL 30.30 requires a communication of readiness on the record at a time when the People are in fact ready to proceed. On this appeal, we consider the narrow issue whether the People can validly answer ready where, wholly as a result of their own conduct defendant could not be arraigned, and thus trial could not commence, within the statutory time period.

On June 24, 1992, defendant was arrested on a felony complaint charging her with burglary in the third degree. She was arraigned in Oswegatchie Town Court and released under the supervision of the St. Lawrence County Probation Department. On December 24, 1992, a full six months after the filing of the felony complaint, the St. Lawrence County Grand Jury--as it was being discharged, after approximately 2 1/2 months of service--handed up an indictment charging defendant with burglary in the second and third degrees and grand larceny in the third and fourth degrees. That indictment and 23 other indictments returned at the same time were filed that day in St. Lawrence County Court. With the indictments, the People filed notice of readiness for trial and declared readiness in all 24 cases.

On December 30, defendant sought dismissal of the indictment for failure to comply with CPL 30.30 alleging that, by the time of the scheduled arraignment--January 7, 1993--196 days would have elapsed from the commencement of the criminal action. The court found no excludable preindictment periods, and the People claimed no exclusion for the period between indictment and arraignment. County Court granted defendant's motion and dismissed the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed, noting that the timing of the People's presentation to the Grand Jury was within the control of the People. As stated by the Appellate Division, in opposing defendant's motion to dismiss "the People failed completely to offer any excuse or explanation for that delay, resulting in the reporting of the indictment on the last day of the period within which the People were required to be capable of bringing defendant to trial under CPL 30.30. Thus, it was the People's unexplained laxity in obtaining an indictment that 'was a direct, and virtually insurmountable, impediment to the trial's very commencement' within the statutory period (People v McKenna, [76 N.Y.2d 59,] 64 [556 N.Y.S.2d 514, 555 N.E.2d 911]" (195 A.D.2d 751, 753, 600 N.Y.S.2d 320 [Levine, J.].

The sole question before us is whether, in the unusual circumstances presented--where, owing entirely to the People's delay, no indictment was handed up for the full six months--the People could prior even to defendant's arraignment genuinely have declared trial readiness. We agree with both County Court and the Appellate Division that the People's announcement of readiness was insufficient to satisfy CPL 30.30, and conclude that the indictment therefore was correctly dismissed.

CPL 30.30 requires dismissal of a felony indictment where the People are not ready for trial within six months of the commencement of the criminal action (CPL 30.30[1][a]. The statutory period, 183 days in this case, commenced with the filing of the felony complaint on June 24, 1992 (see, People v. Sinistaj, 67 N.Y.2d 236, 237, 501 N.Y.S.2d 793, 492 N.E.2d 1209), and expired on December 24, 1992. County Court determined that all of that time was chargeable to the People, a holding not questioned on appeal.

There is no dispute that the People made a facially sufficient declaration for the record on December 24, 1992 by serving written notice of readiness upon defense counsel and declaring readiness in open court. Appellant's challenge centers instead on whether the People were presently ready to try this defendant at the time they made the declaration. A statement of readiness at a time when the People are not actually ready is illusory and insufficient to stop the running of the speedy trial clock (see, People v. Cole, 73 N.Y.2d 957, 958, 540 N.Y.S.2d 984, 538 N.E.2d 336).

We have on several occasions made clear that readiness is not defined simply by an empty declaration that the People are prepared to present their direct case. Trial readiness in CPL 30.30 means both a communication of readiness by the People on the record and an indication of present readiness (Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d, at 337, 486 N.Y.S.2d 888, 476 N.E.2d 287). The inquiry is whether the People have done all that is required of them to bring the case to a point where it may be tried (see, People v. McKenna, 76 N.Y.2d 59, 64-65, and n., 556 N.Y.S.2d 514, 555 N.E.2d 911 supra). The People are not presently ready for trial, for example, where they fail to provide Grand Jury minutes necessary for resolution of defendant's motion to dismiss (see, McKenna, 76 N.Y.2d, at 64, 556 N.Y.S.2d 514, 555 N.E.2d 911) or where they fail to produce an incarcerated defendant for trial (see, Cole, 73 N.Y.2d, at 958, 540 N.Y.S.2d 984, 538 N.E.2d 336; People v. Jones, 66 N.Y.2d 529, 539-540, 498 N.Y.S.2d 119, 488 N.E.2d 1231). Delays caused by court congestion, on the other hand, do not affect the People's readiness (see, People v. Smith, 82 N.Y.2d 676, 678, 601 N.Y.S.2d 466, 619 N.E.2d 403; People v. Correa, 77 N.Y.2d 930, 931, 569 N.Y.S.2d 601, 572 N.E.2d 42; People v. Brothers, 50 N.Y.2d 413, 417, 429 N.Y.S.2d 558, 407 N.E.2d 405; People ex rel. Franklin v. Warden, 31 N.Y.2d 498, 501-502, 341 N.Y.S.2d 604, 294 N.E.2d 199).

Defendant could not have been brought to trial before arraignment, the process by which the court acquires jurisdiction over a defendant (CPL 1.20[9]. That is an elemental prerequisite to trial readiness. Here, the undisturbed factual finding is that the long delay was directly attributable not to defendant or court congestion, but to the People's laxity in securing an indictment that provided a jurisdictional basis for the court to act at all. With arraignment within the statutory period impossible (see, CPL 210.10[2], the People's statement of readiness for trial on December 24, 1992 was meaningless (see, Cole, 73 N.Y.2d, at 958, 540 N.Y.S.2d 984, 538 N.E.2d 336). In the circumstances, the People could not validly declare readiness until January 7, 1993 at defendant's arraignment, entitling defendant to dismissal of the indictment. As the Appellate Division noted, "[p]ostreadiness delay is not chargeable to the People when prosecutorial laxity merely affects the defendant's ability to proceed to trial, but will be chargeable when such laxity, even if inadvertent, constitutes a direct impediment to commencement of the trial (see, People v. McKenna, [76 N.Y.2d, at 64, 556 N.Y.S.2d 514, 555 N.E.2d 911]; People v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529, 536-538 [498 N.Y.S.2d 119, 488 N.E.2d 1231]; Preiser, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 11A, CPL 30.30, at 174)" (195 A.D.2d 751, 752, 600 N.Y.S.2d 320, supra ).

The nub of our disagreement with the dissent is a simple one, amply supported by our case law: that the statement "ready for trial" contemplates more than merely mouthing those words. Where the trial court and Appellate Division have found the relevant period to be entirely chargeable to the unexplained laxity of the People, the announcement of trial readiness before defendant was even brought before the court can only be an empty declaration, insufficient to satisfy CPL 30.30.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

TITONE, Judge (dissenting).

Before the decision in this case, the People had a full six months from the filing of the first accusatory instrument (plus any excused period of delay) to prepare a felony case and declare themselves "ready" to proceed to trial. Further, under our existing decisional law, the obligation to become "ready" consisted of no more than obtaining and filing an indictment and making a record statement of present readiness (see, People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 486 N.Y.S.2d 888, 476 N.E.2d 287; People v. Colon, 59 N.Y.2d 921, 466 N.Y.S.2d 319, 453 N.E.2d 548; People v. Sturgis, 38 N.Y.2d 625, 381 N.Y.S.2d 860, 345 N.E.2d 331). While the People were free to do whatever else they deemed necessary to prepare their case for trial, the case law construing CPL 30.30 neither "looked behind" a record readiness statement nor imposed obligations unrelated to either the preparation of the People's case or the fulfillment of the People's statutory duties (see, People v. McKenna, 76 N.Y.2d 59, 556 N.Y.S.2d 514, 555 N.E.2d 911; People v. Giordano, 56 N.Y.2d 524, 449 N.Y.S.2d 955, 434 N.E.2d 1333). Now, the majority turns the case law, as well as the purpose of the statute, on its head by ruling that CPL 30.30 requires the People not only to file an indictment, ready their case and declare readiness within the statutory period but also to take those steps in time to assure that the defendant can theoretically be arraigned within that period. Under the holding of this case, the People will no longer have the full six months provided by CPL 30.30 to become ready if they choose to file their indictment as the last step in the preparation of their case. Inasmuch as that conclusion has no support in the statutory language, the case law or the legislative history, I dissent.

Like the majority, I begin with the premise that the proper inquiry under CPL 30.30 is whether the People have "done all that is required of them to bring the case to the point where it may be tried" (People v. McKenna, 76 N.Y.2d 59, 64, 556 N.Y.S.2d...

To continue reading

Request your trial
183 cases
  • People v. Canosa
    • United States
    • New York District Court
    • March 11, 2013
    ...of them to bring the case to a point where it may be tried ( see, People v. McKenna, 76 N.Y.2d 59, 64–65).” People v.. England, 84 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 613 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1994); See also: People v. Carter, 91 N.Y.2d 795, 676 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1998); People v.. Beasley, 69 AD3d 741, 893 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2nd......
  • People v. Brown
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • December 20, 2016
    ...People are not actually ready is illusory and insufficient to stop the running of the speedy trial clock" (People v. England, 84 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 613 N.Y.S.2d 854, 636 N.E.2d 1387 [1994] ). "[R]eadiness is not defined simply by an empty declaration that the People are prepared to present their ......
  • People v. Brown
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • December 20, 2016
    ...People are not actually ready is illusory and insufficient to stop the running of the speedy trial clock" (People v. England, 84 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 613 N.Y.S.2d 854, 636 N.E.2d 1387 [1994] ). "[R]eadiness is not defined simply by an empty declaration that the People are prepared to present their ......
  • People v. Austin
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • March 13, 2014
    ...he has failed to show that this inaction led to any delay in the proceedings or impeded the trial's commencement ( see People v. England, 84 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 613 N.Y.S.2d 854, 636 N.E.2d 1387 [1994];People v. McCummings, 203 A.D.2d 656, 657, 610 N.Y.S.2d 634 [1994];compare People v. McKenna, 76......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT