People v. Esteves

Citation549 N.Y.S.2d 30,152 A.D.2d 406
PartiesThe PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Ramon ESTEVES, Appellant.
Decision Date11 December 1989
CourtNew York Supreme Court Appellate Division

Scott N. Singer, New York City, for appellant.

Elizabeth Holtzman, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn (Barbara D. Underwood, Ann Bordley and Jonathan Svetkey, of counsel), for respondent.

Before MOLLEN, P.J., and KUNZEMAN, RUBIN and EIBER, JJ.

RUBIN, Justice.

On this appeal, the defendant argues, inter alia, that his guilt was not established beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence an exculpatory, nonverbal statement made by the wounded victim approximately 13 hours after the shooting and six days prior to his demise. The defendant was charged with acting in concert with another unapprehended person in the commission of the crimes, inter alia, of murder in the second degree, the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree, and reckless endangerment in the first degree, arising from two separate incidents. At the defendant's trial, the following facts were adduced by the prosecution.

On the evening of August 23, 1983, a short time after the complainant Armando Santiago and the defendant had a verbal confrontation in front of Santiago's residence, the defendant returned to the scene with a male companion, who had a scar on his face. The latter carried a baseball bat. When the defendant displayed a revolver, a friend of Santiago pushed Santiago into the hallway of the apartment house and they took cover behind the stairs. The defendant fired one shot at Santiago, but missed. Subsequently, a police detective observed a bullet hole in the siding below the steps leading to the upstairs apartments and removed a misshapen piece of lead, which was discarded after the officer was informed that it had no ballistics value.

The following evening, August 24, 1983, Santiago walked to the corner of Wilson and Madison Avenues and met the defendant and the man with the facial scar. Santiago had on numerous prior occasions spoken with the defendant and the man with a scar as they stood outside the neighborhood club, located on this corner. Santiago asked the defendant why he had shot at him. The defendant replied that his girlfriend had advised him that Santiago had a gun. The man with a scar stated that if he had known Santiago had a gun, he would have killed him. Santiago's stepsister Julia then walked over to the group and began to argue with the man with a scar. Ramon Vincente, Santiago's cousin, interceded and instructed the man with a scar not to argue with Julia, because she was his woman. The man with a scar asked Vincente if he was tough. Vincente replied that there was no problem. The man with a scar then walked a few feet away from the group and stood beside the wall of the neighborhood club. The man with a scar next opened his shirt and pulled out a gun. The defendant, who was standing closer to the curb only a few feet in front of Vincente, also took out a gun. Both men started shooting at Vincente. The man with a scar fired four times and the defendant fired three times. Neither Santiago nor Vincente were armed with a gun. Vincente fell onto the sidewalk, holding his neck. As the man with a scar ran towards Wilson Avenue, he continued to fire a couple of shots in the direction of Vincente. The wounded Vincente told Santiago to leave so that he would not be injured. The defendant was also hit by a bullet, but Santiago did not know how the defendant sustained his injury.

Santiago's testimony regarding the shooting of his cousin was corroborated by the testimony of another eyewitness, Nieves, who was sitting on a stoop directly across the street from the corner where the incident took place. On prior occasions, Nieves had seen the defendant and the man with a scar standing in front of the club. He also knew Santiago and Vincente from the neighborhood. After hearing a loud argument, the witness observed the defendant and the man with a scar holding guns and shooting at Vincente. Several shots were fired and Vincente fell to the ground. Nieves did not see anyone else with a gun. On the sidewalk beside the wounded Vincente was a baseball bat. The witness did not know how the defendant was wounded in the incident, but he also observed the man with a scar run towards Wilson Avenue while continuing to fire his gun.

Vincente was hospitalized for his injury. The bullet had severed his spinal cord, rendering Vincente a quadriplegic. Vincente died on August 31, 1983, one week after he had been shot, from bronchopneumonia, a complication resulting from his gunshot wound.

The defendant testified at his trial. Although admitting that he had a physical confrontation with Santiago on August 23, 1983, the defendant denied possessing or firing a gun that evening. According to the defendant, the next night he saw five people arguing on the corner in front of the club where he is employed, including Santiago, Vincente and a man with a scar named Franscisco. When he approached the corner, Santiago put his arm around the defendant's shoulder. The defendant shrugged off Santiago's arm and walked away from the crowd when his fiancee called him from the door of her residence. As he walked in the direction of her house, the defendant heard shooting and felt a pain in his side. The defendant denied that he either possessed or fired a weapon on the evening of August 24. The defendant conceded that he had a prior conviction for criminal possession of stolen property. Two other witnesses to the August 24 shooting were called to testify for the defense. Upon hearing gunshots on the corner of Madison and Wilson Avenues, each defense witness looked in that direction and saw the defendant holding his side as he ran from the corner. Neither witness saw who fired the shots.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of acting with another in the commission of the crimes of manslaughter in the first degree, with regard to the homicide of Ramon Vincente, and reckless endangerment in the first degree, with regard to the bullet fired at Armando Santiago on August 23, 1983. The prosecutor's two eyewitnesses, Santiago and Nieves, identified the defendant, who each knew from the neighborhood, as one of the two gunmen firing shots at Vincente in the aftermath of a heated argument. Rejecting as incredible the defendant's portrayal of himself as a wounded bystander, a rational trier of fact could have readily found that the defendant was wounded by a stray bullet fired by his scar-faced accomplice based on evidence as to the position of the participants at the time the shooting commenced and the fact the scar-faced accomplice continued to fire his weapon as he fled in the direction of Wilson Avenue. Santiago additionally identified the defendant as the man who fired a shot at him, but missed, on the previous evening. This testimony was corroborated by a piece of lead removed from a bullet hole from the steps Santiago hid behind when the shot was fired.

Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15[5]. Insofar as the defendant's argument focuses upon alleged inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses' trial testimony and their prior statements to the police, we note that minor discrepancies, as here, do not render the challenged testimony incredible as a matter of law (see, People v. Di Girolamo, 108 A.D.2d 755, 485 N.Y.S.2d 98). The question of credibility was properly presented to the triers of fact, and we perceive no basis for disturbing their resolution of this issue (see, People v. Harris, 133 A.D.2d 649, 651, 519 N.Y.S.2d 758; People v. Wadley, 133 A.D.2d 239, 240, 519 N.Y.S.2d 39; People v. Smith, 124 A.D.2d 839, 840, 508 N.Y.S.2d 987; People v. Russo, 118 A.D.2d 740, 500 N.Y.S.2d 73; People v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88, 353 N.Y.S.2d 500). Contrary to the defendant's contention, we find his guilt was established by overwhelming evidence.

We also reject the defendant's contention that the trial court erred in ruling that the deceased victim's exculpatory declaration was not admissible as either a dying declaration or excited utterance. At the trial, the defendant sought to elicit the fact that approximately 13 hours after the shooting Detective Sescilia went to the hospital where Vincente was being treated for his wounds, showed the victim a photograph of the defendant and asked: "Is this the person who shot you?" Vincente, who could not speak, shook his head to indicate no.

Vincente's nonverbal statement constituted hearsay evidence, as it was made out of court and was sought to be introduced for the truth of what he asserted (see, People v. Nieves, 67 N.Y.2d 125, 131, 501 N.Y.S.2d 1, 492 N.E.2d 109; People v. Edwards, 47 N.Y.2d 493, 496, 419 N.Y.S.2d 45, 392 N.E.2d 1229; see also, People v. Caviness, 38 N.Y.2d 227, 230, 379 N.Y.S.2d 695, 342 N.E.2d 496; Richardson, Evidence § 200 [Prince 10th ed.]. Consequently, the statement was admissible only if the defendant demonstrated that it fell within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.

Dying declarations have long been treated as an exception to the general rule excluding hearsay evidence (see, People v. Becker, 215 N.Y. 126, 145, 109 N.E. 127; Richardson, Evidence § 311 [Prince 10th ed.]. In the usual case, the dying declaration incriminates the defendant and, hence, is received against him at trial. However, if the dying declaration exculpates the defendant, it is admissible on his behalf (see, 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1452; 2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence §§ 324, 317 [14th ed.]; McCormick, Evidence § 261; Richardson, Evidence § 311 [Prince 10th ed.]. When the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
28 cases
  • Morales v. Portuondo, 97 CIV 2559 DC.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. Southern District of New York
    • 24 Julio 2001
    ......people would say, okay, these two people can go home and everything will be fine." ( Id. at 92). When Cohen pushed him further, Fornes stated that he had ...James, 242 A.D.2d 389, 661 N.Y.S.2d 273 (2d Dep't 1997) (same); People v. Esteves, 152 A.D.2d 406, 549 N.Y.S.2d 30, 35 (2d Dep't 1989) (recognizing that the United States Constitution may require courts to admit exculpatory ......
  • People v. Butts
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
    • 10 Junio 2020
    ...v. Gibian, 76 A.D.3d at 585, 907 N.Y.S.2d 226, citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038 ; see People v. Esteves, 152 A.D.2d 406, 413–414, 549 N.Y.S.2d 30 ). "Indeed ‘where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay r......
  • People v. Clay
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
    • 28 Junio 2011
    ...N.Y.S.2d 753, affd. 50 N.Y.2d 850, 430 N.Y.S.2d 36, 407 N.E.2d 1333; cf. People v. Allen, 300 N.Y. 222, 90 N.E.2d 48; People v. Esteves, 152 A.D.2d 406, 410, 549 N.Y.S.2d 30). The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. ORDERED that the ju......
  • People v. Gibian
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court Appellate Division
    • 10 Agosto 2010
    ...right to present a defense ( id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038; see People v. Smith, 195 A.D.2d at 121, 606 N.Y.S.2d 656; People v. Esteves, 152 A.D.2d 406, 413, 549 N.Y.S.2d 30). Moreover, "where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule m......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT