People v. Espinoza
| Decision Date | 03 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 118218.,118218. |
| Citation | 43 N.E.3d 993 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Sandro ESPINOZA, Appellee. The People of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Angela Disera, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and James W. Glasgow, State's Attorney, of Joliet (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Jean M. Godfrey, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona, Deputy Defender, and Lucas J. Walker, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellees.
delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 At issue in this case is whether a charging instrument that identifies the victim simply as “a minor,” is sufficient pursuant to section 111–3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/111–3 (West 2012)
). In two separate criminal cases, the trial courts dismissed criminal complaints based upon the insufficiency of the charging instruments, where those charging instruments identified the victims only as “a minor.” The cases were consolidated on appeal. The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed. 2014 IL App (3d) 120766, 384 Ill.Dec. 682, 17 N.E.3d 664. This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the appellate court.
¶ 3 On June 12, 2013, the State filed an information charging defendant Sandro Espinoza with domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12–3.2(a)(2)
(West 2012)). The information stated that, “said defendant, knowingly, without legal justification made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with a minor, a family or household member, in that said defendant struck the minor about the face, in violation of Chapter 720, Section 5/12–3.2(a)(2), of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, 2012.” At Espinoza's bond hearing, the State indicated that the victim was defendant's son, who sustained a bloody nose. The trial court granted the State's request for a no contact order, admonishing defendant that, as a condition of his bond, he was to have no contact with the minor, D.E.
¶ 4 At a subsequent pretrial hearing, defense counsel indicated that Espinoza wanted to plead guilty and accept the State's plea offer. However, defense counsel also noted his concern that there were no identifiers in the complaint, and orally moved to amend the charging instrument. The trial court declined to consider the oral motion, and directed defense counsel to file a written motion. The trial court also declined to accept Espinoza's guilty plea to a complaint that was defective on its face.
¶ 5 Espinoza then filed a motion to amend the charging instrument, alleging that the victim of the offense was identified as a minor, which was a formal defect in the charging instrument, because the identity of the victim is an essential element that must be pled. Espinoza alleged that pursuant to section 111–5 of the Code, a charge may be amended by the State or the defendant at any time because of formal defects. 725 ILCS 5/111–5 (West 2012)
. Further, the formal defect in the case could be cured by identifying the victim in the complaint as D.E.
¶ 6 The State denied that the complaint was defective. The State argued that Espinoza was not prejudiced by the charging instrument, as full discovery had been tendered which included the full name of the minor victim, so that Espinoza could fully prepare his defense and would not be surprised at trial. The State noted that minors who are victims in juvenile proceedings are provided confidentiality regarding disclosure of identity, as evinced in section 5–901(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5–901(3)
(West 2012)). The State claimed that victims who are minors should be provided the same confidentiality.
¶ 7 The trial court found the charging instrument defective and granted Espinoza's motion. The trial court ordered the State to amend the complaint. The State filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. The State then declined to amend the criminal complaint, and asked the court to dismiss the complaint as a sanction for its refusal. The trial court therefore dismissed the complaint.
¶ 8 Defendant Angela Disera was charged with endangering the life or health of a child (720 ILCS 5/12C–5 (West 2012)
). Specifically, the criminal complaint alleged that Disera committed the offense of endangering the life or health of a child “in that, said defendant willfully caused or permitted the life or health of a minor, a child under the age of 18 years, to be endangered, in that said defendant left the minor child alone at 1350 Sterling, Joliet, Will County, Illinois, without adult supervision.”
¶ 9 Disera filed a motion for bill of particulars, noting that the complaint did not provide the name of the minor in question, nor did it provide any other identifying information about the minor. Disera observed that the police report named five different minors under the age of 18, three of whom allegedly were Disera's children. Given the ambiguity in the complaint, Disera was unable to discern the identity of the complaining witness. The State responded by filing a bill of particulars under seal which stated the full name of the minor. Disera subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the State had not amended the criminal complaint to identify the minor. The circuit court of Will County granted Disera's motion to dismiss based on the insufficiency of the complaint. The State then filed a certificate of substantial impairment and a notice of appeal.
¶ 10 People v. Espinoza and People v. Disera were consolidated on appeal. As noted, the appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the trial courts. 2014 IL App (3d) 120766, 384 Ill.Dec. 682, 17 N.E.3d 664
. The majority noted that where an indictment or information charges an offense against persons or property, the name of the person or property injured, if known, must be stated in the charging instrument and the allegation must be proved as alleged. Id. ¶ 10. In the cases before it, the charging instruments at issue charged crimes committed against individual persons, but neither charging instrument contained any information suggesting the victims' identities. Id. ¶ 11. Further, the State declined to cure the defects in the charging instruments. Under the circumstances, the trial courts acted properly in dismissing both criminal complaints. Id.
¶ 11 The majority also rejected the State's claim that the trial courts erred because neither defendant could show that they were prejudiced by the failure to identify the alleged victims in the charging instruments. The majority observed that a pretrial challenge to the sufficiency of a charging instrument requires strict compliance with section 111–3 of the Code. Id. ¶ 12. Because the defendants each challenged the sufficiency of the charging instruments before trial, the defendants were entitled to demand strict compliance with section 111–3, and did not need to show prejudice. Id.
¶ 12 The majority next rejected the State's claim it was not required to amend the charging instruments because any deficiencies in the charging instruments could be sought through a bill of particulars or through discovery. Although a charging instrument is no longer the exclusive means through which a defendant may obtain information concerning the charge against him, the majority noted that, “[o]ur supreme court has never held or implied that the charging instrument no longer plays an important role in informing a defendant of the nature of the charges against him.” Id. ¶ 15. Finally, the majority rejected the State's claim that its refusal to include the minor victims' initials in the charging instrument was justified on public policy grounds. Id. ¶ 16.
¶ 13 The dissenting justice would have held that the omission of the victims' names did not render the charging instruments defective. Id. ¶ 24 (O'Brien, J., dissenting). The dissent would find that changes in criminal discovery rules eliminated much of the reliance on the indictment as a safeguard against a defendant being tried twice for the same offense. Id. Likewise, the changes in criminal discovery rules allowed a defendant access to much more information to aid in the preparation of a defense. Id. Given those changes, the dissent would find that the trial courts erred in dismissing the criminal complaints in these cases.
¶ 15 At issue in this case is the sufficiency of the charging instruments. As set forth in section 111–3 of the Code, a defendant has a fundamental right to be informed of the nature and cause of criminal accusations made against him. People v. Rowell, 229 Ill.2d 82, 92–93, 321 Ill.Dec. 765, 890 N.E.2d 487 (2008)
. Section 111–3(a) provides:
(West 2012).
This issue presents a question of law, so our review is de novo. Rowell, 229 Ill.2d at 92, 321 Ill.Dec. 765, 890 N.E.2d 487
.
¶ 16 The State first argues that the charging instruments at issue strictly complied with section 111–3, and that the omission of the victims' identities did not render the charging instruments deficient. The State points out that both charging instruments set forth the name of the offense, the statute violated, the elements of the offense, the date and county...
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