People v. Fields

• Decision Date: 19 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 8,8
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew B. FIELDS, Defendant-Appellant. 391 Mich. 206, 216 N.W.2d 51
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 51

216 N.W.2d 51

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew B. FIELDS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 8.

391 Mich. 206, 216 N.W.2d 51

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 19, 1974.

[391 MICH 212] William F. Delhey, Saline, for plaintiff-appellee.

Clan Crawford Jr., Ann Arbor, for defendant-appellant.

Before the Entire Bench (except COLEMAN and FITZGERALD, JJ.).

ON REHEARING

T. M. KAVANAGH, Chief Justice.

In December, 1968 the Circuit Court of Washtenaw County ruled that M.C.L.A. § 712A.4; M.S.A. § 27.3178(598.4), allowing the probate court to waive jurisdiction over certain juveniles, thus allowing them to be tried as adults, was not unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals, upon remand from this Court, upheld this decision. 30 Mich.App. 390, 186 N.W.2d 15 (1971). This Court granted leave and entered a decision reversing these lower courts. 388 Mich. 66, 199 N.W.2d 217 (1972). Rehearing was granted and the case was again before us for decision. Justices Black and Adams each circulated proposed opinions. Before final decision, the terms of Justices Black and Adams on the Court expired.

On January 22, 1973, on the Court's own motion, the Court granted rehearing without oral argument and upon the briefs previously filed. We hereby adopt the opinion of Justice Adams, circulated November 20, 1972. This author has added footnotes 3 and 4 to bring the opinion to date and has changed the wording in the third sentence from the end on page 55, but not the content thereof.

Justice Black, in the opening paragraph of his first opinion in this case (People v. Fields, 388 Mich. 66, 199 N.W.2d 217 (1972)), stated the issue as follows:

'The reviewable question is whether 1948 CL 712A.4; MSA 27.3178(598.4) is unconstitutional for Want of standards governing probate determination of how a juvenile over the age of 15 years, accused of any act the nature of which constitutes a 'felony, may be waived to circuit court for trial.' (Emphasis added.)

Judge Mary Coleman, in her Amicus Curiae brief of Michigan Probate and Juvenile Court Judges Association, stated the issue as follows:

'The principal issue being argued in this case is the extent to which the legislature may delegate power to another body or agency. Such delegation must include Sufficient standards so as to obviate any delegation of legislative power. The legislature may not delegate the power to make laws.' (Emphasis added.)

In my first opinion (People v. Fields, 388 Mich. 66, 199 N.W.2d 217 (1972)), I said (p. 75, 199 N.W.2d p. 221):

'It is important to understand the precise issue in this case. It is Not whether the constitutional requirements of due process stated in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), were met. Rather, it is whether the Lack of standards in the statute preclude a waiver proceeding.' (Emphasis added.)

At this time, it is necessary to state what is not involved in this case because so much has been written that tends to obfuscate the issue. This case was decided by Probate Judge O'Brien on August 16, 1968. The Juvenile Court Rules of 1969 were adopted December 5, 1968 and went into effect March 1, 1969. The Juvenile Court Rules were not in effect when this case was decided by the probate judge. They have no application to the issue in this case.

It is true that, among other reasons, the Juvenile Court Rules of 1969 were written in response to Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). The study draft of Rule 11, circulated to the committee in January 1968 notes as follows:

'Provision for a finding of probable cause in a waiver proceeding appears in Green v. United States (113 U.S.App.D.C. 348) 308 F.2d 303 (1962) and appeared to be the conclusion of conference and committee discussion. Notice provisions are drawn from requirements of the Gault case, And provisions for the right to counsel, access to social records, and written statements of findings from Kent v. U.S. (1966) 383 U.S. 541 (86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84).' ¹ (Emphasis added.)

While this Court cannot enact substantive laws, it does have the authority to decide upon the procedures to be followed in the courts of this state. Such authority has been exercised by adopting the General Court Rules for courts of general jurisdiction, the District Court Rules for the district courts, and the Juvenile Court Rules. Being fully cognizant of the problems created by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Kent, supra and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), the Probate Court Committee of this Court, of which I was then chairman, undertook with the help of the probate judges, to insure Procedural due process in the handling of juvenile court cases. Any question pertaining to JCR 1969, 11, is not before the Court in this case since it was not in effect at the time the action of the probate judge herein reviewed took place.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the issue in this case was framed in terms of standards rather than in the more usual terminology used to attack an ambiguous or unclear statute--void because of vagueness or overbreadth. The fundamental question revolves around the concept that ours is a government of laws and not of men. If we have a viable law that can be applied by the probate judges of this state, the decision of the lower courts should be upheld. On the other hand, if the law is so vague that its application is nothing more than a Carte blanche grant of discretion to each probate judge to exercise his own wisdom and compassion as to what he thinks should be done in each case that comes before him upon a request for waiver, the previous decision of this Court was correct and should be reaffirmed.

Review is an essential part of the judicial process. While a vast majority of cases, both criminal and civil, are decided by a single judge, an all-important element in the decision making process is the everpresent possibility in every case that the decision of a judge will be subjected to appellate review. If that possibility is removed, the judge becomes a monarch from whose ruling-- good, bad of indifferent--there is no recourse. As was said in Kent, supra (p. 561 of 383 U.S., p. 1057 of 86 S.Ct.):

'Meaningful review required that the reviewing court should review. It should not be remitted to assumptions. It must have before it a statement of the reasons motivating the waiver including, of course, a statement of the relevant facts. It may not 'assume' that there are adequate reasons, nor may it merely assume that 'full investigation' has been made.'

Under the statute, the provisions of which I discussed at length in my first opinion, the law leaves it solely up to the judgment of each probate judge to formulate his own criteria. The basis for waiver could be as varied as the number of probate judges. For example, see Appendix A setting forth three possible sets of standards.

The difficulty with the statute has been overcome by the enactment of 1972 P.A. 265; M.C.L.A. § 712A.4; M.S.A. § 27.3178(598.4).

There remains the question as to whether the decision of this Court should be given retroactive or prospective effect. Volumes have been written on this subject. ² We are concerned with the constitutionality of a statute in which the decision by a probate-juvenile judge, under the statute, can result in a person, classified as a juvenile, being waived from that classification and treated as an adult in a prosecution for a criminal offense. Some legal scholars adhere to the theory that once such a statute is declared to be unconstitutional, the court must also find that it was void and of no effect from the time of enactment. Others feel that the court finding can be given just prospective effect.

In O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 89 S.Ct. 1683, 23 L.Ed.2d 291 (1969), the United States Supreme Court held that military courts lacked the authority to try a soldier who, while temporarily freed of military responsibility, had been charged with a crime cognizable in a civilian court. The issue of retroactivity of this decision came before the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in Gosa v. Mayden, Warden, 450 F.2d 753 (CA 5, 1971). Judge Clark, writing the majority opinion, said (p. 758):

'It has always been the law that proceedings of a court which is without jurisdiction of the subject matter are void, but does this inevitably lead to the necessity for full retrospective application of the court decision which first discovers and announces the jurisdictional deficit? We hold it does not.'

In analyzing the question as applied to

'The issue * * * is not whether

'The issue * * * is not whether the accused could be tried at all, but which forum had the right to conduct the proceedings. Not whether, but where.'

Judge Clark applied the tests for refusing retroactive application set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967). Applying the 'purpose of the new standard test', he concluded 'that O'Callahan ultimately decides no more on this subject (jurisdiction) than that there is a belief that a civilian court trial with grand and petit jury protections would tend to prevent arbitrariness and repression and be fairer.' Applying the 'justified reliance on the old standard test', he noted that the O'Callahan decision had not been foreshadowed in other opinions. Applying the 'effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application (test)', he noted that the number of cases which conceivably might be affected and the administrative problems which could arise from them were so considerable as to militate against givin the decision retrospective effect. The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari (June 19, 1972), 407 U.S. 920, 92 S.Ct. 2467, 32 L.Ed.2d 805 (1972). ³

In United States of America ex rel. Flemings v. Chafee, 458 F.2d 544 (CA 2, 1972), the United States Court of Appeals,...