People v. Farnsley, Docket No. 78-2337

• Decision Date: 21 November 1979
• Docket Number: Docket No. 78-2337
• Citation: 287 N.W.2d 361,94 Mich.App. 34
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Susan FARNSLEY, Defendant-Appellant. 94 Mich.App. 34, 287 N.W.2d 361
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 361

287 N.W.2d 361

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Susan FARNSLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 78-2337.

94 Mich.App. 34, 287 N.W.2d 361

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Nov. 21, 1979.

Released for Publication Jan. 29, 1980.

[94 MICHAPP 35] Paul L. Decocq, Howell, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Peter Houk, Pros. Atty., Charles M. Sibert, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before DANHOF, C. J., and V. J. BRENNAN and CARROLL, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

On April 18, 1978, an Ingham County Circuit Court jury convicted defendant of wilfully and maliciously burning a dwelling house and the contents thereof, contrary to M.C.L. § 750.72; M.S.A. § 28.267, and of wilfully burning insured personal property with intent to defraud the insurer, contrary to M.C.L. § 750.75; M.S.A. § 28.270. She appeals from her convictions as of right.

Defendant raises three issues for our consideration, only one of which merits substantial discussion. At trial, Inspector Holliday of the Lansing [94 MICHAPP 36] Fire Department testified that it was his opinion that the fire in question was maliciously set and that it was arson. Defendant failed to object. Absent a showing of manifest injustice, specific objections to the admission of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. People v. Alexander, 72 Mich.App. 91, 249 N.W.2d 307 (1976). Where Inspector Holliday was clearly shown to be a qualified expert arson investigator and where the trial court properly instructed the jury that they were the sole and exclusive judges of the facts, we are unable to find manifest injustice. Moreover, his testimony meets the requirements for the admission of expert testimony. Dep't of Natural Resources v. Frostman, 84 Mich.App. 503, 269 N.W.2d 655 (1978). It is evident that Inspector Holliday's conclusion was the product of professional and scientific knowledge beyond the competency of the jury. Dudek v. Popp, 373 Mich. 300, 129 N.W.2d 393 (1964). Accordingly, we find no error.

Defendant also complains of several remarks made by the prosecuting attorney during his closing argument. Defense counsel's failure to object at trial precludes our review unless failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v. Delgado, 404 Mich. 76, 273 N.W.2d 395 (1978). The prosecutor's remarks must be read as a whole and be evaluated in light of the relationship or lack of relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial. People v. Cowell, 44 Mich.App. 623, 205 N.W.2d 600 (1973). A review of the record in this case convinces us that no manifest injustice occurred.

Finally, defendant argues that the trial court's failure to suppress evidence gathered at the scene of the fire by Inspector Holliday was reversible error. She relies upon People v. Tyler, 399 Mich. [94 MICHAPP 37] 564, 570, 250 N.W.2d 467 (1977). In that case, a fire broke out shortly before midnight. The fire department arrived soon thereafter. At that time two plastic containers were discovered, one of which contained a flammable liquid. By 4:00 a. m. the fire was extinguished. At 8:00 a. m. fire officials returned and briefly surveyed the scene of the fire. They again returned between 9:00 and 9:30 a. m., at which time certain evidence indicative of arson was taken. There were subsequent searches of the premises at various times during the next three weeks. Evidence obtained as a result of these warrantless searches was admitted at trial. The Court found that evidence seized after the fire had been extinguished should have been suppressed. It held:

"If there has been a fire, the blaze extinguished and the firefighters have left the premises, a warrant is required to reenter and search the premises, unless there is consent or the premises have been abandoned." Id., at 583, 250 N.W.2d at 477.

On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the decision was affirmed. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). However, that Court disagreed as to the need for a warrant in the initial searches:

"Although the Michigan Supreme Court appears to have accepted this principle, its opinion may be read as holding that the exigency justifying a warrantless entry to fight a fire ends, and the need to get a warrant begins, with the dousing of the last flame. 399 Mich., at 579, 250 N.W.2d, at 475. We think this view of the firefighting function is unrealistically narrow, however. Fire officials are charged not only with extinguishing fires, but with finding their causes. Prompt determination of the fire's origin may be necessary to prevent its [94 MICHAPP 38] recurrence, as through the detection of continuing dangers such...