People v. Evans
| Decision Date | 29 March 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 39714,39714 |
| Citation | 37 Ill.2d 27,224 N.E.2d 778 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Roosevelt EVANS, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Charles E. Shepherd, Chicago, appointed by the court, for appellant.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., an Elmer C. Kissane, Saul A. Perdomo and Carl M. Walsh, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for appellee.
Two indictments were returned against defendant, Roosevelt Evans, the first charging him with attempted murder and the second with attempted murder and armed robbery, both indictments arising out of the same occurrence. After conviction on pleas of guilty to both indictments, he filed a Pro se post-conviction petition to which the State filed a motion to dismiss. He brings this appeal from the court's order sustaining the dismissal.
Defendant, in his petition, alleged that his constitutional rights had been substantially denied him in the following manner: (a) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for change of venue; (b) that the Cook County jail officials wrongfully took documents from him which were vital to his defense; (c) that the public defender who was appointed to represent him at trial was incompetent; (d) that his plea of guilty resulted from coercion; (e) that the trial judge failed to properly admonish him of the consequences of his plea; (f) that the trial court wrongfully sentenced him in excess of the maximum penalty prescribed for the crime to which he pleaded guilty.
Defendant's petition also contained voluminous allegations of the facts and circumstances in his case, upon which he grounded these charges, supported by his affidavit that the same were true in substance and in fact. The State moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it failed to raise any constitutional questions within the purview of the act; that the defendant's allegations were conclusionary and unsupported by accompanying affidavits, records or other evidence, and that, in any event, defendant's voluntary plea of guilty operated as a waiver of the constitutional rights which he claims were violated. The motion to dismiss also contained as exhibit No. 1 the 'memorandum of orders, the Transcript of the change of plea of indictment No. 62--957 and People's Exhibit 2, the memorandum of orders and the change of plea pertaining to Indictment No. 62--958, and People's Exhibit 3, a signed statement amounting to a confession bearing the signature of the petitioner-denfendant and as People's Exhibit No. 4, a copy of the official records of the Public Defender's office,' and alleged that 'all of which documents establishes affirmatively that petitioner's constitutional rights were not denied.'
Defendant was represented by the public defender at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. On appeal defendant contends that his petition was sufficient and the State should have been required to answer it; and that his counsel at the post-conviction hearing on the motion to dismiss was incompetent.
It is clear that petitioners under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, art. 122,) must 'make a substantial showing of a violation of constitutional rights' and that 'the allegation of mere conclusion to that effect under oath will not suffice.' (People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555, 107 N.E.2d 861.) In order to make a 'substantial showing' the allegations in the petition must be supported by the records in the case, or by accompanying affidavits, unless the absence of same is sufficiently explained. Section 122--2 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.
Herein, we think that defendant's allegations that documents essential to his defense were taken from him by jail officials, and that his plea of guilty was coerced from him, do not meet the above standard since there is no evidence in the record nor accompanying affidavits to support these charges. Therefore, we find that these allegations were properly dismissed by the trial judge.
So also, we find that defendant's allegation that the trial court erred in denying his motion for change of venue was properly dismissed. While, as defendant in his brief argues, a person may have a right under statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 38, par. 114--5) to a substitution of judges upon mere allegation of bias on the part of the judge, the denial of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Sutherland
... ... The court ruled on the motion by letter opinion filed February 3, 1984, after reading the transcripts in this cause, without further hearing, and did not address whether its admonitions had been in substantial compliance with Supreme Court Rule 402(a). Further, People v. Evans (1967), 37 Ill.2d 27, 31-32, 224 N.E.2d 778, 781, held that if admonishment of the consequences of a plea of guilty by the trial court was improper, the law of waiver would be inapplicable since the defendant could not have knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights. (People v ... ...
-
People v. Tate
...motion and was, in every regard, compliant with statute and controlling case law.¶ 40 To the extent the State relies on People v. Evans , 37 Ill. 2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 778 (1967), to support its prejudice argument, that reliance is misplaced. In Evans , the defendant filed a postconviction peti......
-
People v. Gosier
... ... If the admonishments were improper, the law of waiver does not apply because the defendant could not have made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. (People v. Weakley (1970), 45 Ill.2d 549, 552, 259 N.E.2d 802; People v. Evans (1967), 37 Ill.2d 27, 32, 224 N.E.2d 778.) Therefore, it is necessary for us to determine whether the defendant was properly admonished ... As noted above, section 115-3(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 requires that a defendant raise the issue of insanity in order ... ...
-
People v. Moore
... ... None of the items allegedly concealed by the prosecution were requested by the defendant during the trial. It is clear that in a post-conviction hearing the burden is upon the defendant to show a denial of a constitutional right by a preponderance of the evidence (People v. Evans, 37 Ill.2d 27, 224 N.E.2d 778), and the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material. (Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215.) We have exaimined the record on the post-conviction ... ...