People v. Estrada

Decision Date28 August 2009
Docket NumberNo. 1-08-2909.,1-08-2909.
Citation914 N.E.2d 679
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Rolando ESTRADA, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Anta Alarmed, State's Attorney (James E. Fingered, Marie Quinlivan Czech, Anthony L. Kenney, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-People of the State of Illinois.

Pablo Decastro, Rascia & Decastro, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Salvador Ruano.

Justice TOOMIN delivered the opinion of the court:

In this appeal we confront the validity of a warrantless search of lawfully parked and locked vehicle where its recent occupant is seized outside the vehicle in the absence of any articulable basis. In the proceedings below, the court granted defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence derived therefrom. The State now appeals contending the court erred in finding the arresting officer did not have a reasonable suspicion sufficient to warrant an investigatory stop. Additionally, the State contends that the exclusionary rule should not apply in this case. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

In the case sub judice, defendant was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver after cocaine was seized from his car. Defendant moved to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and ordered suppression of the evidence. Thereafter, the State filed a certificate of substantial impairment pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill.2d. R. 604(a)(1)) and a notice of appeal. We now consider whether the trial court's order suppressing the evidence was proper based upon the facts adduced at the hearing and in conformity with fourth amendment jurisprudence.

Chicago police officer Jason Cloherty, a five-year police veteran, was the lone witness to testify at the hearing on the motion. Cloherty was a member of the 25th District tactical team. On May 22, 2008, he was on patrol, riding in the passenger seat of an unmarked tactical unit vehicle. He was not in a Chicago police uniform, but was wearing his badge, a duty belt, and a bulletproof vest. Officer Cloherty and his partner were traveling westbound on Dickens Avenue as they approached Lavergne Avenue, a street running one-way southbound. Cloherty initially saw defendant sitting in the driver's seat of a dark-colored sport utility vehicle talking to an individual standing in the parkway on the driver's side of the vehicle. This vehicle was the first one parked on the east side of Lavergne, north of Dickens.1 He could not see if there were any other passengers in the vehicle with defendant.

Officer Cloherty and his partner turned right onto Lavergne Avenue heading northbound, proceeding the wrong way down a one-way street. Defendant's car was 20 feet or possibly two car lengths away from Cloherty's unit. As Cloherty and his partner turned the corner, he "observed the defendant place a bag over with his right hand over the passenger seat of the vehicle placing it in the rear seat of the floor, I wasn't sure." He described the bag as a white plastic bag like one "you would see at Jewel." Defendant held the bag, which appeared to possibly be knotted, by its top.

On direct examination, Officer Cloherty indicated that by the time his unit pulled up, defendant had exited the vehicle and was near the rear of the car. Defendant's vehicle was already closed and locked when Cloherty asked defendant to stop and talk. On cross-examination, Officer Cloherty described the events as follows: "We stopped our vehicle, had the defendant turn off his vehicle and exit his vehicle to the rear, I exited my vehicle and met the defendant in the rear of his vehicle." According to this account, Cloherty's unit stopped front bumper to front bumper with defendant's vehicle or "not head-on, but * * * askew." He could hear defendant's engine running when they pulled up.

Officer Cloherty did not believe the unit's emergency equipment was activated, but he was not sure. As Cloherty exited his unit to approach defendant, he noticed that defendant's vehicle did not have a City of Chicago vehicle sticker displayed on the windshield. He then walked in the street from his unit and met defendant at the rear of defendant's vehicle.

Cloherty asked defendant for a driver's license and proof of insurance. According to the officer, defendant "stated that he had some problems with his license." Consequently, Cloherty instructed defendant to place his hands on the front of the unmarked unit. The officer then went to run defendant's name through the police computer and defendant fled as Cloherty was typing his name into the computer. Cloherty's partner gave chase and apprehended defendant.

On cross-examination, the initial encounter with defendant was described differently. Officer Cloherty indicated that he approached defendant and asked him only about the city sticker as well as the ownership of the car. Defendant responded that the car was his girlfriend's. When asked about his license, "he stated that he had problems with his license" and did not provide a license or proof of insurance. Officer Cloherty did not ask defendant about the individual he was seen speaking to initially. Defendant then accompanied Cloherty to the front of the unmarked unit and was, at that point, being detained while they investigated the status of his license. While Cloherty checked defendant's license status, defendant fled. Thereafter, he was taken into custody for driving on a revoked license and for fleeing the scene.

According to Officer Cloherty, approximately one minute passed from the time defendant was first observed until the point where Cloherty met him at the rear of defendant's vehicle. The officer believed, based on his observations, that he and his partner "were walking into a narcotics transaction." He conceded that he did not stop to talk to defendant about the absent city sticker. Instead, he wanted to determine what was going on with defendant and the other individual they had observed. He had a suspicion about the bag and wanted to search the car in order to confirm that suspicion.

On examination by the trial court, Officer Cloherty stated that defendant's vehicle was legally parked on the street. He was unable to run the vehicle's plates before defendant fled, so all he knew was that defendant said the vehicle was his girlfriend's. Additionally, Cloherty indicated that the vehicle defendant was seen in was not under surveillance for any other reason.

After defendant was apprehended and placed in custody a warrantless search of the vehicle was conducted by Officer Cloherty with the assistance of officers from the gang team. The officers subsequently found a quantity of cocaine in the vehicle. The cocaine was discovered in a Target bag in the passenger side of the backseat. According to Cloherty, the vehicle was searched preliminary to a tow because the defendant had neither a license nor insurance, as such it was an inventory search. Additionally, according to Officer Cloherty, defendant made incriminating statements about the recovered cocaine after he was placed under arrest.

Following argument, the trial court issued its findings. According to the court, Officer Cloherty was credible in his account of the events. Moreover, what Cloherty saw was "neutral conduct" when he observed defendant moving a sealed bag from one part of the vehicle to another. There was, "No other reason to believe that this may have been drugs other than a hunch by the police officer." The trial court also noted that only those vehicles registered in the City of Chicago are required to display city stickers. Therefore, the court was unsure how the officer could have thought this was even a possible violation without knowing the registered owner of the vehicle and the address of such registration. Nevertheless, "[H]e stopped this person with a legally parked car under color of law he demanded the identification and licenses and other things." All of this was done because he was "curious and wanted to see what was in the bag because he had a hunch about that."

The trial judge noted that the city sticker violation would require only a ticket that need not be given to the driver personally and could be left on the windshield. Thereafter, it became a traffic matter in terms of defendant driving without a license. Additionally, "Even if that is a custodial event I have a car legally parked, don't even know that the car is his, I don't see any necessity to tow the car and make an inventory search from it." The car was legally parked and, as far as Officer Cloherty knew from defendant, the car belonged to someone else. Therefore, there was "no manifest necessity to tow that car and do an inventory search of it." The trial court concluded by observing, "The police officer was candid enough to admit that he had some suspicions. In [sic] fact his suspicions turned out to be right doesn't mean that he was able to articulate them for purposes of this motion."

The trial court allowed the motion to suppress. The State filed a motion for reconsideration. In denying the State's motion, the trial court recited the points relied upon in granting the motion to suppress, highlighting Officer Cloherty's testimony about the city sticker. In turn, the State filed a certificate of impairment based on the suppression of the evidence as well as a notice of appeal. This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

We review rulings on motions to suppress in accordance with the two-part standard articulated in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 920 (1996), providing that findings of historical fact are viewed for clear error with reviewing courts affording due weight to any inferences drawn therefrom by the trial court and the ultimate...

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