People v. Everhardt

• Decision Date: 01 March 1887
• Citation: 104 N.Y. 591,11 N.E. 62
• Parties: PEOPLE v. EVERHARDT.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

104 N.Y. 591

11 N.E. 62

PEOPLE

v.EVERHARDT.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 1, 1887.

The testimony corroborative of that of the accomplice referred to in the opinion was as follows: That of Schulken showed that, prior to the perpetration of the crime, the defendant made several suspicious visits to the office of the firm whose name was forged, for the purpose of inspecting their canceled checks, and thereby of so familiarizing himself with the signature of the firm as to enable him to execute a forgery thereof; that he, to that end, introduced himself by a false and fictitious name; that a bundle of canceled checks was submitted to him for inspection the day before the crime was committed; and that 10 checks were found missing from that bundle, upon examination thereof, after discovery of the forgery. Caroline Gaylord, the accomplice's wife, testified that she overheard defendant, in conversation with her husband, say that ‘there was lots of money in it, and that it was sure;’ that she overheard them talking about two canceled checks; that on the day of the forgery, before its commission, defendant called twice at the house, and that the last time he produced a red pocket-book, from which he took a paper on which she saw the word ‘Bank’ in print; that, as soon as defendant saw witness, he put the paper in the pocket-book, and gave it to her husband; that late in the afternoon the defendant called at the house, and told her that he thought something was wrong; that he had been waiting for her husband, but he had failed to come; and further testified to many acts of defendant showing his interest in her husband; and that defendant said it was too bad the only gentleman among them, meaning her husband, was arrested,

A. Suydam, for appellant.

McKenzie Semple, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the People.

EARL, J.

The defendant was convicted in the court of general sessions, in the city of New York, of the crime of forgery in the second degree, committed by uttering a forged check, knowing it to be forged. Prior to his conviction one Gaylord had been convicted of the same offense for uttering the same check, and had been sentenced to the state prison at Sing Sing. He was produced as a witness on the trial of the defendant, and testified that he received the forged check from him, and was induced by him to attempt to obtain the money upon it from the bank upon which it was drawn. He was therefore an accomplice, and the objection is now made that his testimony was not sufficiently corroborated under section 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that ‘a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless he be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.’ Prior to the enactment of this section, it was customary for judges to instruct jurors that they should not convict a defendant of crime upon the evidence of an accomplice unless such evidence was corroborated; and yet it was the law in this state that a defendant could be convicted upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, if the jury believed it. This section has changed that rule of law, and requires that there should be simply corroborative evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.

Here, without referring particularly to the evidence of Schulken and of Caroline Gaylord, we think such evidence was sufficient to show some active agency on the part of the defendant in uttering the check, and thus to connect him with the commission of the crime, and that satisfies the law. Whether that evidence was sufficient corroboration of the accomplice was for the determination of the jury. The law is complied with if there is some other evidence fairly tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, so that his conviction will not rest entirely upon the evidence of the accomplice.

Upon the trial the people were allowed to prove, against the objection of the defendant, the uttering of other forged checks by him upon other occasions. In this there was no error. The defendant, by his plea of not guilty, had put in issue everything which it was incumbent upon the people to prove. They had no direct or positive evidence that he personally forged the check which he uttered, and it was open for him to show that at the time he uttered it he had no knowledge that it was forged, and was therefore innocent of crime; and, for the purpose of showing the prisoner's guilty knowledge in such cases, it has always been held competent to prove other forgeries. Mayer v. People, 80 N. Y. 364;People v. Shulman, Id. 373. Such proof is not received for the purpose of showing other crimes than that charged in the indictment, but for the purpose of showing the guilty knowledge and intent, which are elements of the crime charged, and it can be considered by the jury only for that purpose.

Although the evidence of Gaylord, corroborated, as it was, as to the guilty knowledge of the defendant, was quite clear and convincing, yet the people were not bound to rest upon a prima facie case, but had the right to confirm that evidence by the proof as to the uttering of other forged checks.

The defendant was...