People v. Farmer

• Decision Date: 20 April 1995
• Docket Number: 76154,76153,Nos. 76152,76155,s. 76152
• Citation: 650 N.E.2d 1006,209 Ill.Dec. 33,165 Ill.2d 194
• Parties: , 209 Ill.Dec. 33, 45 A.L.R.5th 927 The PEOPLE of The State of Illinois, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Edna Mae FARMER et al., Appellees (Peggy June Myers, Appellee and Cross-Appellant). , and 76272.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1006

650 N.E.2d 1006

165 Ill.2d 194, 209 Ill.Dec. 33, 45

A.L.R.5th 927

The PEOPLE of The State of Illinois, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. Edna Mae FARMER et al., Appellees (Peggy June Myers,

Appellee and Cross-Appellant).

Nos. 76152, 76153, 76154, 76155, and 76272.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 20, 1995.

Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Thomas J. Brown, State's Atty., Pontiac (Rosalyn Kaplan, Solicitor Gen., and Arleen C. Anderson and Kathy Shepard, Asst. Attys. Gen., Springfield, of counsel), for the People.

Carey J. Luckman, Pontiac, and Lori S. Klingman, Wilmette, for appellee and cross-appellant Myers.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, and Judith L. Libby, Asst. Defender, of the Office of the State Public Defender, Springfield, for appellees Farmer, Henry and Flores.

Justice NICKELS delivered the opinion of the court:

These four consolidated appeals by the State present the common issue of the constitutionality of the sentencing provisions imposing felony penalties for the offense of possessing contraband in a penal institution (720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(b) (West 1992)). By cross-appeal, defendant Peggy June Myers challenges the constitutionality of the provisions imposing felony penalties for the offense of bringing contraband into a penal institution (720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(a) (West 1992)).

BACKGROUND

In unrelated prosecutions in the circuit court of Livingston County, defendants Myers (Nos. 76154 & 76155), Edna Mae Farmer (No. 76152), Mary Henry (No. 76153) and Loretta Flores (No. 76272) were each charged with one count of bringing contraband into a penal institution (720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(a) (West 1992)) and one count of possessing contraband in a penal institution (720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(b) (West 1992)). The records of the proceedings below reflect that the defendants were charged after each allegedly visited either the Pontiac Correctional Center or the Dwight Correctional Center, where they were subjected to routine searches for contraband. Cannabis was allegedly discovered as a result of the searches of defendants Myers and Henry. A weapon, namely a knife, was allegedly discovered during a search of defendant Farmer. A search of defendant Flores allegedly resulted in the discovery of phencyclidine (PCP).

In the case of People v. Myers (Cir.Ct. Livingston Co.), No. 93-CF-120, the defendant moved for the dismissal of both of the charges against her on the basis that the felony penalties prescribed for the offenses of possessing contraband in a penal institution and bringing contraband into a penal institution were constitutionally impermissible. The trial court denied defendant Myers' motion to dismiss the charge of bringing contraband into a penal institution, but granted the motion to dismiss the charge of possessing contraband in a penal institution. The trial court reasoned that while the offense of bringing contraband into a penal institution required a knowing act, possessing contraband in a penal institution was an absolute liability offense. The trial court ruled that the applicable felony penalty was excessive punishment for an offense for which no culpable mental state is required. In its written order dismissing the charge, the court ruled that the applicable sentencing provision violated State and Federal equal protection and due process guarantees (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV), the proportionate Thereafter, prior to trial in People v. Farmer (Cir.Ct. Livingston Co.), No. 93-CF-129, and People v. Flores (Cir.Ct. Livingston Co.), No. 93-CF-108, the trial court similarly declared that the applicable felony penalties for the offense of possessing contraband in a penal institution were unconstitutional. In People v. Henry (Cir.Ct. Livingston Co.), No. 93-CF-83, the court declared the applicable sentencing provision to be unconstitutional on the date set for sentencing of defendant Henry, who had already been found guilty of possessing contraband in a penal institution but not guilty of bringing contraband into a penal institution at a bench trial. The State appealed the trial court's rulings directly to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill.2d R. 603). Defendant Myers has taken a cross-appeal from the trial court's order denying her motion to dismiss the charge bringing contraband into a penal institution. We consolidated the State's appeals and defendant Myers' cross-appeal. ¹

[209 Ill.Dec. 36] penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11) and the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII).

ANALYSIS

I

At the outset, we address two procedural matter involving only defendant Myers. First, we note that defendant Myers' cross-appeal seeking review of the trial court's denial of her motion to dismiss the charge of bringing contraband into a penal institution is not properly before us. The denial of a motion to dismiss criminal charges is an interlocutory order from which, generally speaking, an appeal may not be taken. That defendant Myers seeks review by way of cross-appeal is of no consequence, since a reviewing court acquires no greater jurisdiction on cross-appeal than it could on appeal. (People v. Miller (1966), 35 Ill.2d 62, 68, 219 N.E.2d 475.) Accordingly, defendant Myers' cross-appeal is dismissed.

Second, we address defendant Myers' argument that the State has waived review of the trial court's ruling in her case. During the proceedings below, the State failed to raise any argument in response to defendant Myers' motion to dismiss. Defendant Myers asserts that we should affirm the trial court's ruling on the basis of the State's waiver, and need not reach the merits of the constitutional issue with respect to her case. The waiver rule is one of administrative convenience rather than jurisdiction, and the goals of obtaining a just result and maintaining a sound body of precedent may sometimes override considerations of waiver. (People v. Bailey (1994), 159 Ill.2d 498, 506, 203 Ill.Dec. 459, 639 N.E.2d 1278.) We agree with the State that relaxation of the waiver rule is appropriate here. Four cases presenting the same constitutional issue are currently before this court, but only defendant Myers claims the benefit of a general waiver by the State. Since we must decide the constitutional issue in the remaining cases, for us to refrain from applying that decision to Myers would neither promote the interests of administrative convenience nor lead to a just result.

II

Turning to the merits of the State's appeals, section 31A-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1 (West 1992)) provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) A person commits the offense of bringing contraband into a penal institution when he knowingly and without authority of any person designated or authorized to grant such authority (1) brings an item of contraband into a penal institution or (2) causes another to bring an item of contraband into a penal institution or (3) places an item of contraband in such proximity to a penal institution as to give an inmate access to the contraband.

(b) A person commits the offense of possessing contraband in a penal institution The phrase "item of contraband" encompasses various objects and substances specifically enumerated in the statute. (720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(c)(2) (West 1992).) Convictions under both subsections (a) and (b) carry felony penalties which vary depending on the type of contraband involved. Possession of cannabis is a Class 3 felony. (720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(e) (West 1992).) Possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance (such as PCP) or a weapon is a Class 1 felony. (720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(g), (i) (West 1992).) It is an affirmative defense to the charge of possessing contraband in a penal institution that such possession "was specifically authorized by rule, regulation, or directive of the governing authority of the penal institution or order issued pursuant thereto." 720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1(k) (West 1992).

[209 Ill.Dec. 37] when he possesses contraband in a penal institution, regardless of the intent with which he possesses it."

As noted above, the trial court declared the sentencing provisions for the offense of possessing contraband in a penal institution unconstitutional because they impose felony penalties for an offense which requires no mental state, or mens rea. The State argues, inter alia, that felony penalties for such absolute liability offenses are not per se unconstitutional, and that the felony penalties applicable here are justified by the magnitude of the threat which the prohibited items of contraband pose in a penal setting. Consequently, in the State's view, the applicable felony penalties represent a valid exercise of the State's police power. Alternatively, the State suggests that the trial court may have erred in viewing section 31A-1.1(b) as creating an absolute liability offense. According to the State, the statute might be properly interpreted to penalize only knowing possession of contraband, in which case defendants' constitutional objection to the sentencing provisions would be meritless.

Defendants respond that the trial court correctly interpreted section 31A-1.1(b) to create an absolute liability offense. While the trial court concluded that the sentencing provisions violate various constitutional guarantees, defendants rely primarily on principles of substantive due process in order to uphold the trial court's ruling. Defendants argue that the measure sweeps too broadly, punishing innocent as well as culpable conduct. (See generally People v. Zaremba (1994), 158 Ill.2d 36, 196 Ill.Dec. 632, 630 N.E.2d 797; W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 2.12 (2d ed. 1986).) Defendants maintain that insofar as the offense imposes absolute liability, the corresponding felony penalties are unduly harsh and cannot be considered to be a reasonable means of promoting safety, order and discipline in...