People v. Erie R. Co.

Citation198 N.Y. 369,91 N.E. 849
PartiesPEOPLE v. ERIE R. CO.
Decision Date26 April 1910
CourtNew York Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Action by the People against the Erie Railroad Company. From an order of the Appellate Division, reversing a judgment for the People (135 App. Div. 767,119 N. Y. Supp. 873), the People appeal. Reversed and judgment of trial court affirmed.

This is an appeal from an order of the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversing a judgment against the defendant for a fine because it permitted or required an employé in charge of one of its block signal towers to be on duty more than eight hours in twenty-four, in violation of the provisions of section 7a of the labor law (now section 8, c. 31, in the Consolidated Laws), which reads as follows: ‘It shall be unlawful for any corporation or receiver, operating a line of railroad, either surface, subway or elevated, in whole or in part in the state of New York, or any officer, agent or representative of such corporation or receiver to require or permit any telegraph or telephone operator who spaces trains by the use of the telegraph or telephone under what is known and termed the ‘block system’ (defined as follows): Reporting trains to another office or offices or to a train dispatcher operating one or more trains under signals, and telegraph or telephone lever men who manipulate interlocking machines in railroad yards or on main tracks out on the lines or train dispatchers in its service whose duties substantially, as hereinbefore set forth, pertain to the movement of cars, engines or trains on its railroad by the use of the telegraph or telephone in dispatching or reporting trains or receiving or transmitting train orders as interpreted in this section, to be on duty for more than eight hours in a day of twenty-four hours, and it is hereby declared that eight hours shall constitute a day of employment for all laborers or employés engaged in the kind of labor aforesaid; except in cases of extraordinary emergency caused by accident, fire, flood, or danger to life or property, and for each hour of labor so performed in any one day in excess of such eight hours, by any such employé, he shall be paid in addition at least one-eighth of his daily compensation. Any person or persons, company or corporation, who shall violate any of the provisions of this section, shall, on conviction, be fined in the sum of not less than one hundred dollars, and such fine shall be recovered by an action in the name of the state of New York, for the use of the state, which shall sue for it against such person, corporation or association violating this section, said suit to be instituted in any court in this state having appropriate jurisdiction. Such fine, when recovered as aforesaid, shall be paid without any deduction whatever, one-half thereof to the informer, and the balance thereof to be paid into the free school fund of the state of New York. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any part of a railroad where not more than eight regular passenger trains in twenty-four hours pass each way; provided, moreover, that where twenty freight trains pass each way generally in each twenty-four hours then the provisions of this section shall apply, notwithstanding that there may pass a less number of passenger trains than hereinbefore set forth, namely eight.'

The defendant was engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce, and the majority of the trains which the employé in question spaced were moving the former.Edward R. O'Malley, Atty. Gen., for the People.

George N. Orcutt, for respondent.

HISCOCK, J. (after stating the facts as above).

If section 7a of the labor law, above quoted, was a valid enactment in August, 1907, applicable to a block signal tower operator, engaged in spacing interstate and local trains, the order appealed from was erroneous and the judgment of the trial court correct, because there is no question that during that month the respondent required one of its employés thus engaged to be on duty more than eight hours out of twenty-four in violation of the provisions of that act. Two reasons are alleged why said statute was not valid and applicable. The first of these is that the Legislature had no power to place such a limitation on the right of the respondent to keep such an employé on duty, and the second one is that, such employé, being in part engaged in forwarding interstate commerce, Congress had the superior power to regulate his hours of labor, and that it had done this by legislation which barred or superseded the state legislation referred to.

It is clear that the first defense cannot be maintained. The doctrine that the Legislature under proper circumstances and within reasonable limits may exercise its police power in the regulation of hours and conditions of labor is now thoroughly and broadly established. One familiar form of this class of legislation is that which has for its object the promotion of the health and welfare of the employé as especially in the case of women and children. Another class seeks to protect the safety of the public by limiting the hours of labor of those who are in control of dangerous agencies lest by excessive periods of duty they become fatigued and indifferent and cause accidents leading to injuries and destruction of life. This statute comes within the latter class, and this court in the case of Pelin v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 102 App. Div. 71,92 N. Y. Supp. 468;Id., 115 App. Div. 883,104 N. Y. Supp. 1136;Id., 188 N. Y. 565, 81 N. E. 1171, affirmed a judgment where the basis of the recovery was as here, that the defendant had permitted or required an employé to be on duty for a length of time in excess of that prescribed by another section of the act which we are now considering.

The counsel for the respondent has reviewed at length the duties discharged and the exact amount of time required in the actual performance thereof by the operator on the occasion in question, and he makes these facts the basis for an argument that no conditions existed which warranted the Legislature in fixing the limit which it did, and he insists that the period of service prescribed for this particular class of employés is entirely out of proportion to that permitted to various other employés engaged in the operation of a railroad. His argument is not without force, and very well might be addressed to the Legislature as a reason for permitting employment for a larger number of hours. I do not think, however, that we can say that the facts so conclusively show a lack of relation between the legislation and the justifiable ends sought to be gained that we can condemn the statute as unconstitutional; for, while each of the duties performed by the operator seems simple enough, still as a whole they form quite a complicated series of acts in the transmission of signals, the giving of orders and the movement of trains, and, while the actual time occupied in performing these acts is not large, still the employé for the proper discharge of his duties is compelled to be on the alert during the entire time of his employment, and it not infrequently happens that lack of active occupation during hours of duty is more trying than work itself. Thus it is not at all inconceivable that such an employé subjected to too long hours of duty and confinement might become physically fatigued and mentally inert and make mistakes which would lead to the destruction of life. This being so, it was permissible for the Legislature to pass a statute limiting the hours of labor, and it cannot be said that there is no reason or argument to support its judgment that eight hours was a proper limit. The control of such a matter by the Legislature would naturally be exercised by virtue of the police power. If the form of the statute in question could be criticised as relating only to corporations engaged in the operation of railroads, and therefore unduly discriminatory against them, it now being settled that an individual as well as a corporation may operate a railroad (Village of Phoenix v. Gannon, 195 N. Y. 471, 88 N. E. 1066), I think that we might take judicial notice of the fact that all of the railroads in the state to which this act could apply are and almost necessarily must be operated by corporations and not by individuals, since the latter have no power to acquire land by eminent domain for railroad purposes. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 29 Sup. Ct. 370, 53 L. Ed. 530.

Moreover, even if the statute failed as a valid exercise of the police power, personally I am not doubtful that under its reserved control over corporations the Legislature might pass such an act in regulation of the performance of the business for which a railroad was organized. Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 194 N. Y. 212, 237,87 N. E. 443,22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 420;People v. Phyfe, 136 N. Y. 554, 557,32 N. E. 978,19 L.R.A. 141;Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574, 5 Sup. Ct. 681, 28 L. Ed. 1084;Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677, 16 Sup. Ct. 714, 40 L. Ed. 849; Mayor, etc., of Worcester v. Railroad Co., 109 Mass. 103.

Equally important and possibly of more difficult solution are the considerations presented by the second defense, that the statute here sought to be enforced trespasses on a field of legislative action which had already been pre-empted by Congress by virtue of its power to govern interstate commerce and those engaged therein, and that, therefore, it was forbidden and nugatory. It will be noted that this defense assumed, as I think correctly, that the labor law purports and attempts indiscriminately and inseparably to regulate the hours of the classes of employés designated whether engaged in interstate or local traffic, and that, therefore, its validity must be tested by the power of the Legislature over the former.

This defense is...

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