People v. Estabrooks

• Decision Date: 28 April 1989
• Docket Number: Docket No. 105835
• Citation: 175 Mich.App. 532,438 N.W.2d 327
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert T. ESTABROOKS, Defendant-Appellee. 175 Mich.App. 532, 438 N.W.2d 327
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 327

438 N.W.2d 327

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert T. ESTABROOKS, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 105835.

175 Mich.App. 532, 438 N.W.2d 327

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Jan. 9, 1989.

Decided March 6, 1989.

Released for Publication April 28, 1989.

[175 MICHAPP 533] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., L. Brooks Patterson, Pros. Atty., Robert C. Williams, Chief, [175 MICHAPP 534] Appellate Div., and Richard H. Browne, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

Robert W. Larin, Birmingham, for defendant-appellee on appeal.

Before GRIBBS, P.J., and MICHAEL J. KELLY and MARILYN KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The people appeal from a circuit court order reversing defendant Robert T. Estabrooks' district court conviction. We reverse the circuit court and reinstate defendant's conviction.

Defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of liquor (OUIL) ¹ following a district court jury trial. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence gained due to an alleged unlawful traffic stop. The facts behind this stop are as follows: On July 8, 1986, Farmington Hills Police Officer Nancy Summers was investigating an accident near the intersection of Farmington and Twelve Mile Roads. While investigating that accident, a motorcyclist approached Summers and told her that he had been rear-ended several times by a Lincoln Continental automobile. The motorcyclist pointed out the car in question, which was stopped in traffic. Summers approached the car and directed the defendant, the driver, to pull over so she could investigate the alleged accident. Defendant pulled over and got out of his car. When defendant got out of his car, Summers observed that he appeared intoxicated, and subsequently arrested him for OUIL.

After an evidentiary hearing, the district judge concluded that Officer Summers had sufficient cause to stop defendant to investigate the possible accident and denied defendant's motion to suppress. The jury convicted defendant of OUIL.

[175 MICHAPP 535] Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress to the circuit court. The circuit judge ruled that Officer Summers did not have sufficient cause to stop defendant's car, so the stop was unconstitutional. The circuit court reversed defendant's conviction for OUIL. The people now appeal from this reversal.

A reviewing court should not reverse a lower court's ruling on a motion to suppress unless that ruling was clearly, erroneous. People v. Burrell, 417 Mich. 439, 448, 339 N.W.2d 403 (1983).

The Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures. Fourth Amendment restrictions apply to seizures of persons that are short of traditional arrests, including brief investigative detentions. People v. Shabaz, 424 Mich. 42, 52, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985), cert. dis. 478 U.S. 1017, 106 S.Ct. 3326, 92 L.Ed.2d 733 (1986); Pontiac v. Baldwin, 163 Mich.App. 147, 150, 413 N.W.2d 689 (1987). There is a limited exception to the probable cause requirement for seizure of a person: Where an officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime, he may briefly stop that person for the purpose of investigation. Shabaz, 424 Mich. pp. 54-56, 378 N.W.2d 451; Baldwin, 163 Mich.App. p. 151, 413 N.W.2d 689. The articulable reasons for suspecting criminal activities must derive from the police officer's assessment of the totality of the circumstances. Baldwin, p. 151, 413 N.W.2d 689.

This rule also applies to stops of automobiles such as defendant's. Police may properly make an investigative stop of an automobile if the stop is based upon specific, articulable facts which, when taken with rational inferences from those facts, would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that a crime has been committed or criminal activity is taking place. People v. Spencer, 154 Mich.App. 6, 10, 397 N.W.2d 525 (1986). Our Supreme[175 MICHAPP 536] Court in People v. Whalen, 390 Mich. 672, 682, 213 N.W.2d 116 (1973), has also noted that the following rules apply to determine the constitutionality of a stop of a moving automobile:

"1. Reasonableness is the test that is to be applied for both the stop of, and the search of moving motor vehicles.

"2. Said reasonableness will be determined from the facts and circumstances of each case.

"3. Fewer foundation facts are necessary to support a finding of reasonableness when moving vehicles are involved, than if a house or a home were involved.

"4. A stop of a motor vehicle for investigatory purposes may be based upon fewer facts than those necessary to support a finding of reasonableness where both a stop and a search is conducted by the police."

Here Officer Summers decided to stop defendant's car on the basis that another motorist informed her that defendant's car had rear-ended his motorcycle several times. Whether reasonable cause to stop a motor vehicle is established by an informant's tip depends on the presence of indicia of reliability of the information. Spencer, 154 Mich.App. p. 11, 397 N.W.2d 525. We must examine three factors to determine whether the motorcyclist's information carried enough indicia of reliability to provide the officer with a reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred or was taking place: (1) the reliability of the informant, (2) the nature of the information given to the police, and (3) the reasonableness of the suspicion in light of these factors. People v. Tooks, 403 Mich. 568, 577, 271 N.W.2d 503 (1978). With regard to the first factor, the fact that the motorcyclist was actually present and accusing defendant immediately after the rear-endings indicated reliability[175 MICHAPP 537] on the part of the informant. Second, the fact that the informant actually pointed out defendant's car to Officer Summers provided her with precise and easily verifiable information, which also indicated that the information was reliable. In light of these factors, it was quite reasonable for Summers to suspect that an accident may have occurred and warranted further investigation on her part.

On appeal to the circuit court, defendant argued that the information provided by the motorcyclist to Officer Summers only indicated that a traffic violation had occurred. Defendant argued that, since no criminal activity was indicated, Summers could not stop defendant for a traffic violation without some personal observation that an accident or other civil infraction had occurred. The circuit court agreed with this reasoning and held that Summers could not have properly stopped defendant without some evidence within her own observation which corroborated the motorcyclist's complaint. The court held that, since Summers did not properly corroborate the motorcyclist's story prior to the stop, she was operating beyond her...