People v. Erickson

• Decision Date: 29 September 1964
• Docket Number: No. 37384,37384
• Citation: People v. Erickson, 201 N.E.2d 422, 31 Ill.2d 230 (Ill. 1964)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. James ERICKSON, Plaintiff in Error.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 422

201 N.E.2d 422

31 Ill.2d 230

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. James ERICKSON, Plaintiff in Error.

No. 37384.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 29, 1964.

Maurice E. Grosby, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and William J. Bauer, State's Atty., Wheaton (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and William V. Hopf and James E. Fitzgerald, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for defendant in error.

UNDERWOOD, Justice.

James Erickson was convicted of burglary in a jury trial in the circuit court of Du Page County and sentenced to a term of 3 to 8 years imprisonment. A writ of error presents constitutional questions arising from what it is contended was an unreasonable search and seizure violative of the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and section 6 of article II of the Illinois constitution, S.H.A.

The defendant was riding in a 1953 Pontiac automobile, with Florida license plates and showing damage to its front end, being driven by James Marino on Route 59 in Du Page County about 3:00 P.M., on December 7, 1960. The car was observed and followed by a State trooper who noticed the brake lights did not operate when the vehicle slowed as it approached railroad road tracks. The officer signalled the car driver to pull over and asked to see his driver's license. Marino stated he had no driver's license, was 're-learning' to drive and did not know of the defective brake lights. The officer inquired as to whether defendant owned the car, and defendant replied that he did but could produce no documentary proof. Defendant had and exhibited a valid Florida driver's license. He could not explain the damage to the car.

The trooper then informed defendant that he was under arrest for allowing an unauthorized driver to operate his motor vehicle, and arrested Marino for driving without a license. The officer, while there, noticed a brown rubberized cord extending a foot and a half to two feet out of the car trunk. The car occupants were then taken to the Naperville police station where defendant stated he lived in Chicago at 2900 North Clark Street. The police then asked defendant for permission to search his car including the locked trunk. Defendant refused, saying he had no key and would have to consult an alleged co-owner of the car before giving permission. The Naperville police sergeant thereupon searched the automobile without a search warrant, including moving the rear seat forward and looking into the trunk with a flashlight, where he saw 'what appeared to be a clock radio' and 'what looked like a typewriter'. He thereafter reported his findings to the trooper who called the Chicago Police Department Bureau of Investigation and determined that defendant had a police record. Upon further questioning defendant said he and Marino had left Chicago at 10:00 A.M. that day to go for a ride and that the car had been loaned to someone else on the previous day.

Thereafter the officers again searched the car, moving the rear seat and unlocking the trunk from the inside. Various household appliances and other articles therein were removed, including a box of silverware upon which this conviction is predicated and which was admitted into evidence following denial of defendant's motion to suppress this exhibit. After the search and removal of the articles, a telephone call was received by the police from a Mrs. Hagman reporting that a set of silverware had been taken from her burglarized home. The Hagmans came to the jail and identified as theirs the box of silverware removed from the Pontiac. The single issue before us is as to the correctness of the ruling upon the motion to suppress.

It should be observed that, while many of the cases cited by both the People and defendant deal with the validity of searches made incidentally to valid arrests, that is not the problem posed by these facts. (Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777.) The instant question is, as conceded by the People, whether the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers at the time of the search constituted probable cause justifying a search of the automobile without a warrant. It is our opinion that they did not.

It has long been established that the constitutional safeguards contained in section 6 of article II of the constitution of this State and the fourth amendment of the United States constitution do not prohibit all searches made without a warrant but only those which are unreasonable, and that a determination of the reasonableness of any given search must be made upon the facts there present. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653; People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433.

It is equally well established that valid searches which are not incidental to an arrest may be made without a warrant. Such searches, however, must be based upon probable cause, defined as a knowledge of facts justifying a reasonably prudent person in believing that a crime has been or is being committed, and that evidence thereof is contained in the automobile. (Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543; 74 A.L.R. 1457, et seq.). The absence, in the case of moving vehicles, of an opportunity to secure a search warrant, is frequently cited as a reason for sustaining such searches. But, in all cases, the search must be for specific property, and may not be exploratory and made solely to find evidence of guilt. United States v. Guido (7th Cir. 1958,) 251 F.2d 1, cert. den. 356 U.S. 950, 78 S.Ct. 915, 2 L.Ed.2d 843.

We have examined the cases cited by the People and do not consider them authority for the argument here made that the facts and circumstances known to the police prior to the...