People v. Fern

• Decision Date: 18 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. 86154.,86154.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Jay Harry FERN, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

723 N.E.2d 207

189 Ill.2d 48

243 Ill.Dec. 175

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Jay Harry FERN, Appellant.

No. 86154.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

November 18, 1999.

Rehearing Denied January 31, 2000.

Gary Senner, Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal, Elissa L. Isaacs, Rudnick & Wolfe, Chicago, for Jay Harry Fern.

State's Attorneys App. Pros., Elgin, Jay Paul Hoffman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, State's Attorney McHenry County, Woodstock, for the People.

Justice BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:

The issue in this appeal is whether the propriety of a criminal sentence may be judged by comparing it to the sentences imposed on defendants in other cases. We hold that the excessiveness of a sentence may not be determined from a consideration of the sentences imposed on defendants in separate, unrelated cases.

FACTS

Defendant, Jay Harry Fern, was charged in the circuit court of McHenry County with the unlawful delivery of 250 grams of cocaine. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 56½, par. 1401(a)(2). This offense carried a sentencing range of 9 to 40 years' imprisonment. Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 56½, par. 1401(a)(2)(B). Defendant entered an open plea of guilty and was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment.

Defendant thereafter filed a motion to reconsider his sentence pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (145 Ill.2d R. 604(d)). Defendant argued that his 25-year sentence was excessive because it failed to account for his rehabilitative potential. In this regard, defendant noted his long marriage, his three children, and his consistent employment history. Defendant also pointed out that he had only one prior conviction, and that he had accepted responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty.

Defendant also argued that his sentence was excessive when compared to the sentences imposed on defendants in other cases for the same or more serious drug offenses. Defendant included a chart of Illinois decisions in which a person convicted of the same or a more serious drug crime was given a sentence shorter than that given to defendant in this case. Based on this comparative information, defendant argued that his sentence was excessive and "should be reduced to bring it in line with sentences for comparable offenses." The State moved to strike the portion of defendant's motion that asserted his "comparative sentencing" analysis. The State asserted that such an analysis was not a valid basis for judging the propriety of a sentence. The circuit court granted the State's motion to strike. The circuit court subsequently denied defendant's motion to reconsider his sentence.

The appellate court affirmed the circuit court. The appellate court rejected defendant's comparative sentencing analysis. The court reaffirmed its previous decisions declining to use a comparative sentencing analysis in evaluating the propriety of a sentence. The court noted, however, that appellate court decisions from other districts had used sentencing information from similar cases to determine whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. No. 2-97-0917 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315. We now affirm the appellate court.

ANALYSIS

Defendant contends that the circuit court erred in striking his comparative sentencing argument. He asserts that courts, if presented with comparative sentencing information, must consider it and act on it where the information reveals "an unexplainable and gross disparity." Defendant asks this court to reduce his sentence on the ground that it is "inexplicably and grossly disparate and excessive when compared to sentences imposed on numerous similarly-situated defendants." The issue we must decide, therefore, is whether the excessiveness of a sentence may be determined from a consideration of the sentences imposed on defendants in separate, unrelated cases. We now hold that such information is not a proper basis for judging the excessiveness of a sentence.

A brief review of our state's sentencing structure is necessary. The legislature sets forth by statute the range of permissible sentences for each class of criminal offense. The statutory sentencing scheme is intended to advance four purposes: (1) to prescribe sanctions proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and permit the recognition of differences in rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders; (2) to forbid and prevent the commission of offenses; (3) to prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons adjudicated offenders or delinquents; and (4) to restore offenders to useful citizenship. 730 ILCS 5/1-1-2 (West 1998).

Although the legislature has prescribed the permissible ranges of sentences, great discretion still resides in the trial judge in each case to fashion an appropriate sentence within the statutory limits. People v. Wilson, 143 Ill.2d 236, 250, 157 Ill.Dec. 473, 572 N.E.2d 937 (1991); People v. James, 118 Ill.2d 214, 228, 113 Ill.Dec. 86, 514 N.E.2d 998 (1987). The trial court must base its sentencing determination on the particular circumstances of each case, considering such factors as the defendant's credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. People v. Streit, 142 Ill.2d 13, 19, 153 Ill.Dec. 245, 566 N.E.2d 1351 (1991); People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill.2d 149, 154, 11 Ill.Dec. 274, 368 N.E.2d 882 (1977). A reviewing court gives great deference to the trial court's judgment regarding sentencing because the trial judge, having observed the defendant and the proceedings, has a far better opportunity to consider these factors than the reviewing court, which must rely on the "cold" record. Streit, 142 Ill.2d at 18-19, 153 Ill.Dec. 245, 566 N.E.2d 1351; Perruquet, 68 Ill.2d at 154, 11 Ill.Dec. 274, 368 N.E.2d 882.

In considering the propriety of a sentence, the reviewing court must proceed with great caution and must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed the factors differently. Streit, 142 Ill.2d at 19,153 Ill.Dec. 245,566 N.E.2d 1351; James, 118 Ill.2d at 228, 113 Ill.Dec. 86, 514 N.E.2d 998. A sentence within statutory limits will not be deemed excessive unless it is greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. People v. Cabrera, 116 Ill.2d 474, 493-94, 108 Ill.Dec. 397, 508 N.E.2d 708 (1987).

Defendant contends that the excessiveness of a sentence may properly be judged by comparing it to the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants in other cases. He asserts that a sentence cannot be permitted to stand when it is grossly disparate in comparison to the sentences imposed on such similarly situated defendants. Defendant states, however, that he does not seek a requirement that courts independently conduct comparative sentencing analyses. Rather, defendant contends that courts must conduct such an analysis if the parties provide comparative sentencing information. The State, on the other hand, argues that allowing the type of comparative sentencing analysis urged by defendant would interfere with the intended operation and purpose of sentencing.

This court has not directly addressed this issue. Several districts of our appellate court have considered the question, with differing results. Decisions out of the Fourth and Second Districts have refused to apply a comparative sentencing analysis in considering the excessiveness of a sentence. See People v. Thornton, 286 Ill. App.3d 624, 636, 222 Ill.Dec. 60, 676 N.E.2d 1024 (1997) (refusing to compare the defendant's sentence to that imposed in a separate case); People v. Bien, 277 Ill.App.3d 744, 753-55, 214 Ill.Dec. 657, 661 N.E.2d 511 (1996) (same); People v. Lintz, 245 Ill.App.3d 658, 669, 185 Ill.Dec. 807, 615 N.E.2d 366 (1993) (same); People v. Terneus, 239 Ill.App.3d 669, 675-78, 180 Ill.Dec. 499, 607 N.E.2d 568 (1992) (same); People v. Welsh, 99 Ill.App.3d 470, 471, 54 Ill.Dec. 541, 425 N.E.2d 53 (1981) (affirming trial court's refusal to consider comparative sentencing information in imposing sentence); People v. Brown, 103 Ill. App.3d 306, 309, 59 Ill.Dec. 24, 431 N.E.2d 43 (1982). The Third District of the Appellate Court has reached seemingly contrary conclusions on this issue. Compare People v. Conaway, 101 Ill.App.3d 202, 204, 56 Ill.Dec. 756, 427 N.E.2d 1302 (1981) (affirming a trial court's refusal, in sentencing the defendant, to consider the milder sentence imposed on another person), with People v. Martin, 58 Ill.App.3d 915, 16 Ill.Dec. 381, 374 N.E.2d 1156 (1978) (although acknowledging that each case must be judged on its own peculiar facts, reviewing the cases cited by the defendants and finding that the defendants' sentences were "comparable to those received by defendants in other cases"). The First District applied a comparative sentencing analysis in reviewing the excessiveness of a sentence in People v. Harris, 187 Ill. App.3d 832, 135 Ill.Dec. 291, 543 N.E.2d 859 (1989); see also People v. Norfleet, 259 Ill.App.3d 381, 396, 197 Ill.Dec. 107, 630 N.E.2d 1231 (1994) (finding that defendant's sentence "greatly exceeded" those imposed in other cases); People v. Neither, 230 Ill.App.3d 546, 551, 172 Ill.Dec. 61, 595 N.E.2d 124 (1992) (comparing defendant's sentence to that imposed in other cases and finding it excessive).

We agree with those decisions rejecting cross-case comparative sentencing as a basis for challenging a sentence. We find that such an analysis does not comport with our sentencing scheme's goal of individualized sentencing and would unduly interfere with the sentencing discretion vested in our trial courts.

As noted above, the range of sentences permissible for a particular offense is set by statute. Within that statutory range, the trial court is charged with fashioning a sentence based upon the particular circumstances of the individual case,...