People v. Fin. Cas. & Sur., Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 May 2021
• Docket Number: B297049
• Citation: 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 710,64 Cal.App.5th 405
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY, INC., Defendant and Appellant.

64 Cal.App.5th 405

278 Cal.Rptr.3d 710

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY, INC., Defendant and Appellant.

B297049

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Filed May 17, 2021

Law Office of John Rorabaugh, Crystal L. Rorabaugh, Santa Ana, and John Mark Rorabaugh, Fresno, for Defendant and Appellant.

Office of the County Counsel, Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, Acting County Counsel, Adrian G. Gragas, Assistant County Counsel, and Michael J. Gordon, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

WILLHITE, J.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (Financial Casualty) executed a bail bond to secure the release from custody of criminal defendant Jose Geronimomendez, promising to guarantee Geronimomendez's appearance in court or pay $60,000, the amount at which bail had been previously set by the court. After Geronimomendez failed to appear, the trial court ordered the bond forfeited and later signed and entered summary judgment against Financial Casualty on the bond.

Financial Casualty moved to set aside the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d). It argued that the judgment was void because the court failed to inquire into Geronimomendez’ ability to pay bail, as required by In re Humphrey (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1006, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 513 ( Humphrey ), review granted May 23, 2018, ordered to have partial precedential effect August 26, 2020, S247278, affd. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 135, 276 Cal.Rptr.3d 232, 482 P.3d 1008. Financial Casualty did not argue that the court failed to "enter" summary judgment as required by Penal Code section 1306,¹ or that the bond should not be enforced under principles of unconscionability. The court denied the motion on six separate grounds, including that even if Humphrey error had occurred, it did not abrogate Financial Casualty's obligations under the bond.

On appeal from the court's order denying its motion, Financial Casualty contends the court erred because: (1) the court did not "enter" judgment within the 90-day statutory period as set forth under section 1306, subdivisions (a) and (c) ; (2) the court violated Humphrey's requirement in setting bail, rendering the judgment entered on the bond void; and (3) the bail-setting order was an unconscionable contract between Geronimomendez and the state.

We reject these contentions. As reflected on the file-stamped order granting summary judgment, the trial timely entered judgment on the bond. Any failure by the trial court to consider Geronimomendez's ability to pay bail, even if erroneous, did not void the bond or judgment entered thereon. Finally, the unconscionability claim has been forfeited by Financial Casualty's failure to raise it below, and, in any event, the claim is meritless because it is directed at a judicial order rather than a contract. We affirm the orders granting summary judgment and denying the motion to set aside the summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

1. The Judgment on the Bail Bond

In February 2017, the People charged Jose Geronimomendez with possession or purchase for sale of a controlled substance, and transportation or importation of a controlled substance. The trial court set bail in the amount of $60,000 in reliance on the bail schedule without inquiring into his ability to pay.

Financial Casualty executed a bail bond on March 6, 2017. In exchange for the People's release of Geronimomendez from custody, Financial Casualty promised to pay $60,000 if he failed to appear as required by order of the court. Financial Casualty also agreed that if forfeiture of the bond was ordered by the court, judgment could be summarily made and entered against it.

Following his release from custody, on May 26, 2017, Geronimomendez failed to make a required court appearance. The same day, the court ordered bail forfeited and issued a bench warrant. The court mailed notice of forfeiture to Financial Casualty on May 30, 2017. On December 29, 2017, the court granted Financial Casualty's motion to extend the period within which it could seek to exonerate the bond to June 27, 2018.

On June 29, 2018, upon application by the clerk of court, the court signed an order granting the People summary judgment against Financial Casualty in the amount of $60,000 plus court costs. The court signed the judgment as of June 29, 2018. The judgment bears a preprinted file stamp indicating that it was "FILED AND ENTERED" by Jessica Flores, deputy clerk on behalf of "Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk." No date appears on the file stamp.

The same day, a "notice of entry of judgment on forfeited bond and demand for payment" was file-stamped and entered by a deputy clerk and executive officer/clerk. The notice of entry of judgment listed the case number, bond number, date of judgment entered, amount of bond and court costs, the total amount due, and where payment could be made. On July 3, 2018, the court clerk mailed the notice of entry of judgment to Financial Casualty and its bail agent.

2. The Motion to Set Aside the Judgment

On July 31, 2018, Financial Casualty filed a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 to set aside summary judgment, discharge forfeiture, and exonerate bail. Relying on Humphrey , Financial Casualty argued that the court had acted in excess of jurisdiction by setting the amount of bail without inquiring into Geronimomendez's ability to pay.

In opposition to the motion, the People argued that any error in setting bail, including Humphrey error, did not render the bond void or result in exoneration of bail. The People also argued that Financial Casualty lacked standing to assert Geronimomendez's constitutional rights, and Humphrey could not be applied retroactively in the manner requested.

In its reply, Financial Casualty generally repeated the arguments it had made in its motion, and purported to rebut the People's position that it did not have standing to challenge the setting of bail and that Humphrey should not apply retroactively.

At the hearing on its motion, Financial Casualty submitted on the briefing, and the court took the matter under submission.

3. The Trial Court's Ruling

On February 15, 2019, the court denied the motion to set aside the judgment. The court premised its ruling on the following grounds: (1) Humphrey does not "abrogate[ ] the surety's contractual duty to pay the bond amount it is obliged to pay due to Defendant's failure to appear as it guaranteed"; (2) Financial Casualty lacked standing to assert the constitutional rights of Geronimomendez; (3) the Supreme Court's grant of review in Humphrey means it is no longer binding authority; (4) Humphrey did not apply retroactively to cases in which a criminal defendant posted bail and fled; (5) Financial Casualty mischaracterized caselaw for the proposition that the state had conceded its bail system was unconstitutional; and (6) the court lacked authority to rule that another trial judge had erred in setting bail.²

Financial Casualty filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Financial Casualty contends: (1) the trial court lost jurisdiction over the bond because it did not "enter" judgment on the bond; (2) the court's order denying the motion to set aside the judgment was erroneous, because the court had violated Humphrey when setting bail; and (3) the court's bail-setting order constituted an unconscionable contract between Geronimomendez and the state. None of these contentions has merit.

1. Governing Law

"While bail bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal prosecutions, they are independent from and collateral to the prosecutions and are civil in nature. [Citation.] ‘The object of bail and its forfeiture is to insure the attendance of the accused and his obedience to the orders and judgment of the court.’ ... Nevertheless, the ‘bail bond is a contract between the surety and the government whereby the surety acts as a guarantor of the defendant's appearance in court under the risk of forfeiture of the bond.’ " ( People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co . (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 657, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020.)

When a criminal defendant for whom a bail bond has been posted fails without sufficient excuse to appear as required, the trial court must declare a forfeiture of the bond. (§ 1305, subd. (a)(1).) The surety that posted the bond then has a statutory "appearance" period in which to either produce the accused in court and have the forfeiture set aside, or demonstrate other circumstances requiring the court to vacate the forfeiture. (§ 1305, subd. (c)(1); People v. Western Ins. Co . (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1025, 1030, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 479.) For a bond exceeding $400, the appearance period is 185 days (180 days plus five days for service by mail). (§ 1305, subd. (b)(1).) The court may, upon the surety's motion demonstrating good cause, extend the appearance period for up to an additional 180 days. (§ 1305.4.)

When a bond is forfeited and the appearance period lapses without forfeiture having been set aside, the court "shall enter a summary judgment" in the amount of the bond plus costs. ( § 1306, subd. (a).) The clerk of court in which the judgment is rendered must serve notice of entry of judgment on the surety and any of its agents within five days after the date of entry of summary judgment. ( §§ 1306, subd. (b), 1308, subd. (b).) If summary judgment is not entered within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be entered, "the right to do so expires and the bail is exonerated." ( § 1306, subd. (c).)

Ordinarily, we review an order denying a motion to vacate the forfeiture of a bail bond for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1213, 1219, 252 Cal.Rptr.3d 564 ( Financial Casualty ).) When the appellate court is deciding only legal issues, however, it conducts an independent review. ( Ibid . ) If there are factual disputes, "the trial court's findings of fact will be upheld under the abuse of discretion...