People v. Felella

• Decision Date: 20 September 1989
• Docket Number: No. 66444,66444
• Citation: 137 Ill.Dec. 547,131 Ill.2d 525,546 N.E.2d 492
• Parties: , 137 Ill.Dec. 547 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Lee C. FELELLA, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 492

546 N.E.2d 492

131 Ill.2d 525, 137 Ill.Dec. 547

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Lee C. FELELLA, Appellee.

No. 66444.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 20, 1989.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 1989.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Richard M. Daley and Cecil A. Partee, State's Attys. (Terence M. Madsen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Kenneth T. McCurry, Susan J. Crane, Patrick M. Brady, Inge Fryklund, Marie Quinlivan Czech and James E. Fitzgerald, Asst. State's Attys., counsel), for People.

John M. Kalnins, Chicago, for appellee.

George M. Elsener, George M. Elsener & Associates, Chicago, for amicus curiae Alliance Against Intoxicated Motorists.

Chief Justice MORAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Lee C. Felella, was indicted in the circuit court of Cook County for the murder (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2)) of Robert Stegan. He waived his right to a jury and following a bench trial was convicted of voluntary manslaughter (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 9-2(b)). At the sentencing hearing, Stegan's mother testified about the emotional and physical impact she suffered as a result of her son's death. The defendant was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment. The appellate court, in a Rule 23 order (107 Ill.2d R. 23), affirmed defendant's conviction, but vacated the sentence because of "the very real possibility that the mother's testimony was taken into account in assessing the sentence." (163 Ill.App.3d 1156, 124 Ill.Dec. 384, 529 N.E.2d 101 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).) We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill.2d R. 315), and allowed the Alliance Against Intoxicated Motorists to file a brief as amicus curiae in support of the State. 107 Ill.2d R. 345.

An issue presented for review is whether the mother's testimony should have been introduced at the sentencing stage of defendant's noncapital felony trial, pursuant to the Bill of Rights for Victims and Witnesses of Violent Crime Act (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 1401 et seq.). Defendant on a cross-appeal contests the sufficiency of the evidence as to his manslaughter conviction.

The record reveals that defendant fatally stabbed Stegan, who was unarmed, with an eight-inch martial arts knife. It was stipulated that Stegan died from a stab wound to the heart and tested negative for drugs commonly known as "mushrooms."

The record also reveals that defendant and his brother, Fred, met Stegan on the morning of July 3, 1984, at Lonnie Nelson's house in Chicago. Nelson, Stegan, defendant and defendant's brother then went to Stegan's house, about a block away, where they drank beer. Stegan agreed to drive defendant and his brother to Franklin Park, Illinois. A short time later, Stegan, defendant and defendant's brother left in Stegan's pickup truck.

On the way to Franklin Park they stopped at a liquor store to buy more beer. While in the liquor store parking lot, defendant removed the martial arts knife from his bag to repair the truck's stereo. The knife was used by both Stegan and the defendant to strip the plastic casing off the stereo wires. After using the knife, defendant placed the open knife on the seat of the truck, where it remained throughout the day. During the trip to Franklin Park, Stegan drank beer and, allegedly, ate hallucinogenic mushrooms.

After dropping defendant's brother off in Franklin Park, Stegan and defendant were to return to Chicago. Rather than returning directly to Chicago, Stegan drove to an apartment complex in Schiller Park, Illinois, where he met Lester Hermes, a former co-worker.

On the return trip to Chicago, Stegan allegedly slammed his watch into the dashboard of the truck and tried to "punch" defendant. Stegan also allegedly told defendant that he would "kick [his] ass."

Lonnie Nelson testified that at 7 or 7:30 p.m. that evening, he and Daniel Killian were sitting on his porch when defendant drove up in the truck with Stegan in the passenger seat. Defendant stopped the truck in the middle of the street in front of Nelson's house. He said the two men were arguing about defendant's "water bong," which was described as marijuana paraphernalia. Defendant left the truck and took the keys with him. Stegan moved over to the driver's side and exited the truck. Defendant then threw the keys into some bushes, which prompted Stegan to ask why he did so. The two resumed arguing about the "bong" and defendant said he would not help find the keys. Nelson further testified that he believed Stegan grabbed defendant by the shoulder, not to throw him down, but just to get his keys back. Stegan told defendant, "I'll kill you, you are shaking so bad." Nelson said that at this point defendant asked him for help, but he replied that he was not going to interfere. He further stated that defendant then pulled a knife from his right pocket, stabbed Stegan in the heart and ran away. He said that he had seen the defendant playing with the knife on several previous occasions, and that defendant had told him he attended a martial arts school. He also said that Stegan never had a weapon in his hands during this time.

Daniel Killian testified as follows: he corroborated Nelson's testimony and added that both Stegan and defendant were pushing one another after they left the truck; he saw the knife in defendant's hand after Nelson told defendant that he would not get involved; he saw defendant reach out his arm, stab Stegan, pull the knife back and run; and he did not see any weapons in Stegan's hands. He further testified that he too had seen defendant playing with the knife at least once before; that when Stegan commented that he could kill defendant, Stegan's arms were at his side; and that although defendant was shaking when he requested help, it did not appear as if he needed any help.

Defendant testified that Stegan called him a "wimp" and threatened to kill him and "cut him up like a gook." He also said that Stegan jumped at him after he asked Nelson and Killian for help, and that he put out his hand with the knife in an effort to block Stegan, but instead the knife struck Stegan, after which he dropped the knife and fled. He also admitted that he had a prior felony conviction for burglary in Mississippi.

Defendant argues, in his cross-appeal, that the State failed to prove him guilty of the offense of voluntary manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant contends that Stegan was committing an aggravated battery, which is a forcible felony (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 12-4(b)(8)), and he was therefore entitled to use deadly force to repel Stegan. He argues that he did all he could, short of not using any force to avoid Stegan's threats, by retreating and asking for assistance.

Whether a killing is justified under the law of self-defense is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. (See People v. Woods (1980), 81 Ill.2d 537, 542, 43 Ill.Dec. 733, 410 N.E.2d 866.) That determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. People v. Collins (1985), 106 Ill.2d 237, 261, 87 Ill.Dec. 910, 478 N.E.2d 267.

After hearing the evidence, the trial court found defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Both voluntary manslaughter (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 9-2(b)) and self-defense (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 7-1) involve the issue of whether defendant subjectively believed, at the time of the occurrence in question, that deadly force was justified. The distinguishing feature is the reasonableness of defendant's belief: if the defendant's belief as to the use of force was unreasonable, the crime should be reduced from murder to manslaughter. People v. O'Neal (1984), 104 Ill.2d 399, 405, 84 Ill.Dec. 481, 472 N.E.2d 441.

The long-standing rule is that mere threats of personal injury or death do not justify taking the life of the person making the threats when he is doing nothing to put them into execution. (See People v. Golson (1945), 392 Ill. 252, 255-56, 64 N.E.2d 462.) Similarly, the use of foul or abusive language is no reason for taking another's life. People v. Marrow (1949), 403 Ill. 69, 75, 85 N.E.2d 34.

The testimony at trial was conflicting. Consequently, the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses testify, was entitled to weigh their credibility, draw reasonable inferences from their testimony, and resolve conflicts in the evidence in determining the reasonableness of defendant's action in killing the deceased. (People v. Slim (1989), 127 Ill.2d 302, 307, 130 Ill.Dec. 250, 537 N.E.2d 317.) Where the evidence is conflicting, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Woods, 81 Ill.2d at 542, 43 Ill.Dec. 733, 410 N.E.2d 866.

Defendant's claim of being an innocent victim conflicted with the testimony of Nelson and Killian. Additionally, although defendant asserted that he stabbed Stegan because he was afraid, on cross-examination he admitted that Stegan could have used the open knife that lay on the seat of the truck to make good his threats, but did not do so.

After reviewing the record, it cannot be said that the trial court's verdict is so unreasonable, improbable or unsatisfactory as to raise a doubt about defendant's guilt.

The next issue is whether the mother's testimony about the impact of her son's death should have been introduced at the sentencing phase of defendant's trial. The State asserts that the appellate court improperly applied the holding of Booth v. Maryland (1987), 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440, to this noncapital case. The State argues that Booth held only that victim impact statements should not be considered in capital sentencing hearings. The State also maintains that applying Booth to noncapital felony cases would disregard one of the rights accorded a victim under the Act (...