People v. Ephraim
| Decision Date | 24 January 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 31999,31999 |
| Citation | 411 Ill. 118,103 N.E.2d 363 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. EPHRAIM. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Bernard Ephraim, pro se.
Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen. and John S. Boyle, State's Atty., of Chicago (John T. Gallagher, Rudolph L. Janega, Arthur F. Manning, and William J. McGah, Jr., all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
After a trial by jury in the criminal court of Cook County, the defendant, Bernard Ephraim, was found guilty of the crime of burglary and was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of not less than twenty years nor more than thirty-five years. Appearing pro se and presenting only the common-law record, he now prosecutes this writ of error to review that judgment.
It is defendant's claim that the trial court lost jurisdiction to proceed to a valid conviction and sentence because of errors which allegedly deprived him of his right to counsel of his own choice during preliminary proceedings and, later, of his right to defend in person. Specifically, he contends: (1) that the unwanted services of the public defender were thrust upon him in pretrial matters and that the court allowed the said public defender to appear even after he had been ordered to withdraw as defendant's counsel; and, (2) that after the court had given defendant leave to defend in person he was denied that right when the court appointed a defense counsel who in fact conducted the defendant at the trial.
With relation to the first assignment of error, the record shows that defendant was indicted in March, 1948, and while being represented by one Ellis, an attorney of his choice, pleaded not guilty and was admitted to bail. Ellis was given leave to withdraw as counsel before any futher proceedings were held and attorneys Lee and Perlin entered their appearance in his stead. Several days later, they moved to withdraw their appearance. Hearing on their motion was continued and at the same time the court ordered defendant's bond forfeited and directed that a capias issue. A month later, in June, 1948, the cause was stricken with leave to reinstate, when it appeared that defendant had not been apprehended. The next entry in the record, made in April, 1949, shows that defendant appeared in court with the State's Attorney and the cause was reinstated. When it appeared that defendant had no counsel, the court, on its own motion, appointed the public defender. The cause was continued on two occasions, then on May 20, 1949, the public defender was given leave to withdraw his appearance and the record indicates that one Alfasso filed his appearance as defendant's counsel. Twenty days later, before any further proceedings, an order was entered permitting Alfasso to withdraw his appearance and the court again appointed the public defender. Following this, the public defender successfully prosecuted a petition for a change of venue and represented defendant at a hearing which culminated in an order that defendant be examined by the Behavior Clinic. Several continuances intervened until September 12, on which date the court again granted leave to the public defender to withdraw his appearance and granted leave to defendant to act as his own counsel in the cause.
Much of defendant's argument that the appointment of the public defender was thrust upon him in such a manner as to deny him his right to choose his own counsel is based upon his assertion that the public defender was not reappointed as his counsel after Alfasso withdrew from the cause, thus making the defender's later appearances unauthorized and unwanted. This argument may be met simply by pointing out that it is not supported by the record, which clearly and expressly shows that the court reappointed the public defender with no objection from the defendant. Nor was it necessarily error for the court to appoint and reappoint the public defender at the times when it appeared that the defendant was without counsel. It is true that the right of a defendant to be represented by counsel includes the right to employ counsel of his own choice, People v. Cohen, 402 Ill. 574, 85 N.E.2d 19; Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, but it is not error for a court, on its own motion, to appoint an attorney for one charged with a crime unless it is done over his objection and some exception is taken to the court's action at the time. People v. Witt, 394 Ill. 405, 68 N.E.2d 731. The same rule has been extended to the appointment of the public defender. People v. McKay, 403 Ill. 417, 86 N.E.2d 218; People v. Montville, 393 Ill. 590, 66 N.E.2d 861. In the Montville case it was stated that the appointment was not improper where the defendant registered no objection or exception and where the record shows that defendant was not deprived of any right but was in fact given assistance not required by law to have extended to him.
There is no bill of exceptions filed in this cause nor does the common-law record show any objection or protest by defendant to the appointment or reappointment of the public defender as his counsel. Neither is there any suggestion in the record that the services of the public defender were forced upon defendant. That defendant's argument in this respect comes as an afterthought is made obvious by the record, for defendant, far from objecting, availed himself of the help thus given by the court and was aided at least to the material extent that he was granted a change of venue. The...
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...of his choice. United States v. Gonzalez–Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006); see also People v. Ephraim, 411 Ill. 118, 120, 103 N.E.2d 363 (1952). However[361 Ill.Dec. 379] [971 N.E.2d 34]this right is measured against the trial court's interest in trying th......
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People v. Gacy
... ... Defendant[103 Ill.2d 108] was, however, represented by counsel and until his appearance in this court had made no request to be permitted to defend himself. On these facts, we must conclude that defendant waived his right to personally argue the motion for a new trial. (People v. Ephraim (1952), 411 Ill. 118, 122-23, 103 N.E.2d 363.) Defendant also contends that he should have been present when the record was corrected to show that on March 13, 1980, when the death penalty verdict was returned, defendant waived his right to a presentence investigation and requested the immediate ... ...
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York v. El-Ganzouri
...that courts may infer a party's subsequent acquiescence in court procedures after making contrary motions. See People v. Ephraim, 411 Ill. 118, 123, 103 N.E.2d 363, 366 (1952) ("[t]he record here shows that the defendant made a pro forma request that he be allowed to defend himself, then fa......
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People v. McDonald
...assistance of counsel. (People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252, 267, 73 Ill.Dec. 360, 454 N.E.2d 220, quoting People v. Ephraim (1952), 411 Ill. 118, 122, 103 N.E.2d 363.) Here, defendant is represented by counsel on appeal. Defense counsel has submitted a brief on behalf of defendant. Co......