People v. Felix
| Decision Date | 26 July 1996 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 4-95-0607 and 4-95-0608,s. 4-95-0607 and 4-95-0608 |
| Citation | 218 Ill.Dec. 160,668 N.E.2d 644,282 Ill.App.3d 621 |
| Parties | , 218 Ill.Dec. 160 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Erik FELIX, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael D. Clary, State's Attorney, Danville, Norbert J. Goetten Director, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Robert J. Biderman, Depty. Dir., State's Attorney Aplt. Prosecutor, David E. Mannchen, Staff Attorney, State's Attorney Aplt. Prosecutor, Springfield, for People.
Randall Brinegar, Danville, for Erik Felix.
In these consolidated cases, the trial court dismissed unrelated felony drug charges against defendant, Erik Felix, because (in each case) the State successfully sought forfeiture of defendant's cash and other property that was allegedly connected to the drug charges. In each case, the court held that the forfeitures barred prosecution, pursuant to the provisions of the United States and Illinois Constitutions which prohibit double jeopardy (U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 10).
The State appeals, and we reverse.
In March 1994, police seized $1,800 in cash and 1.6 grams of cocaine as a result of an investigation that ultimately led to felony drug charges against defendant. In June 1994, the State filed a complaint seeking forfeiture of the cash and cocaine pursuant to the provisions of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Controlled Substances Act) (720 ILCS 570/505 (West 1992)) and the Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (Forfeiture Act) (725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1992)). The complaint alleged that the cash was subject to forfeiture because (1) defendant used it or intended to use it to facilitate a violation of the Controlled Substances Act; or (2) it represented proceeds from violations of the Controlled Substances Act (725 ILCS 150/7(1) (West 1992)). In August 1994, a grand jury charged defendant with delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2), (d) (West 1992)), and defendant filed a claim contesting forfeiture of the cash.
In December 1994, the trial court held a hearing on the forfeiture of the $1,800 cash, and in February 1995, the court entered a written order forfeiting the cash to the State.
In May 1995, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the asset forfeiture constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes and any subsequent prosecution for the same offense violated the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions.
In August 1994, police arrested defendant and charged him with unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(c) (West 1992)). As a result of that arrest, the State seized $633 cash, a cellular phone, a pager, and a vehicle. In November 1994, the State sought forfeiture of the seized items under the Controlled Substances Act and the Forfeiture Act.
In January 1995, defendant filed a claim contesting forfeiture of the $633 cash, the cellular phone, the pager, and the vehicle. In March 1995, by agreed order, the trial court entered judgment for the State regarding the $633 cash and the cellular phone. The remaining property was returned to defendant.
In June 1995, defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the asset forfeiture constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes and any subsequent prosecution for the same offense violated the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions.
The trial court consolidated this case and that underlying our case No. 4-95-0607, and, in July 1995, allowed defendant's motions.
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const., amend. V. Protections against double jeopardy are similarly guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution of 1970, which provides that "[n]o person shall be * * * twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 10. In his motions to dismiss, defendant relied on both the federal and state constitutions. Neither the State nor defendant has argued, however, that a double jeopardy analysis under the state constitution should differ from such an analysis under the federal constitution. Therefore, we analyze the issue before us only under the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the federal constitution.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 496 (1989). The present cases address the third of these protections, multiple punishments for the same offense.
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that double jeopardy does not preclude the imposition of both a criminal and a civil sanction with respect to the same act, provided that the civil sanction does not constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 450, 109 S.Ct. at 1903, 104 L.Ed.2d at 503; In re P.S., 169 Ill.2d 260, 272-73, 214 Ill.Dec. 475, 481-82, 661 N.E.2d 329, 335-36 (1996). Thus, to resolve the question presented in this appeal, we must determine whether the asset forfeitures in the present cases constitute punishment. The recent Supreme Court opinion in United States v. Ursery, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), guides our analysis. In Ursery, the Court reaffirmed its traditional understanding that in rem civil forfeitures, as in the present cases, do not constitute "punishment" for the purpose of the double jeopardy clause. Ursery, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2148, 135 L.Ed.2d at ----. Consistent with that reaffirmation, we reverse the dismissals in these cases because they were based upon in rem civil forfeitures.
In Ursery, the Court provided an historical overview of its civil forfeiture cases, stating as follows:
Ursery, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2142, 135 L.Ed.2d at ----.
The Court specifically reaffirmed its unanimous decision in Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 51 S.Ct. 282, 75 L.Ed. 558 (1931), in which the Court held as follows:
" " (Emphasis in original.) Ursery, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2140, 135 L.Ed.2d at ----, quoting Various Items, 282 U.S. at 581, 51 S.Ct. at 284, 75 L.Ed. at 561.
The Court in Ursery also distinguished three of its cases upon which numerous federal and state courts premised their holdings that asset forfeiture could constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes (see appendix). First, the Supreme Court distinguished Halper on the ground that it involved a civil penalty (a statutory penalty imposed pursuant to the false claims statute (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1982)), not a civil forfeiture. Ursery, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2144, 135 L.Ed.2d at ----. Second, the Court stated that its decision in Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), addressed only whether a civil forfeiture could violate the excessive fines clause of the federal constitution (U.S. Const. amend. 8) and did not concern the double jeopardy clause at all. Ursery, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2144, 135 L.Ed.2d at ----. Third, the Court explained that it based its finding of double jeopardy in Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994), on the "penal and prohibitory intent" of the drug tax ( that only a person charged with a criminal offense was subject to the tax, and the taxpayer did not possess or own the drugs when the tax was assessed), which made the tax proceeding the " 'functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution.' " Ursery, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2144, 135 L.Ed.2d at ----, quoting Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1959, 128 L.Ed.2d at 795.
The Supreme Court's decision in Ursery makes clear that in rem civil forfeitures do not implicate double jeopardy. The Court's holding implicitly overrules P.S., in which the Supreme Court of Illinois determined that asset forfeitures could constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes. P.S., 169 Ill.2d at 282, 214 Ill.Dec. at 486, 661 N.E.2d at 340. The Supreme Court of Illinois relied in P.S. upon Halper, Kurth Ranch, and particularly Austin, noting--consistent with the holdings of many courts from other jurisdictions--that "[a] fair reading of Austin is that it resolves the 'punishment' issue with respect to forfeitures for double jeopardy purposes." P.S., 169 Ill.2d at 285, 214 Ill.Dec. at 487, 661 N.E.2d at 341.
In P.S., the Supreme Court of Illinois explicitly overruled People v. 1988 Mercury Cougar, 154 Ill.2d 27, 180 Ill.Dec. 323, 607 N.E.2d 217 (1992), which had previously...
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... ... 1988 Mercury Cougar, 154 Ill.2d 27, 180 Ill.Dec. 323, 607 N.E.2d 217 (1992) (forfeiture proceeding against instrumentality of a crime is civil and in rem in nature and precludes double jeopardy protection; forfeiture is remedial). See People v. Felix, 282 Ill.App.3d 621, 218 Ill.Dec. 160, 668 N.E.2d 644 (1996) (finding that Mercury Cougar, which was overruled in P.S., now again correctly embodies the law following Ursery ) ... B. Punitive Effect Despite Legislative Intent ... Under the second prong of the 89 Firearms test, we ... ...