People v. Fields

• Decision Date: 26 July 1972
• Docket Number: No. 6,6
• Citation: 199 N.W.2d 217,388 Mich. 66
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew B. FIELDS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 217

199 N.W.2d 217

388 Mich. 66

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew B. FIELDS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 6.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 26, 1972.

William F. Delhey, Pros. Atty., Washtenaw County, for plaintiff-appellee by Karl V. Fink, J.D., Asst. Pros. Atty., Ann Arbor.

Clan Crawford, Jr., Ann Arbor, for defendant-appellant.

Mary Coleman, Judge of Probate, Calhoun County, President, Michigan Probate and Juvenile Court Judges Association, amicus curiae.

Before the Entire Bench.

ADAMS, Justice.

On August 16, 1968, upon a motion by the prosecuting attorney for waiver of jurisdiction of Andrew Fields on petitions for uttering and publishing of checks and breaking and entering, the Probate Judge for Washtenaw County ruled as follows:

'The Court: I rule that, on the testimony that has been presented, that a prima facie case has been made out on both petitions. The question of fact in the situation is something that, of course, has to be proven before a jury or a judge. But the record, as presented by the prosecuting attorney, would, if there were a magistrate, if there were a preliminary examination, would, I am certain, warrant the binding of someone to Circuit Court; if this was presented, that certainly it would be submitted to the jury.

'So I do rule at this time that the matter has been made out.

'The next question is whether or not the Court should retain jurisdiction or whether or not it should waive the jurisdiction to a higher court.

'The basis upon which this is done is contained in Downs, Michigan Juvenile Court: Law and Practice.

'The ultimate question is not solely whether the juvenile may be rehabilitated through the facilities of the Juvenile Court. And the Court, of course, does have the responsibility to determine whether everything that could be done for the individual in the Juvenile Court has been done. Also, whether or not the particular individual is so mature that the facilities of the Juvenile Court cannot aid, and their cases must be referred to criminal courts.

'There are three tests that apply there:

'(1) 'Where the nature of the offense which in itself was of such an obviously adult character as to make the juvenile court inappropriate.

'(b) 'Where the court has made use of every available disposition and the minor has been unamenable to treatment.

'And (c) 'Where the minor whose physical and mental development showed a maturation beyond the calendar age and which made the minor unwilling to accept treatment as a minor.'

'Now, my ruling is that these tests have been met, and I am ordering that the matter be referred to the Circuit Court.

'In support of that ruling, I will give you the reason for it.

"Where the nature of the offense was in itself of such an obviously adult character as to make the juvenile court inappropriate.' I think it has been shown, after all, that this was not just a case of sudden impulse. This was a rather planned breaking and entering; that the theft was not of money but of a check protector; the developing of the checks; the writing of them, all of this is, in my judgment, of a mature character, to make the Juvenile Court inappropriate.

'It is mature.

"Where the court has made use of every available disposition and the minor has been unamenable to treatment.' We have had Andy on probation for years. He has not responded to it. It is true there is one facility which the Court would not use, that is the training school. I will go into that in a moment. That would be the only thing that is left, if there were a conviction in this case.

'Second, A minor whose physical and mental development showed a maturation beyond calendar age and which made the minor unwilling to accept treatment as a minor. After all, the record has shown he is over 15 years old, very close to 17 years old; he is married; and his response, actually, to the efforts that the Court has made, the social worker has made, has not been effective.

'But I think beyond that, the defendant did, it was indicated in the previous hearings, feel that a trial was necessary. I think we should recognize there is a denial and a demand for trial. I think the question whether this Court can give him the type of trial that this particular serious matter deserves. And I cannot, under the law, provide for a jury trial, other than by a six-juror panel. Six people determined by the sheriff's department. On the other hand, the Circuit Court does have the authority to offer him a trial by a jury of 12 people, under the provisions of the Circuit Court.

'In the previous hearing, it was stated here that the desire was for an open court, a 12-man jury, and for one open to the news media. Of course, this is inconsistent with the philosophy, and for the ability, actually, of the Juvenile Court to provide. If the ultimate decision in this case, trial in this case, results in an acquittal, certainly the court that is best equipped to provide the fairest trial, that of a 12-man jury, should be afforded.

'Now, on the other hand, if it should result in a conviction, the only this (sic) this Court could do, if it should remain in Juvenile Court, the only disposition left would be commitment to the training school. And this would mean that I would have to commit a person close to 17, who is married, whom, I understand, his wife is expecting a baby, to the training school. I would have no other alternative because the probationary order has not proven effective. Secondly, the other possibility, of course, would be a school like Boy's Republic. This, I think, would be rejected, at least.

'On the other hand, if the allegations were sustained in the Circuit Court, then they do have the facilities of adult probation, also the provisions relative to adult young offenders, which would, of course, be a responsibility of the judge in the Circuit Court to make whatever disposition he felt appropriate, but he does have these facilities that this Court does not have.

'I regret it when I say that there has not been more response to the efforts that have been made, and the efforts of Mr. Newhouse, but since there were not, since we have a serious matter before us, since there is a denial and since there are limitations upon which this Court could do as far as Andrew Fields is concerned, the order is that the matter be waived to Circuit Court in both cases.'

The issue as to whether the Probate Judge had authority to waive Andrew B. Fields to circuit court for trial as an adult was considered by the circuit court. On December 27, 1968, that court held:

'* * * There is a question in the Court's mind whether or not the fact that the statute does not set forth any guide-lines for the juvenile judge to follow in making a decision as to whether or not to waive the minor to circuit court for trial to some extent bothers the Court as to whether or not it is a constitutional statute. * * *. * * * I think in view of the fact that Judge O'Brien did make his findings and that the findings comply with the reasons given in the Kent case, that, therefore, the Court will have to find that the statute under which Mr. Fields was bound over in this case does comply with the necessary constitutional requirements * * *.'

On April 24, 1969, the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. On January 26, 1970, this Court granted leave and remanded the matter to the Court of Appeals for a determination as on grant by that court of defendant's application for leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals (30 Mich.App. 390, p. 392, 186 N.W.2d 15, p. 16) held that:

'Although the Kent decision (Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84) enunciated certain standards which must be met in order to satisfy the requirements of due process and fairness, the Court did not hold that a statute which failed to enumerate the standards is constitutionally defective.'

The Court concluded (p. 393, 186 N.W.2d p. 16):

'After a careful review of the record, we are of the opinion that the waiver proceedings in the instant case were in accord with the basic requirements of due process and fairness, as well as our juvenile court act.'

Application for leave to appeal to this Court, filed March 4, 1971, stated:

'The sole issue involved in this litigation is whether or not the statute allowing probate courts to waive jurisdiction over certain juveniles is void on its face, and the attack is based solely on the theory that the statute is void because it lacks standards for determining whether or not the probate court should waive jurisdiction. * * *

'The legislature, by Act 288, P.A.1939 (Sec. 27.3178(598.1) et seq. Mich.Stats.Anno.) sought to protect juveniles from the consequences of prosecution in our criminal courts by setting up the juvenile court system. Whether or not a probate judge has power to deny a particular juvenile the advantages of the protection of the statute is certainly a matter of major significance to the jurisprudence of Michigan.'

In an Amicus Curiae Brief of Michigan Probate and Juvenile Court Judges Association filed by Mary Coleman, Judge of Probate of Calhoun County and President of said Association, the issue in this case is succinctly stated as follows:

'The principal issue being argued in this case is the extent to which the legislature may delegate power to another body or agency. Such delegation must include sufficient standards so as to obviate any delegation of legislative power. The legislature may not delegate the power to make laws.' (Emphasis added.)

The statute with which we are concerned (M.C.L.A. § 712A.4; M.S.A. § 27.3178(598.4)) states:

'In any case where a child over the age of 15 years is accused of any act the nature of which constitutes a felony, the judge of probate of the county wherein the offense is alleged to have been committed may, after investigation and examination, including notice to parents if address is known, and upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, waive...